TEWHEY V. MIT COMPLAINT FILED IN MIDDLESEX SUPERIOR COURT ON APRIL 11, 1995. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MIDDLESEX, SS SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DOCKET NO. 95-2130 JAMES R. TEWHEY PLAINTIFF v. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CHARLES M . VEST, MARK S . WRIGHTON, MARY P. ROWE JOAN F. RICE, ARTHUR C. SMITH, ANNE GLAVIN SHARON P. SHEA, STAN HUDSON AND KATHERINE M. NOLAN DEFENDANT COMPLAINT (JURY CLAIM) COUNT I (VIOLATION OF GENERAL LAWS CHAPTER 151B) 1. The plaintiff, James R. Tewhey ("Tewhey") is a resident of Sudbury, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 2. The defendant, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ("MIT") is an educational institution located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 3. The defendant, Charles M. Vest ("Vest") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 4. The defendant, Mark S. Wrighton ("Wrighton") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 5. The defendant, Mary P. Rowe ("Rowe") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 6. The defendant, Joan F. Rice ("Rice") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex county, Massachusetts. 7. The defendant, Arthur C. Smith ("Smith") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 8. The defendant, Sharon P. Shea ("Shea") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex county, Massachusetts. 9. The defendant, Katherine M. Nolan ("Nolan") was at all material times employed by the defendant educational institution in Cambridge, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. 10. Tewhey began his employment with defendant MIT in August, 1986 as Associate Dean of Students. 11. Tewhey always performed his work in a fully competent and professional manner over the years. 12. On or about July 9, 1992, Tewhey ended a personal relationship with Nolan. Nolan threatened Tewhey that if he refused to continue the relationship with her, she would insure that he would end up without friends, family, and job. 13. On or about July 17, l992, Nolan called two neighbors of Tewhey to inform them of the former relationship and described Tewhey as unstable. 14. On or about July 21, 1992, Nolan went to Tewhey's supervisor (Smith), described Tewhey as mentally ill and asked that he be removed from his position at MIT. 15. On or about July 31, 1995, Nolan called and harassed Tewhey's wife at her place of employment and attempted to convince Tewhey's wife that she should leave him. 16. Sometime on or about August 3, 1994, Nolan called Tewhey's mother, harassing her and demanding that Tewhey's mother supply Nolan with the names and addresses of Tewhey's friends. 17. Sometime on or about September of 1992, Nolan went to Rowe and informed her of the former relationship that had existed between Tewhey and Nolan. 18. On or about October 2, 1992, Smith informed Tewhey that Nolan had seen him (Smith) in July and had described Tewhey as unstable. Smith suggested that perhaps Tewhey should resign. 19. Tewhey refused to resign, stated that Nolan's actions amounted to retaliation for Tewhey's refusal to continue a personal relationship and as such, Nolan actions constituted sexual harassment. Tewhey asked that Smith take action to insure that Nolan did not go to other administrators and that Nolan be told that the harassment must end. 20. Smith acknowledged that nothing that had been raised with him was work related, stated that Tewhey's tenure as Associate Dean had been outstanding, apologized for raising these issues and stated that he hoped Tewhey and Smith could continue their productive working relationship. 21. On three separate occasions, over a period of a month, Tewhey requested that Smith take some action to insure that Nolan was informed of Tewhey's complaint and that appropriate action then be taken by MIT. 22. On or about October 14, 1992, Tewhey asked a co-worker, to begin to accompany Tewhey on any trips Tewhey took outside of Tewhey's office. Tewhey made this request because of the increasing number of times Nolan had been in or around the building where Tewhey's office was located. 23. On or about October 28, 1992, Tewhey informed Smith that he, Tewhey, intended to approach Nolan's supervisor with Tewhey's complaint. Smith told Tewhey not to undertake such action as some at MIT would construe it as sexual harassment. 24. During October 1992 and November 1992, Nolan met with Rowe on a number of occasions now complaining that Tewhey was following her. 25. On or about November 12, 1992, Tewhey approached Rowe to raise general concerns about Smith and Nolan. Without using names, Tewhey outlined his concerns and asked for advice. Rowe suggested that Tewhey was "burnt out" and should consider resigning. Rowe did not notify Tewhey of Nolan's complaints. 26. On or about November 11, 1992, Tewhey met with Dr. Clarence Williams, a special assistant to the president of MIT, to ask how to deal with Nolan's harassment. 27. Sometime in December of 1992, Nolan and Rowe went to Smith, alleging that Tewhey was following her and harassing her on the MIT campus. Smith never told Tewhey about this complaint nor, to the best of Tewhey's knowledge, did Smith undertake any action to ascertain the validity of Nolan and Rowe's allegation. 28. On or about December 18, 1992, Nolan followed Tewhey and a co-worker to Tewhey's parking lot and when the co-worker left Nolan demanded Tewhey talk with her. 29. On or about January 20, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and told him that he intended to look for a position outside of MIT. Tewhey stated that he was concerned about failure of Smith to place any boundaries on Nolan's behavior and complained about on-going harassment. 30. On or about February 23, 1993, Glavin, Chief of MIT's Campus Police, along with John Driscoll (''Driscoll"), Captain of the MIT Campus Police, informed Tewhey that Nolan had lodged a complaint with the MIT Campus Police alleging that Tewhey was following Nolan. Glavin ordered Tewhey to stay away from Nolan. 31. Tewhey was informed that Nolan had been moved to a different parking lot for her protection and that the location would remain hidden from Tewhey. 32. Tewhey denied all allegations, pointed out that he had been away from the campus for most of the last month and alleged that he was being harassed. Tewhey requested that his parking lot be changed and that his new location be kept secret from Nolan and this request was refused as being unnecessary. 33. Tewhey, on or about February 23, 1993, again approached Rowe regarding the allegations and was again told that Tewhey should resign. 34. On or about February 24, 1993, Tewhey accompanied by his wife met with Rowe and outlined his allegations of harassment. Rowe offered no support to Tewhey and stated that Ms. Nolan's allegations sounded credible. 35. On or about February 24, 1993, Tewhey accompanied by his wife met with Glavin and Driscoll. Tewhey's wife described several incidents where Nolan attempted to contact Tewhey and members of Tewhey's family, but Tewhey's wife was told that this did not constitute harassment. 36. Tewhey's wife was subjected to harassing and humiliating allegations by Glavin. 37. Glavin told Tewhey that if he was on campus and saw Nolan he should turn and go the other way or find a men's room to hide in. 38. Glavin told Tewhey that it would be easy for Nolan to get a restraining order issued against Tewhey and that would create an impossible situation for Tewhey. 39. Tewhey again asked that his parking lot be changed and the new location be kept secret from Nolan and this request was again refused. 40. On or about February 26, 1993, Tewhey sent a written complaint to Glavin regarding Nolan's behavior. To the best of Tewhey's knowledge, no action was taken regarding that complaint. 41. On or about February 26, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith to inform him of the interactions with Campus Police and Rowe. 42. On or about March 2, 1993 Tewhey met with Driscoll and again asked that his parking lot be changed and Driscoll told Tewhey that such a move was not necessary. 43. On or about March 3, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice and stated that he wanted to file a grievance against Nolan. Rice suggested that instead of a grievance, Tewhey write a letter to her outlining his concerns and that this letter would constitute a form of protection for Tewhey. 44. On March 10, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey to inform Tewhey that allegations had been made that his credentials were not in order. Smith informed Tewhey that this allegation had been made by a staff member and that Tewhey should assume that the information had come from Nolan. 45. At the same meeting, Smith stated that there were a number of individuals determined to get Tewhey fired and that Nolan was one of them. Smith also informed Tewhey that he believed calls had been made by Nolan and others to schools he had attended and places he had worked in an attempt to find compromising information about Tewhey. 46. On or about March 24, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey and stated that while there had been some irregularities regarding Tewhey's credentials, Smith had determined that they were not serious enough to warrant any disciplinary action. 47. On or about March 26, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and told Smith that he believed the situation at MIT was completely out of control. Tewhey expressed concern that a number of people at MIT would work with Nolan to get a restraining order issued against Tewhey, expressed concern that an incident on campus would be manufactured to embarrass Tewhey and Tewhey asked about the possibility of taking a leave from MIT for a year. 48. On or about April 2, 1993, Nolan brought her allegations to Hudson. Hudson called Tewhey, insisted upon a meeting and demanded that Tewhey resign from his position at MIT. 49. On or about April 6, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice and an agreement is reached on the terms of a paid leave of absence from MIT for Tewhey. 50. On or about April 6, 1993, Nolan alleged to the Campus Police that Tewhey had, at approximately 5:10 p.m., driven his car up next to her and followed her through a red light during rush hour traffic onto Massachusetts Avenue. 51. On or about April 7, 1993, with the assistance of Driscoll, Nolan has issued in Cambridge Superior Court a temporary restraining order (209A) against Tewhey. 52. On or about April 7, 1993, in a meeting attended by Hudson, Rowe, Rice, Smith, Jay Keyser ("Keyser") Associate Provost at MIT, Glavin and William Dickson, Senior Vice President at MIT, Rowe and Hudson insist that Tewhey should be fired. 53. On or about April 7, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey and a co-worker and ordered Tewhey off-campus until this matter was resolved. 54. On or about April 9, 1993, Cambridge Superior Court vacated the 209A issued against Tewhey for Lack of Jurisdiction. 55. On or about April 9, 1993, Cambridge District Court at the request of Tewhey, issued a temporary restraining order (209A) against Nolan. 56. On or about April 9, 1993, Newton District court, at the request of Nolan, issued a temporary restraining order (209A) against Tewhey. 57. On or about April 13, 1993, Tewhey filed a written grievance with the MIT Personnel office against Nolan alleging sexual harassment. 58. On Friday, April 16, 1993, Nolan testified at Newton District Court that Hudson had told her that Tewhey blamed her for all of his troubles and that, therefore, she feared retaliation. The judge issued a restraining order based on the fear of retaliation . 59. On Tuesday, April 20, 1993, the 209A issued against Nolan is vacated in that Tewhey is unable to show that his life is in danger. 60. On or about April 20, 1993, Wrighton, Provost at MIT, requested Tewhey's resignation from his position as Associate Dean. Tewhey asked that he be placed on leave as previously suggested and that MIT act on his grievance against Nolan. Wrighton stated that Tewhey should resign and that MIT would continue to pay Tewhey's salary until July 1994. Tewhey agreed to resign only if MIT would act on the grievance. Wrighton was very reluctant, said that acting on the grievance was not in MIT's interest, but finally agreed. 61. That night, Wrighton issued a statement to area newspapers stating that Tewhey has problems he needs to resolved and had submitted his resignation. 62. On or about May 2, 1993, Wrighton and Tewhey met again. Wrighton strongly suggested that Tewhey withdraw his grievance against Nolan and repeatedly Tewhey refused. 63. On or about May 19, 1993, Tewhey met with Rice, at that time the Director of Personnel at MIT, and Rice informed Tewhey that a wide ranging investigation of all allegations made against Tewhey would take place. Rice informed Tewhey that he had been reassigned to the Provost Office and would continue to receive salary and benefits from MIT. 64. On or about May 19, 1993, during the same meeting, Rice informed Tewhey that members of the Dean's Office had accused Tewhey of having multiple affairs with undergraduate students of both sexes and that these charge would also be investigated. Tewhey demanded that the charges be investigated. 65. On or about May 19, 1993, at the aforementioned meeting, Rice told Tewhey that Shea had made the above allegation. 66. On or about June 4, 1993, Rice wrote to Tewhey, stating that MIT would not act on the grievance and that no wide ranging investigation would take place. 67. On or about June 12, 1993, this decision was appealed to Wrighton and the appeal was turned down. 68. On or about July 9, 1993, Wrighton's decision was appealed to Vest, President of MIT. 69. On July 26, 1993, Tewhey filed a formal grievance with Wrighton against Shea alleging that Shea had (1) approached Rice claiming that Tewhey had engaged in multiple affairs with undergraduate women, (2) alleged to Rice and other MIT administrators that Tewhey had sodomized undergraduate males, (3) approached several MIT student newspapers and attempted to induce them to print the above allegations and (4) had sent electronic mail to former colleagues of Tewhey's at Smith College asking for any compromising information that they might have in their possession regarding his employment at Smith College. Tewhey included copies of the electronic mail with the grievance. 70. On or about July 30, 1993, Tewhey received an annual raise in pay from MIT. 71. On August 2, 1993, Vest informed Tewhey that MIT would not investigate the grievance against Nolan. 72. On August 4, 1993, Wrighton deferred Tewhey's grievance against Shea until Tewhey agreed to sign a letter of resignation. 73. On or about August 17, 1993, Tewhey filed an employment discrimination charge with MCAD and EEOC outlining what he considered to be discriminatory acts. 74. On or about October 12, 1993, a packet of material was sent to Tewhey's academic advisor and the dean of the law school Tewhey was attending. The packet was sent anonymously and contained the newspaper articles (both local and national) detailing Tewhey's alleged resignation from MIT in April of 1993. 75. On or about October 12, 1993, Tewhey received a letter from Rice demanding that Tewhey sign a letter of resignation. 76. On or about October 14, 1993, Tewhey met with Smith and showed him the package that had been sent to the law school and asked Smith to intercede with MIT to assist Tewhey in protecting himself and his family. Smith agreed to do so. 77. On or about October 17, 1993, Smith met with Tewhey at Smith's home and told Tewhey he could expect no help from MIT regarding the on-going harassment. 78. On or about October 18, 1993, Tewhey notified Wrighton that Tewhey would not sign a letter of resignation. 79. On or about October 19, 1993, Tewhey was terminated from employment at MIT. 80. As a result of the discriminatory acts as alleged herein, Tewhey, has sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries. 81. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that defendants Shea and Nolan unlawfully sexually harassed the plaintiff and created a hostile work environment in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B section 4, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 214 section 1C and other related laws. 82. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendants MIT, Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, and Vest acting as agents, servants, and employees of MIT and acting without justification or privilege, unlawfully sexually harassed the plaintiff and created a hostile work environment in violation of General Laws chapter 151B Section 4 and other related laws. Wherefore, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendants, MIT, Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, Shea, Nolan and Vest as follows: A. That Tewhey be awarded compensatory damages. B. That Tewhey be awarded punitive damages. C. That Tewhey be awarded all reasonable attorney's fees, interest, and costs of the suit. D. For other such relief as to this court may seem just and proper. Count II (Violation of General Laws Chapter 12 Section llI) 83. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I of the complaint. 84. The allegations contained in Count I of the Complaint also constitute a violation of the General Laws Chapter 12 Section llI, in that Tewhey's rights were violated through threats, intimidation, or coercion within the meaning of General Laws chapter 12 Section 11I 85. As a result of the wrongful acts as alleged herein, Tewhey has sustained severe and substantial damages as injuries. 86. This count is brought pursuant to General Laws Chapter 12 Section 11I WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendants MIT, Smith, Rowe, Glavin, Wrighton, Hudson, Rice, Shea, Nolan and Vest as follows: A. That Tewhey be awarded compensatory damages. B. That Tewhey be awarded punitive damages. C. That Tewhey be awarded all reasonable attorney's fees, interest, and costs of the suit. D. For other such relief as to this court may seem just and proper. COUNT III (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 87. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the complaint. 88. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Nolan knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Nolan's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 89. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Nolan intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 90. The defendant Nolan created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 91. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 92. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Nolan in such amount as may be determined. COUNT IV (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 93. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 94. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Shea knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Shea's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 95. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Shea intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 96. The defendant Shea created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 97. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 98. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Shea in such amount as may be determined. COUNT V (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 99. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 100. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Smith knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Smith's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 101. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Smith intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 102. The defendant Smith created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 103. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 104. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Smith in such amount as may be determined. COUNT VI (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 105. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the complaint. 106. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Wrighton knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Wrighton's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 107. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Wrighton intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 108. The defendant Wrighton created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 109. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 110. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Wrighton in such amount as may be determined. COUNT VII (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 111. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 112. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Rowe knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Rowe's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 113. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Rowe intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 114. The defendant Rowe created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 115. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 116. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Rowe in such amount as may be determined. COUNT VIII (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 117. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 118. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Hudson knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Hudson's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 119. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Hudson intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 120. The defendant Hudson created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 121. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 122. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Hudson in such amount as may be determined. COUNT IX (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 123. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 124. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Rice knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Rice's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 125. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Rice intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 126. The defendant Rice created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 127. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 128. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Rice in such amount as may be determined. COUNT X (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 129. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 130. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Vest knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Vest's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 131. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Vest intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 132. The defendant Vest created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 133. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 134. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Vest in such amount as may be determined. COUNT XI (Intentional Interference with Advantageous Contractual Relations) 135. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the complaint. 136. Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT and the defendant Glavin knew that Tewhey had an employment contract with the defendant MIT, and that but for Glavin's interference, Tewhey would have continued to be employed by the defendant MIT. 137. Tewhey believes and therefore avers that the defendant Glavin intentionally, maliciously, wrongfully, and improperly interfered with Tewhey's employment contract with the defendant MIT. 138. The defendant Glavin created a hostile and offensive work environment and prevented Tewhey from carrying out his duties as an employee of the defendant MIT. 139. As a result of the intentional, malicious, wrongful, and improper interference with his employment contract, Tewhey sustained severe and substantial damages and injuries, including lost wages, humiliation, injury to his feelings, and otherwise damage. 140. This count is for intentional interference with advantageous contractual relations. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Glavin in such amount as may be determined. COUNT XII (SLANDER) 141. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the Complaint. 142. Defendant Shea did maliciously make public false statements so as to hold plaintiff up to hatred, ridicule and scorn and to discredit him in the minds of considerable and respected class in the community. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Shea in such amount as may be determined. COUNT XIII (ABUSE OF PROCESS) 143. Tewhey reiterates the allegations contained in Count I and II of the complaint. 144. Defendant Nolan on April 9, 1993 maliciously and falsely, and without probable cause, swore to an affidavit charging plaintiff with harassment and thereafter used lawful process to accomplish an unlawful purpose with malice and to Tewhey's damage. 145. WHEREFORE, Tewhey demands Judgment against the defendant Nolan in such amount as may be determined. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUDBURY, MA April 11, 1995 Then personally appeared the above named James R. Tewhey, and made oath that he has read the allegations contained in this Complaint, and that they are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, before me. /s/ MANUELA DEROSA __________________________ Notary Public My Commission Expires: 8/8/97 THE PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES AND CLAIMS TRIABLE BY JURY By, /s/ JAMES R. TEWHEY ___________________________ James R. Tewhey Pro Se 120 Fairbank Road Sudbury, MA 01776 (508) 443-5057 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX THE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DOCKET# MICV95-02130 RE: Tewhey v MIT et al TO: James R Tewhey 120 Fairbank Road Sudbury MA 01776 --- TRACKING ORDER - A TRACK You are hereby notified that this case is on the average (A) track as per Superior Court Standing Order 1-88. The order requires that the various stages of litigation described below must be completed not later than the deadlines indicated. STAGES OF LITIGATION DEADLINE Service of process made and return filed with the Court 07/10/95 Response to the complaint filed (also see MRCP 12) 09/08/95 All motions under MRCP 12, 19, and 20 filed 09/08/95 All motions under MRCP 15 filed 07/04/96 All discovery requests and depositions completed 05/30/97 All motions under MRCP 56 filed and heard 07/29/97 Final pre-trial conference held and firm trial date set 11/26/97 Case disposed 04/10/98 The final pre-trial deadline is not the scheduled date of the conference. You will be notified of that date at a later time. Counsel for plaintiff must serve this tracking order on defendant before the deadline for filing return of service. This case is assigned to Superior Court session D sitting at Middlesex. Dated: 04/13/95 Edward J Sullivan, Clerk of Courts BY: J Haviland, Asst Clerk Location: Rm 7A (Cambridge) Telephone: 617-494-4251