Supplementary reading S6
Phi-regret minimization
We saw in earlier lectures the definition of \(\Phi\)-regret. As we have seen, external regret minimization is a very narrow instantiation of \(\Phi\)-regret minimization—perhaps the smallest sensible instantiation. Then, clearly, the problem of coming up with a regret minimizer for a set \(X\) cannot be harder than the problem of coming up with a \(\Phi\)-regret minimizer for \(X\) for richer sets of transformation functions \(\Phi\). It might then seem surprising that there exists a construction that reduces \(\Phi\)-regret minimization to regret minimization. We see this general construction in Section S6.2. First, we start with an example of this principle, whose discovery predates the general construction of Section S6.2, and which happens to be a special case of it.
S6.1 Blum-Mansour’s swap regret minimization algorithm
Let’s start by considering the task of constructing a swap regret minimizer for probability simplex \(X = \Delta^{n}\) over \(n\) actions \(A = \{1,\dots ,n\}\). As we mentioned when discussing learning, when all players in a normal-form game play according to the strategies generated by such an algorithm, the average product strategy converges to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. The swap regret minimization algorithm of [BM07[BM07] Blum, A., & Mansour, Y. (2007). From external to internal regret. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 8(6).] is a simple and elegant algorithm that minimizes swap regret by starting from multiple copies of an external regret minimizer.
Recall that in swap regret minimization, the learner wants to minimize the \(\Phi\)-regret with respect to the set of strategy transformations \(\Phi\) represented by stochastic matrices
In order to construct a swap regret minimizer for \(X = \Delta^{n}\), we start with \(|A|\) copies of an external regret minimizer for \(\Delta^{n}\), denoted by \(R_{i}\).
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To compute the
NextStrategy()of the swap regret minimizer, we first call theNextStrategy()of each \(R_{i}\) to obtain a distribution \(p_{i}^{(t)} \in \Delta^{n}\). We will then assemble all \(p_{i}^{(t)}\) into a stochastic matrix \(P^{(t)}\), and will output a fixed point\[\displaystyle x^{\left(t\right)} = P^{\left(t\right)} x^{\left(t\right)} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}^{\left(t\right)} p_{i}^{\left(t\right)} \in \Delta^{n}.\] -
To compute the
ObserveUtility\((u^{(t)})\) of the swap regret minimizer, we first call theObserveUtilityof each \(R_{i}\) with the linear utility function\[\displaystyle v_{i}^{\left(t\right)} \coloneqq x_{i}^{\left(t\right)} u^{\left(t\right)}\]that is obtained by rescaling \(u^{(t)}\) by the component \(x_{i}^{(t)}\) of the last-output strategy \(x^{(t)}\).
The process can be depicted pictorially as in Figure 1.
We now claim that the algorithm described above is a swap regret minimizer for \(\Delta^{n}\).
Theorem S6.1 .
Let \(\text{Reg}_{i}^{(T)}\) denote the regret incurred by each external regret minimizer \(R_{i}\) for \(\Delta^{n}\) in the Blum-Mansour construction described above. Then, the swap regret cumulated by the algorithm satisfies:
Proof.
By construction, the external regret incurred by each \(R_{i}\) is
Pick any \(\hat{P} = (\hat{p}_{1} | \dots | \hat{p}_{n}) \in \Phi\). Then, the swap regret cumulated compared to always transforming strategies according to \(\hat{P}\) is, by definition,
S6.2 The general case: Gordon-Greenwald-Marks’s reduction
Blum-Mansour’s swap regret minimization algorithm is a special case of a much more general construction. [GGM08[GGM08] Gordon, G. J., Greenwald, A., & Marks, C. (2008). No-regret learning in convex games. Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Machine Learning, 360–367.] show that \(\Phi\)-regret minimization for a strategy set \(X\) can be constructed starting from the following two ingredients:
- an external regret minimization for the set \(\Phi\); and
- a fixed point oracle \(\Phi\), that is, an algorithm that given any \(ϕ \in \Phi\) outputs a fixed point \(ϕ(x) = x \in X\).
Intuitively, the external regret minimizer for \(\Phi\) has the role of tracking which transformation \(ϕ\) the decision maker should focus on at each time. The linear utility function \(U^{(t)} : \Phi \to \mathbb{R}\) observed by the external regret minimizer is constructed from the last-output strategy \(x^{(t)}\) and the utility function \(u^{(t)}\) observed at time \(t\), according to the formula
where \(x^{(t)}\) is the last-output strategy. The final construction is as follows:
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Each call to
NextStrategyfirst calls \(R\).NextStrategyto obtain the next transformation \(ϕ^{(t)}\). Then, a fixed point \(x^{(t)} = ϕ^{(t)}(x^{(t)}) \in X\) is computed and output. -
Each call to
ObserveUtility\((u^{(t)})\) with linear utility function \(u^{(t)}\) constructs the linear utility function \(U^{(t)}: ϕ \mapsto u^{(t)}(ϕ(x^{(t)}))\) given in (2), and passes it to \(R\) via \(R\).ObserveUtility\((U^{(t)})\).
Graphically, we can summarize the process as in the following block diagram.
Theorem S6.2 ([GGM08]) .
The \(\Phi\)-regret \(\Phi \text{-Reg}^{(T)}\) cumulated up to time \(T\) by the algorithm we just defined is exactly equal to the (external) cumulative regret \(\text{Reg}_{\Phi}^{(T)}\) cumulated by \(R\):
Proof.
The proof of correctness of the above construction is deceptively simple. Since \(R\) outputs transformations \(ϕ^{(1)},ϕ^{(2)},\dots \in \Phi\) and receives utilities \(ϕ \mapsto u^{(1)}(ϕ(x^{(1)})), ϕ \mapsto u^{(2)} (ϕ (x^{(2)})), \dots\), its cumulative regret \(R^{(T)}\) is by definition
Now, since by construction \(x^{(t)}\) is a fixed point of \(ϕ^{(t)}\), \(ϕ^{(t)}(x^{(t)}) = x^{(t)}\), and therefore we can write
Bibliography for this lecture
| [BM07] | Blum, A., & Mansour, Y. (2007). From external to internal regret. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 8(6). |
| [GGM08] | Gordon, G. J., Greenwald, A., & Marks, C. (2008). No-regret learning in convex games. Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Machine Learning, 360–367. |