by Alan Shihadeh
The diplomatic strife over Israel's latest seizure of Palestinian land in Jerusalem offers considerable clarity into the imperatives of the unfolding "peace process" in the Middle East. Ethan Bronner, writing in the Boston Globe, provided an apt metaphor for what is transpiring in the aftermath of the PLO-Israel accords: "Egypt is leading an Arab effort to force Israel to abandon its latest land seizure in East Jerusalem but is running into a surprising foot-dragger in the campaign-the Palestinians." (19 May 1995) The situation was temporarily defused when Prime Minister Rabin abandoned the seizure after the conservative Likud party announced it would support a no-confidence measure (for other reasons) introduced by the half-dozen Arab members of the Israeli parliament to protest the land grab. Shortly after the measure was introduced, Bronner continued, Arafat "asked Arab members of the Israeli parliament to withdraw the no-confidence measure...in order to preserve the peace process." Naturally Arafat's betrayal was "seen by Israel and the United States as encouraging...by contrast, Egypt's sudden pan-Arab efforts are a sign of malaise over its regional role," Bronner adds. But Israel and the US have much else to be encouraged about, a matter to which we will return. The Peace Processª Joining Arafat's efforts, the US vetoed an otherwise unanimous UN Security Council resolution that called for Israel to rescind the seizure. Following the veto, Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained that the veto was necessary to "prevent institutions outside the peace process from taking steps that might interfere with it," reflecting the long established principle that the "peace process" is, by definition, limited to US policy, and therefore any outside institution, as a point of logic, can only "interfere." Following this protocol, Christopher re-iterated that the Jerusalem dispute "ought to be resolved between the parties," where "parties" means the US and Israel: "we have reservations about the action that was taken by the Israelis in Jerusalem. I think those concerns have been registered because of the [assurances] by the Israeli cabinet indicating there would be no further [land confiscation] of this kind taken in the near future," which should be enough, obviously-no need to brook outside interference. The principle is far reaching. In the aftermath of the Hebron Massacre last March-when Israeli army reservist and physician Baruch Goldstein fired his machine gun at Palestinians kneeling in prayer, killing 46, and injuring hundreds-UN Secretary General Boutrous Gali offered to provide UN troops to protect Palestinians from Israeli settlers. Clinton summarily rejected the proposal as "annoying" and "neither useful nor helpful...the answer now is to re-double our efforts...and begin implementation of the [Israel-PLO] agreement as soon as possible." Israeli settler rampages continue as before, and the "peace process," by definition, remains on-track. Returning to Christopher's recent remarks, "the United States feels a tremendous responsibility to protect the peace process...and so we took the unusual step yesterday of vetoing a resolution." Indeed the US has accrued an unusually long record of UN vetoes and isolated votes in the General Assembly "to protect the peace process" and has been unwavering in its rejection of Palestinian rights, even siding alone with Israel in voting (153-2) against a General Assembly resolution that strongly condemned terrorism because it contained a clause which recognized the right of people to "resist racist or colonialist regimes," which at the time was taken to refer to South Africa, but with obvious implications for Israel. Other instances include vetoes in 1976 and 1980 of UN Security Council resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territory it captured in 1967 and the creation of an independent Palestinian state with security guarantees for all states in the region, in accordance with international consensus, including the PLO. In the General Assembly similar resolutions have regularly passed, for example by votes of 144-2, 151-3, 138-2, in 1990, 1989, and 1988 respectively, with Israel and the US constituting the radical rejectionist minority, an occasional Dominican Republic joining for solidarity. Unlike Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions, however, are not enforceable. Reasons for the US's rejectionist stance in Palestine stem from its support for Israel as a barrier to "indigenous radical nationalism" in the Middle East which could interfere with US control over the region's oil production. Control over the World's most valuable commodity was recognized by the State Department in 1945 as "...a stupendous source of strategic power," leading the US to ensure that the oil remained in the domains of compliant family dictatorships which were created by the British following World War I. Part of ensuring that this "Arab facade" remained in power was to set up a system of local gendarmes, including Iran (under the Shah), Turkey, and Israel who could be called upon as needed. The system is described and documented in detail in Chomsky's Fateful Triangle (South End Press, 1983). New Bottles... Little has changed apart from the fact that the PLO has finally agreed to depart from international consensus on Palestinian national rights and instead participate in the "peace process," as Arafat's actions in the recent dispute over Jerusalem have shown again. Returning to why the US and Israel have much to be encouraged by, it is useful to recall Rabin's remarks shortly after signing the Oslo Agreement: "I prefer the Palestinians cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza [Strip]. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the [Israeli] Association for Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule there by their own methods, freeing...the Israeli soldiers from having to do what they [the PLO] will do. All Gaza Strip settlements will remain where they are, The Israeli army will remain in the Gaza Strip to defend them...." (Yediot Ahronot, 7 September 1993) The current situation in Gaza flows logically from Rabin's the-PLO-will-do-our-dirty-work-for-us formula, as New York Times reporter Joel Greenberg inadvertently notes: "first reports from the Palestinian Authority's closed trials of Islamic militants indicate that tribunals are handing down summary verdicts after short court proceedings, some no longer than a few minutes." (27 April 1995). Again, the paymasters are encouraged: "While Israeli and American officials have welcomed the hearings, human rights groups have condemned them as violating the defendants' civil liberties...the trials have been held secretly at night, with judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers drawn from the Palestinian security forces." Amnesty International has described the trials as "grossly unfair, violating the minimum standards of international law, including the right to have adequate time to prepare a defense, the right to a fair and public trial by an independent tribunal, the right to be defended by a lawyer of one's choice and the right to appeal to a higher court," essentially reproducing its own critique of the Israeli military courts throughout the Occupied Territories, a point not lost on ordinary Palestinians. In other respects as well the new face of Israeli occupation hasn't relegated its duties. Last month, the West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists reported "many cases of torture of persons detained by Palestinian police and arrests of dozens of persons suspected of being members or supporters of opposition groups," during the first quarter of 1995. The old face has also been busy, with "a significant increase in numbers of administrative detention [imprisonment without charges], significant deterioration in prison conditions, a dramatic increase in land confiscation throughout the West Bank, tightening of the closure of East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the Jericho Areas, intensified settler violence in Hebron, Nablus and Tulkarem areas, continued raids on Mosques and religious sites, and torture during interrogation." Black November Perhaps the most spectacular demonstration of Arafat's new role in the peace process was the PLO massacre of 12 Palestinians (with hundreds wounded) in Gaza last November during what was supposed to be a peaceful rally in solidarity with 200 suspected members of Islamic Jihad who had been rounded up by the PLO police (Reuter, 18 November 1994). The massacre came three days after a warning by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin to the PLO to "toughen its campaign" in the Territories; "we expect a more serious effort from the Palestinian Authority than we have seen thus far," he said. Its not unlikely that the weapons used in the massacre were supplied by the Israeli army, as noted by Ariel Sharon in Yediot Ahronot (25 November 1994), the main Israeli daily. The Israeli security system responded to the massacre with delight, since it made clear that Arafat would indeed take on Hamas as hoped. Former senior Military Intelligence officer and Rabin's advisor for PLO affairs Jacques Neriya commented that "the violence of last Friday was neither ruthless nor pervasive enough. Arafat did not win a victory as decisive as that won in Syria [by Assad] against the Muslim Brotherhood [in which 10,000-20,000 were massacred in Hama], or by King Hussein in Jordan in September 1970 [8,000-10,000 massacred]." (Yediot Ahronot, 20 November 1994) Nahum Barnea, writing in Yediot Ahronot, similarly reported that "the bloody riots which took place in Gaza on Friday didn't surprise Arafat's Israeli patrons. If anything, they rejoiced them.....The Security System people want Arafat to emulate the massacre of Palestinians by King Hussein in September 1970. The Israelis want to see blood gushing: for Arafat's benefit, but also in order to neutralize the Islamic terror's disconcerting influence on Israeli public mood by the sight of piles of corpses in Gaza." (Yediot Ahronot, 20 November 1994) Barnea also quotes a high ranking Israeli minister as saying that "unless Arafat begins to shoot in Gaza, the Israeli government will not be able to proceed with the peace process, because the Israeli public will not allow it," again offering no small insight into the "peace process," or the Nobel Prize for Peace, for that matter. ...Old Wine Arafat has taken a new position as local enforcer, but the position itself is not new. Israel has from the beginning of the occupation searched for the most efficient methods for ruling the Territories and appropriating its resources. Initially the strategy was to cultivate relations with Palestinian "notables" who would run the Territories according to Israel's wishes in return for various privileges such as building permits. From 1967 to 1974 the practice was quite effective, requiring that Israel station 10,000-15,000 soldiers in the Territories to enforce the system. Eventually Ariel Sharon replaced the "notables" by instituting the Village Leagues-councils of Palestinian collaborators who created one of the most totalitarian regimes on Earth. One of the great accomplishments of the Palestinian uprising was to eliminate the Village Leagues. As a result, Israel's administrative costs sky-rocketed: at the Intifada's peak, in 1988, 180,000 Israeli soldiers were required to impose Israeli rule in the Territories. Since then, approximately 100,000 soldiers have been stationed there. This form of direct rule was more costly, more embarrassing, and intensified Israel's moral degeneration in the eyes of its own citizens. By now the lessons are clear: the PLO, having lost its popular support and being on the verge of collapse, preserved itself by taking over responsibility of repression in the Territories, partly under the assumption that it will be immune to outside criticism and will therefore be able to employ even more brutal methods than those of the Israelis, as Rabin explained. Prospects: Apartheid One should add the West Bank to Rabin's dictum "that all Gaza Settlements will remain where they are." Currently, 70% of the land in the West Bank, and about 30% of the Gaza Strip has been confiscated for people "of Jewish race, religion, or origin," and the confiscation has continued since the Oslo agreement, as has spending on permanent infrastructure and housing-up by 70% in 1994 compared to 1993. Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza have been located so as to "fragment the Palestinian community by creating islands, cantons, small spheres of containment," according to Dutch geographer Jan de Jong, and thereby preempt the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian territory which could one day form the basis for an independent state. This cantonization has its roots in the Israeli Allon Plan of 1969, which proposed that Israel maintain control over the West Bank and Gaza, except for areas of dense Palestinian settlement which would be allowed some form of home rule. In this way Israel could maintain sovereignty over the land and resources of the Territories without facing the "demographic problem" in which too many non-Jews are allowed citizenship in what remains by law "the sovereign state of Jewish people." Rabin reiterated this imperative again recently in a Globe editorial: "I am not prepared to forcibly annex the territories and their inhabitants, thereby changing the state of Israel into a binational state. I don't believe that for 2,000 years, the generations of our people dreamed to 'return to Zion' in order to establish a binational state in which 35 percent of the citizens would not be Jewish." (11 February 1995) The Israeli government has become even more brazen in constructing the symbols of apartheid in the Territories, and is now proposing a "security fence" which would "separate Israelis on one side, and Palestinians on the other," according to Rabin. (Boston Globe, 11 February 1995) Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, considered a great dove, affirmed the Nobel Laureate's sentiments: "an electronic fence is the only way to make good neighbors...My heart yearns for a fence, enforcing physical segregation and at the same time symbolizing spiritual segregation between us and them." Segregation is being achieved by other means as well. Yediot Ahronot recently reported construction of two tunnels and a long bridge linking settlements south of Bethlehem with Jerusalem. "The first tunnel is half a mile long and leads to an overpass bridge above the Palestinian town of Beit Jallah. The bridge is 164 ft tall and a fifth of a mile long." (2 December 1994) Similarly, the army "already proceeded to execute the formidable job of linking each settlement's water pipes and electricity supply lines with Israeli sources so as to make them independent from Palestinian water and electricity supplies." (Yediot Ahronot, 11 November 1994) There should be no illusions about what future is being planned for Palestinians; this is the essence of the "peace process," as it has always been. Israeli dissident Israel Shahak recently wrote that "an apartheid regime...is no longer just planned but already implemented. The sooner this grim reality is recognizedÐtogether with the role played by Arafat and his supporters in the whole schemeÐand the sooner the illusions about the 'peace process' are discarded, the easier will it be to put up resistance to the advancing apartheid." US taxpayers must recognize their direct responsibility for this "grim reality" and stop paying for the continuing dispossession of the Palestinian nation's land, culture, and future. Justice demands no less. *Note: all quotations from theIsraeli press were translated by Professor Israel Shahak; his important reports are available on-line through Gopher at alquds.org