MIT 6.7980 · Fall 2026

Topics in Multiagent Learning

This course studies multiagent systems through game theory, optimization, and learning theory. We cover foundational topics such as Nash equilibria, regret minimization, learning dynamics, and extensive-form games.

We also explore modern topics: multiagent deep reinforcement learning; information and mechanism design; team games and hidden-role games; alignment; high-dimensional and kernelized learning; nonconvex games; calibration; and the complexity of finding equilibria. Applications and open research questions connect the theory to multiagent AI.

Two phase portraits of learning dynamics in two-player games, showing strategy updates and marked equilibria.

Schedule & lecture notes

#DateTopicNotes
00

Course Overview

We will discuss the syllabus, projects, administrative details, and an overview of the topics covered.

Part I: Foundations

#DateTopicNotes
01

Setting and equilibria: the Nash equilibrium

Nash's existence theorem and its connection to fixed-point theorems.

02

Brouwer and Sperner

Sperner's lemma, Brouwer's theorem, and combinatorial proofs of equilibrium existence.

03

Properties of Nash equilibrium

Topological and computational properties. Zero-sum games and linear programming. Correlated and coarse correlated equilibria.

04

Learning in games: Foundations

Regret and hindsight rationality. Regret minimization and its relationships with equilibrium concepts.

05

Learning in games: Algorithms

General principles for learning algorithms. Follow-the-leader, regret matching, multiplicative weights, and online mirror descent.

06

Learning with bandit feedback

Partial feedback and exploration. From multiplicative weights to Exp3; regret guarantees.

07

Modeling extensive-form games

Perfect and imperfect information. Kuhn's theorem. Normal-form and sequence-form strategies.

08

Learning in extensive-form games

No-regret learning, counterfactual utilities, and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR).

No classNo classMIT follows a Monday schedule.
09

Multiagent deep RL

Reinforcement learning in games. Self-play and deep learning methods for perfect-information games.

#DateTopicNotes
10 project

Taking stock

We will discuss big open questions in the field and possible project ideas.

Part II: Information, Communication, Alignment

#DateTopicNotes
11

Information and mechanism design

Designing information and incentives in strategic interactions.

12

Team games and hidden-role games

Coordination in teams and games with hidden roles.

13

Alignment (part I)

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and alignment.

14

Alignment (part II)

Regularized RLHF and direct preference optimization (DPO).

Part III: Advanced learning

#DateTopicNotes
15

Forecasting and calibration

Calibrated prediction and its connections to learning in games.

16

High-dimensional games

Learning with large strategy spaces. Kernelized methods and multiplicative weights.

17

Nonconvex games

Nonconvexity, learning dynamics, and local equilibrium concepts.

Part IV: Computational complexity

#DateTopicNotes
18

Total search and TFNP

Total search problems, the TFNP framework, and the PPAD complexity class.

19

PPAD-hardness of Nash equilibrium

Reductions and the computational hardness of finding Nash equilibria.

Project work and presentations

#DateTopicNotes
breakNo classProject break
No classNo classThanksgiving holiday.
20 project

Project presentations

Show us your cool work!

21 project

Project presentations

Show us your cool work!

22 project

Project presentations

Show us your cool work!

23 project

Project presentations

Show us your cool work!

Supplementary reading

Improving Material

We would like to make the lecture notes available to as many people as possible. You can now read them in a browser, follow links between sections and references, and move between the notes and their source. We would like everyone's help to make this a useful resource for learners around the world.

We will divide the class into groups, each focusing on a different part of the material. Using the class GitHub repository, each group can open issues to identify improvements and submit pull requests to implement them. We will improve the material together, reviewing and building on one another's contributions.

Contributions can include clarifying explanations and proofs, fixing errors, adding examples and homework-style exercises for future readers, and polishing figures, organization, and presentation. If anyone is brave enough, we would also love interactive components that let readers experiment with the ideas.

On the bright side, there is no homework! :-) Improving the shared material accounts for 30% of the course grade.

Project

Projects may be completed individually or in groups of 2-5 students and will include a presentation. We will offer three project directions:

Fog of War Chess Challenge. Build and evaluate an agent that plays with partial information. Explore how it uses observations, reasons about uncertainty, and chooses strategic actions. Each bot sandbox is allocated two CPU cores and 4 GiB of memory. A dedicated document will describe the challenge, including the rules, starter code, and how to access the arena.

Modeling questions. Formulate a multiagent problem by specifying the players, objectives, information, and available actions. Study how modeling choices affect the resulting strategic behavior. We will provide a separate document with possible modeling questions and leads to explore.

Theory questions. Investigate a mathematical question about equilibria, learning dynamics, or computational complexity. Develop rigorous proofs, bounds, or counterexamples that clarify the behavior of multiagent systems. We will provide a separate document with possible theory questions and leads to explore.

The project is the central component of the course and accounts for 50% of the final grade. We will therefore be "robust" in our grading: we will look carefully at the depth of your understanding, the quality and substance of your work, and how clearly you explain your results.