This matter came before the Court on November 18, 2003 for trial on the merits. This matter involves a civil traffic infraction citation for violating an official traffic control device, to-wit: running a stop sign, pursuant to Section 316.074, Florida Statutes.[1]
The stop occurred in a neighborhood known as Frenchman's Landing in unincorporated Palm Beach County. Frenchman's Landing is a private community with privately owned roads within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 316.003(33). There are stop signs at the various intersections throughout the community, including a four-way multi-party intersectional stop sign the Defendant was charged with violating.
Based on the undisputed evidence, the Defendant admits he did not obey the stop sign. The question addressed here is whether or not the stop sign was allowed to be placed at the intersection. If it was not, then it operates as a nullity.
In order for the traffic laws of this state to apply to privately owned roads, the State must present a Section 316.006(3)(b) jurisdictional agreement between the county and the owner of the roads.[2] See also Section 316.003(53)(b). Here, the State presented to the Court a copy of such a jurisdictional agreement along with correspondence from the Sheriff's Office without objection by the Defendant and it was admitted into evidence.[3] Accordingly, sufficient proof was adduced that the Sheriff's Office has traffic jurisdiction over these private roads.
Florida Statute 316.0747 requires non-governmental entities, such as Frenchman's Landing, to utilize approved traffic control devices conforming to the Federal Department of Transportation (DOT) standards. The standards include the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, Florida Statute 316.0747; see also Rule 14-110.001, Fla. Adm. Code. Section 316.074, under which the Defendant was charged, provides, in pertinent part:
(4) Whenever official traffic control devices are placed in position approximately conforming to the requirements of this chapter, such devices shall be presumed to have been so placed by the official act or direction of lawful authority unless the contrary shall be established by competent evidence. (Emphasis added.)
(5) Any official traffic control device placed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and purporting to conform to the lawful requirements pertaining to such devices shall be presumed to comply with the requirements of this chapter unless the contrary shall be established by competent evidence. (Emphasis added.)
Reading the law in pari materia, if a traffic control device (such as the stop sign in question) is placed at a location, then it is presumed to comply with the various requirements of statutes and traffic control codes unless the contrary is established by competent evidence. In other words, once there is testimony that a traffic control device is in place, the burden is placed upon the Defendant to show illegality or improper placement by competent evidence.
Defendant was the only person to testify regarding the criteria set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices regarding multi-way stop applications. Under Section 2B.07,[4] one of three criteria must be met, by an engineering study, before a stop sign can be legally placed in a multi-way stop application:
1. The multi-way stop is an interim measure to be replaced by traffic control devices;
2. A crash problem is indicated by 5 or more reported crashes reported in a 12 month period that is susceptible to correction by the multi-way stop sign installation; or
3. Minimum volumes of a vehicular volume entering the intersection or the combination of vehicular, pedestrian and bicycle traffic reach a certain predisposed criteria.
In 2002, Section 316.006 was amended to delete the minimum traffic volume requirement. See Florida Statute 316.006(3)(b)(4). The only remaining testimony regarding the second criteria come from the Defendant who testified that there has never been five or more reported crashes in a twelve-month period, and in all the years the Defendant has resided in Frenchman's Landing, a period of time of approximately ten years, there is not been a total of five crashes during that entire span of time. Lastly, there has never been any indication that the stop sign was a prelude to placement of traffic lights. In particular, these stop signs have been in at this community since at least 1991, and therefore, even if they were a prelude to traffic lights, twelve years is more than enough time to make the transition. The Court determines that accordingly, the stop signs are not a prelude to traffic lights being installed.
In sum, Defendant has shown by clear and competent evidence that not only was no engineering study done, but none of the criteria for installing the stop signs had been met based on the testimony before the Court.[5] Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendant has met his burden under Section 316.074(4) and Section 316.074(5) and accordingly, as the Court has more than a reasonable doubt, the Defendant is found not guilty.[6]
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Palm Beach Gardens, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 7th day of January, 2004.
/s/ Jerald S. Beer
Traffic Hearing Officer
Palm Beach County Traffic Court
[1] Apparently the officer chose the more general statute, as opposed to Florida Statute 316.123, specifically governing stop signs.
[2] There is a like statute for municipalities. See Florida Statute 316.006(2)(b).
[3] The documents would have been admissible. See Florida Statute 90.803(8) (public records exception to the hearsay rule as to the letter). See also Florida Statute 90.902 (Self Authorization) and Florida Statute 90.955 (Public Records).
[4] It also includes the general criteria with Section 2B.05 dealing with single stop signs.
[5] Even testimony regarding stop signs as a prelude to traffic lights or the requisite number of crashes would appear to be inadequate by the State to rebut Defendant's evidence, unless it was based on an engineering study.
[6] This has been an ongoing dispute since at least 1991. See State v. Whitney, Case No. 91-208827 TI A08 (Palm Beach County Court -- Traffic Division, Boykin, J., February 28, 1992); State v. Costello, Case No. 94-141923 TI A08 (Palm Beach County Court -- Traffic Division, Boykin, J., February 14, 1995); and State v. Costello, Case No. 98-023147 TI A08 (Palm Beach County Court -- Traffic Division, Sands, D., January 3, 1998). One wonders why enforcement of these stop signs continues in light of consistent rulings by different courts on this matter.