THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, OCT. 16–28 1962

I. BACKGROUND
   A. The US had massive nuclear superiority over the USSR in 1962. Specifically, the US had a clear second-strike countervalue capability (the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on Soviet society after absorbing an all-out Soviet surprise counterforce attack) and perhaps also had a first-strike counterforce capability (the capacity to strike first with enough force to leave the Soviets unable to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation). The US perhaps could have struck the Soviets first and wholly escaped nuclear retaliation.
   B. The US plotted Castro's downfall, 1959–1962. US actions: the Bay of Pigs, 1961; Operation Mongoose and its planned Cuban uprising, 1961ff; the Phibriglex exercise, 1962; and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's reported memo of 10/6/62 ordering execution of plans to invade Cuba. Did the US plan to invade Cuba???
   C. America sent nuclear-armed IRBMs to Britain, Italy and Turkey, 1957–1962.

II. THE SOVIETS SEND MISSILES TO CUBA, MAY-OCTOBER 1962: WHY? AND WHY DID THEY DO IT SECRETLY?
   A. To acquire some nuclear strength, escape from the shadow of US nuclear superiority?
   B. To deter the US from a feared invasion of Cuba?
   C. To humiliate U.S. President John F. Kennedy (JFK)?

Historians and Soviet crisis participants crisis interviewed later both favor explanations #1 and #2. In 1962 JFK's policymakers favored explanation #3.

   Note: the Soviet deployment included 60 nuclear warheads for long-range IRBM missiles; 36 IRBMs; and about 100 tactical nuclear weapons plus short-range missiles or aircraft to deliver them—the latter being ideal for nuking a US invasion force.

III. THE U.S. RESPONSE
   B. The Soviet missiles are discovered, Oct. 16; JFK decides they must go. Why?
      1. Fears for U.S. credibility, NATO unity: "If we cave NATO will collapse!"
      2. Fears that the missiles would give the Soviets an unacceptable military advantage? No: JFK expressed little concern about the military consequences of the Soviet missile deployment.
      3. U.S. domestic politics? Did JFK fear attacks from the right if he caved? The White House tapes don't reveal such concerns; and non-elected officials were more hawkish than JFK, suggesting that electoral political concerns weren't driving hawkish thinking. But JFK did privately expressed fear of impeachment if the missiles stayed in Cuba.
   C. The ExComm considers three options, Oct. 16–Oct. 22:
      1. Quiet diplomacy. Threaten Khrushchev privately while making no public military moves.
      2. Blockade ("quarantine") Cuba. Exclude only missiles and warheads for now, to freeze the military status quo. Maybe extend the blockade to cover oil and other items later, if necessary, to strangle Cuba.
3. A surprise US conventional air strike against the Soviet missiles, and a US military invasion of Cuba. Early in the crisis most of JFK's advisors favored option #3, Surprise Attack and Invasion. But JFK chose option #2, Quarantine. US officials didn't come up with the Quarantine idea until Oct. 19, three days into the crisis. Governments think slowly...


IV. THE SETTLEMENT
A. Khrushchev sent JFK a letter on Friday Oct. 26 offering to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for a U.S. no-invasion pledge regarding Cuba. The next day he sent a second letter adding a demand: the U.S. must also remove its missiles from Turkey. Oh dear!

B. JFK's Oct. 27 answer: He ignored the second letter and publicly accepted Khrushchev's first offer--a Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. He spiced this with a private ultimatum (24 hours to agree or the U.S. would attack the missiles) and sweetened it with a secret concession (withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey within six months). Khrushchev quickly accepted Kennedy's offer on Oct. 28.

Question: Was the spice in Kennedy's offer smart? The sweetener?

V. HINGES OF THE CRISIS
A. U.S. officials feared war at three points:
   -- At the beginning of the crisis--when the U.S. considered launching war.
   -- On October 24, when Soviet ships approached the U.S. blockade line.
   -- On October 27, when Khrushchev seemed to stiffen his terms and a U.S. U-2 was shot down over Cuba.

B. Two hawk-dove disputes in the U.S. government:
   -- The bomb-vs.-quarantine debate early in the crisis.
   -- The later debate over whether to trade U.S. Jupiters to get Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

VI. HOW DANGEROUS WAS THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?
A. How accurate were perceptions on both sides? Not very!
   1. JFK didn't expect USSR missile deployment to Cuba. That's why he warned publicly against it--he thought his bluff wouldn't be called.
   2. US policymakers didn't see a chief USSR motive for deployment (defend Cuba from invasion); hence they nearly overlooked the no-invasion pledge as a solution to the crisis.
   4. US leaders wrongly assumed Khrushchev ordered the Oct. 27 U2 shutdown.
   5. US leaders underestimated Soviet and Cuban military capabilities in Cuba
      a. The US thought the Soviets had 8,000-10,000 troops in Cuba; in fact they had 43,000 troops. Cuba had another 270,000 well-trained troops. The US planned to invade with only 140,000 troops. Sounds like a tough war for the USA!
      b. More interestingly, the US was unaware that the Soviets had roughly 100 Soviet tactical warheads and means to deliver them in Cuba. (US leaders did correctly believe the Soviets probably had some IRBM warheads in Cuba although they lacked hard information on this.)
   6. Castro was unaware of US nuclear superiority. Also, Castro thought that the US was bent on invading Cuba. So... he urged the Soviet Union to forestall this US invasion with nuclear strikes!
7. JFK was unaware of symmetry of Soviet and US missile deployments. JFK: "It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I would think." Bundy and Alexis Johnson then explain "Well, we did, Mr. President."

B. How tight was central control on military operations? Not very!
1. The Oct. 27 Soviet shootdown of the U.S. U2 was unauthorized by Moscow.
2. US anti-submarine operations were more aggressive than JFK knew. Indeed, they were more aggressive and dangerous than the U.S. Navy itself knew. On Oct. 27 the Navy forced to the surface a Soviet submarine that, unbeknownst to the Navy, carried a nuclear torpedo and was commanded by a Soviet officer that feared he was under attack and had briefly considered arming his nuclear torpedoes.
3. A U.S. U2 strayed over Siberia during the crisis. The Soviets could have thought this a precursor to a U.S. first strike.
4. US test ICBMs were armed with nuclear warheads during the crisis; and a scheduled test from this test-field was still conducted.
5. A U.S. intelligence ship remained close to Cuba early in the crisis—an inviting target.
6. A pre-planned retaliatory strike was nearly conducted after the U2 shootdown—another near-oversight.

C. False warning problems. The US jury-rigged south-directed warning system had a hidden common-mode failure: it would see a Cape Canaveral launch as a Cuban launch.

D. Would JFK have pushed matters to war? (Only in extremis.)
E. What if someone else had been President? JFK was markedly more dovish than other U.S. policymakers. Had he not been President history probably would have been different and more exciting. The military favored war, Acheson favored war.

VII. RECENT HISTORICAL REVELATIONS: 3 REVISIONS TO RFK'S ACCOUNT
-- JFK's hidden plan to pursue a public Jupiter trade.
-- The Soviet nukes in Cuba, including tactical nukes. Soviet commanders did not have predelegated authority to use these weapons but there is no guarantee they would have gone unused in event of war.
-- US plans to invade Cuba?

VIII. PERSISTING MYSTERIES OF THE CRISIS
-- Why the rush by the US? The US was in a great rush to resolve the crisis, pressing matters at a desperate pace on October 27, when Kennedy told the Soviets that the US would use force unless matters were resolved in a day or two. What drove JFK's sense of urgency?
-- What U.S. response would have occurred had the Soviets not accepted Kennedy's terms on Oct. 28? (Would Kennedy have implemented the Cordier plan?)
-- What were Soviet and American plans for war if the war erupted?

IX. WHAT CAUSED THE CRISIS? WHY WAS WAR AVOIDED?
A. Causes: US nuclear superiority? Lack of clear "rules of the game"? U.S. belligerence toward Cuba? Soviet desire to humiliate JFK and the USA?
B. Why war was avoided: Lack of Soviet military options? JFK's hidden concessions?
C. The effects of U.S. nuclear superiority were starkly different in the early 1950s (the Soviets stood down in response) and the early 1960s (the Soviets secretly moved missiles to Cuba, nearly provoked war).

> Competing explanations:
-- Khrushchev was more of a risk-taker than Stalin.
Khrushchev had an aggressive option—moving missiles to Cuba—that Stalin didn't have. What if Stalin had had such an option?

Implication: sometimes military superiority is desirable, sometimes not.