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Published Papers
1. "The Original Management Incentive Schemes", Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(4), Fall 2005, 135-144. (Copyright, 2005, American Economic Association).
2. "Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack But Never Crack", (with John Friedman), American Economic Review 98(1), March 2008, 113-144. (Copyright, 2008, American Economic Association).
3. "The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What’s Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?", (with John Friedman), Journal of Politics, forthcoming, April 2009.
Working Papers and Papers Under Review*
Comparative Statics in Principal-Agent Problems
This consolidates and expands on papers previously circulated under the titles: "A Monotonicity Based Approach for Analyzing Principal-Agent Problems", "Holmstrom's Sufficient Statistic Theorem", and "The Value of Information in Principal-Agent Problems".
Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans (with Roland Fryer)
The Nature of Tournaments (with Robert Akerlof)
Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision (with Florian Ederer and Margaret Meyer)
A Theory of Rule Development (with Glenn Ellison)
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Less Than Perfect Information (with Philippe Aghion and Drew Fudenberg)
Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections (with Alberto Alesina)
Incentive Compatibility: Everywhere vs. Almost Everywhere (with Murali Agastya)
Voting Rule Inflation (with Rosalind Dixon)
Managerial Contracts at Regulated Firms (with Christine Jolls)
Ignorance is Bliss? Why Firms May Not Want to Monitor Their Workers (with Robert Akerlof)
Redistricting in a Competitive Environment (with John Friedman)
Does Competition Make Firms More Efficient?
Boesky Insider Traders (with Murali Agastya)
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