PREDICTING THE FUTURE AND PRESCRIBING FOR THE FUTURE:
WHAT LOOMS AHEAD? WHAT POLICIES SHOULD THE U.S. ADOPT?

I. COURSE THEORIES: DID THEY PASS/FLUNK TESTS? WHAT DID THEY EXPLAIN?
Which theories survived confrontation with the evidence, and which did not? How much history do they explain? What evaluative conclusions follow from our answers? (E.g., did the U.S. overlook valid theories? Place false faith in false ones?)
A. Offense-defense (security dilemma) theory: US foreign policy as a test and a case to explain.
   1. Variant #1 (Threat variant): the greater the security threat states face, the more aggressive they become.
   2. Variant #2 (Opportunity variant): the more easily states can conquer, the more aggressive they become.
   Does U.S. activism correlate with America's sense of insecurity? Of opportunity? Was American policy driven by the search for security (or exploitation of opportunity)? Were America's adversaries driven by security concerns, or tempted by opportunity? Was the U.S. in fact insecure? Was it sufficiently aware of others' security concerns and their likely reaction to a U.S. threat?
B. Alliance theories:
   1. Balance of threat theory: can it explain the Cold War's structure? What policy implications follow?
   2. Birds of a feather: did they fly together? How often did the common U.S. expectation that birds of a feather would fly together prove accurate?
D. Foreign Policy Elite theories: did elite values/personalities matter?

II. EVALUATING US FOREIGN POLICIES
A. U.S. policies toward Europe, 1914-present.
   1. Effects on Europe: did the U.S. help or do harm?
   2. Effects on the U.S.: was European involvement a wasteful adventure or a wise investment?
B. U.S. policies toward the Third World, 1898-present.
   1. Effects on Third World: was the U.S. an "evil empire" or white knight?
   2. Effects on the U.S.: was Third World involvement a "bungle in the jungle" or a smart stratagem?
C. Overall quality of U.S. foreign policymaking process: how closely does it match the rational-legal scientific ideal? Is American foreign policy made by strategic wizards or by blundering bureaucrats and ignoramus voters?

III. PREDICTING THE FUTURE / PRESCRIBING FOR THE FUTURE
A. Are geopolitical threats gone forever? If they aren't, should the U.S. act to avert them?
   1. The rise of China: should the U.S. try to hamper China's growth? Break China up? Help China grow, on the theory that this will promote Chinese democracy? On what theoretical or moral assumptions does the issue rest?
2. The rise of other states: Japan; Russia; Germany. Should the U.S. try to stop their rise?

3. Should the U.S. fight to stop the rise of WMD proliferators—e.g., North Korea and Iran? Key issues in the debate:
   i. Can North Korea and Iran be prevented from gaining nuclear weapons by economic coercion or denial of nuclear materials? By positive inducements? Or is war necessary?
   ii. If N.K. and/or Iran nukes, what threat does this pose and what benefits would war to disarm them provide?
      a. Will N.K. or Iran hand WMD to terrorists?
      b. Will N.K. or Iran launch regional aggression under their nuclear umbrellas, believing it protects them from countermeasures?
      c. Will removing their WMD by force deter or dissuade proliferation by other WMD-seekers?
   iii. Are N.K. or Iran the greatest threat? We should set priorities among threats and deal most urgently with the worst.
      -- What about Al Qaeda? Specifically, will confrontation with N.K. or Iran impede the war on Al Qaeda by consuming resources and national attention?
      -- What about Russian loose nukes and biological weapons? Russia is where terrorists will get their WMD! Bush isn't locking them down!
      -- What about unstable Pakistan? Terrorists may gain WMD there too. Let's stabilize it!
      A possible answer: we must address all four problems urgently.
   iv. At what cost could such wars be won? And could the U.S. manage the occupations of N.K. or Iran?
   v. Is arms control an answer to nuclear proliferation? Is U.S. nuclear restraint or disarmament an answer? (Perkovich).

B. Peacemaking: the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Could the U.S. impose peace on Israel and the Palestinians?
   What if the U.S. endorsed a specific final status agreement and moved both sides toward it by carrots and sticks?
   What if the U.S. moved more forcefully to stop the current violence, specifically by persuading the Europeans, Saudis and Egyptians to threaten to cut off aid to Arafat unless he took all measures against it? And what if the U.S. also threatened both sides with aid cutoffs unless they endorsed moderate terms for peace while offering large inducements if they agreed?
   Polls show that a plurality of both the Israeli and Palestinian publics favor a two-state solution. The terms of such a solution are well known, after years of negotiations, as expressed in the 2000 Clinton Plan, the 2002 Abdullah Plan, the 2003 Geneva Accord and the 2003 Peoples' Voice (Ayalon-Nusseibeh) Plan. The major Arab states—most notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia—now want peace. If so why isn't peace now possible?
   How much does the continuation of this conflict injure American standing in the Islamic world? How much does it impede the war on Al Qaeda?

C. New Wars in Eurasia: Will they break out? Will we see a clash of civilizations? Of ethnic groups? Would such conflicts threaten the U.S.? Can/should the U.S. act to avert them? Is the U.S. wise enough to avert them or will U.S. interference only make things worse?
   1. Huntington: "Civilizations will clash: it will be 'the West against the Rest'." This is what Osama bin Laden wants. But will it happen? What U.S. policies could best avert it? We know how to deflect states from aggression—we did it to Germany
and Japan—but how can religions be deflected from aggressive or murderous ideas?
An opposite view from Francis Fukuyama: "history is ending."

a. Fukuyama variant: "liberal ideas are causing a global democratic revolution. The democratic worldview is winning the war of ideas."

b. Robert Dahl/Seymour Martin Lipset variant: "economic growth is causing a global democratic revolution."

Corollary: democracy ---> peace.

2. Chas. Freeman's scenario for war between the U.S. and China: could Taiwan suck the U.S. into war with the mainland? And compare with Robert Kagan's scenario for war between the U.S. and China: could the U.S. appease its way into a war with the mainland?

3. Other U.S. interests and policies:
   a. Does the U.S. have an interest in averting new Eurasian wars? Could such wars produce a new Eurasian hegemon? Could such wars spread to engulf the U.S.?
   b. Can the U.S. prevent such wars? If so, how? What are the lessons of World Wars I and II? Do these lessons apply here?
      -- Minority rights: can they be protected?
      -- Partition of multiethnic states (e.g., Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq): should the US use this as a last resort when minority rights doesn't solve things?
      -- Lies in textbooks: can they be removed? Would it matter if they were?

4. Policy tactics and tools: Unilateralism, NMD.
   a. Unilateral foreign policy tactics: are they effective?
      i. Unilateralists argue: multilateralism lets misguided allies tie America's hands and impede needed U.S. action. They also argue that others will be inspired to follow if the U.S. boldly leads alone.
      ii. Others reply: America's main interests—especially controlling the spread of WMD, defeating terror, and preserving the global environment—are shared by other major powers and are best protected by common action. So let's work with others! Moreover, U.S. unilateralism scares and offends others, perhaps spurring them to coalesce against the U.S.
   b. NMD (national missile defense): Will a U.S. deployment of national missile defense win the U.S. friends by showing strength or provoke the world to coalesce against the U.S.?

D. The struggle to save the global commons. Is the growing threat to the global environment the real way that the world is shrinking?
1. The "tragedy of the commons." Individual pursuit of self-interest won't preserve the environment. The environment is a "commons" or "collective good," so injuring it is in the individual interest of everyone—although this is not at all in their collective interest!
   The foreign policy problem: forging a broad international consensus on common action. Unilateral action will fail. Global warming will not be addressed except by common worldwide action.

2. Inter-generational justice. Have we a broad human ethical system that requires each generation to treat later generations fairly and proscribes injuring later generations? If not can we hope that we will sacrifice to preserve the world for future generations? Watch out grandchildren! We live for ourselves, not for you!

E. Human rights: what about doing the right thing? "Those who really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay more attention to justice than they are compelled to
do by their situation." (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian