Beyond Rigidification: The Importance of Being *Really* Actual

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Sense theory: names are linked to properties...

*modally* being $n$ goes **necessarily** with having the properties

*epistemically* being $n$ goes **apriori** with having the properties

*conceptually* being $n$ goes **in understanding** with having the properties
Each link sets up false expectations

**modal**
If being water goes necessarily with being the watery stuff, then there could be water without hydrogen.

**epistemic**
If being a cat goes a priori with being a purring, furry animal, then cats are as an apriori matter animals.

**conceptual**
If being Peano goes conceptually with finding those axioms, then to be Peano you must discover PA.
But related phenomena, it seems, *do* obtain

**modal**  Water *seems* possible without hydrogen.

**epistemic**  A meter is as an a priori matter the length of stick $S$.

**conceptual**  Nothing counts as heat unless it feels thus and so.
Is this fair?

"Kripke's conclusions are a function less of his evidence than the order of presentation. Better to do it the other way around: the true predictions motivate descriptivism and the false ones are a guide to its proper development."
2D Idea (D&H Version)

The epistemic and conceptual problems are small potatoes, reflecting just a bad choice of associated properties. The modal problem is the one that matters. It arises because we misjudged the association. Being \( n \) goes with being the G not across counterfactual worlds but counteractual.

\[
\text{S is true in } \begin{cases} \text{counterfactual} & \text{w iff} \\ \text{counteractual} & \end{cases} \quad \text{had } w \text{ obtained, it would have been the case that} \quad \text{if it turns out } w \text{ does obtain, it is the case that} \quad S
\]

Look for a description 'D' such that 'D = \( n \)' holds across counterfactual worlds and 'D = the G' holds across counteractual ones.
Rigidified Descriptions

A description behaving like this is 'the actual G'. It is rigid in one dimension -- had we obtained, the actually tallest mountain would still have been Everest -- and non-rigid ("unstable") in another -- which mountain is actually tallest depends on which world turns out to be actual.
Rigidification appears to save descriptivism -- surprising then to hear D&H say...

"we are not confident that the suggested view ['water' means 'the actual watery stuff'] is correct" (20)

"it is no part of our position that the suggested view is the ultimately correct view about the way 'red' functions in English" (21)

Why so cautious?
D&H: 2Dism could be descriptively incorrect

1. Best candidate for 2D treatment is artificial "descriptive" names like Evans's 'Julius'; 'Julius' means 'the actual zip-inventor'.

2. 'Julius' stops being descriptive when we make his acquaintance.

3. So 'water' is descriptive only if we are NOT acquainted with it -- only if "physical ostension of a sample of H2O accompanied by the words 'this stuff'...is similar ...to physical ostension of a screen accompanied by the words 'the man behind this screen'" (20)

4. "Since we do not know whether such a claim can be defended, we are not confident that the suggested view ['water' means 'the actual watery stuff'] is correct" (20).
Why does 'Julius' stop being 2D-ish when we meet him?

D&H answer

'n' is descriptive only if one can understand 'n is F' w/out knowing of any particular x that it is being said to be F. Once we meet him, a neophyte knowing only that the zip-inventor is being said to be drunk doesn't understand 'Julius is drunk'.

However

This tells us why 'Julius' ceases to satisfy someone's definition of "descriptive"; we still don't know why 'Julius' ceases to behave in the characteristic 2D way, denoting the AZI no matter which world is actual.
Real reason why 'Julius' changes when we meet him

'Julius' is descriptive iff Julius-directed judgments are essentially reached by way of AZI-directed judgments. Meeting Julius starts us going the other way. "Julius here is drunk so the AZI must be drunk."

This links descriptiveness to characteristic 2D behavior. If Julius-judgments are reachable in just this one way, then the question "is Julius drunk, supposing that w is actual?" is one we know how to answer. If not, not, since the AZI may be sober while Tom (the guy we know as Julius) is drunk.
So -- is 'water' a descriptive 2D-ish name or a proper Kripkean name?

It's descriptive if judgments about water are "uniformly derivative," essentially reached by way of judgments about the watery stuff.

It's proper if there is such a thing as "original intelligence" about water, deriving from NO descriptive beliefs, and/or "random intelligence" about water, deriving from ANY old descriptive belief thought to bear on the subject matter.

Introspection no help, so try inference to the best explanation. Which hypothesis does better at explaining the modal, epistemic, and conceptual phenomena?
Three issues arising

overkill -- "You're using a cannon to shoot a mouse"
spillover -- "You're hitting innocent bystander mice"
whoops -- "You missed the mouse"

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<th>overkill</th>
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Root cause: Expressive Gap

Rigidifier has trouble with concepts whose extensions are tied to what is really actually the case, as opposed to what is hypothesized to be actually the case for evaluation purposes.

Example: Fool's gold = what looks to real us (not hypothetical us) like gold.

Could this be iron pyrites, that is, something observers like us cannot distinguish from gold?

Could this be wood, and we, observers of some unexpected type who cannot distinguish wood from gold?
The Conceptual Datum

Both sides want to explain why it counts as a defect in understanding not to realize that the referent is supposed to have such and such properties.

E.g., you should appreciate that 'fire' is hot, 'sound' is something detected by listening, '0°C' is the temperature at which water freezes, 'beer' can get you drunk, 'the Sun' is our star, 'salt' goes on food, etc.
Theories of understanding

The 2-dimensionalist says

(2DU) Understanding 'n' is knowing that no matter which world is actual, 'n' refers to x iff x alone is actually G.

It might seem Kripke would say

(???) Understanding 'n' is knowing that 'n' stands for n, or knowing of some x that 'n' stands for x

"if someone else detects heat by some sort of instrument, but is unable to feel it, we might want to say, if we like, that the concept of heat is not the same even though the referent is the same" (NN, 131) "a blind man who uses the term 'light', even though he uses it as a rigid designator for the same phenomenon as we, seems to us to have lost a great deal, perhaps enough for us to declare that he has a different concept" (NN, 139)
Proposed Vaguely Kripkean theory of Understanding

One's *idea* of \( n \) is whatever one uses to form thoughts about \( n \) -- the kind that would be expressed using '\( n \)'.

A *normal* idea of \( n \) is one "involved in normal beliefs and associated with normal recognitional abilities"; more generally it has or otherwise incorporates the features other people's \( n \)-ideas have (Crimmins).

(KRU) Understanding '\( n \)' is knowing that '\( n \)' stands for \( n \) while thinking of \( n \) with a normal idea.
(2DU) asks more than (KRU)

Suppose that I acquire 'Mt Everest' by being told that it stands for the tallest mountain.

(KRU) says I should know that 'Mt Everest' stands for Mt Everest, while thinking of Mt Everest in the normal way.

I do know this, assuming the normal way of thinking of Everest is the way I've been taught. No problem if my knowledge of the referent rests on empirical presuppositions (that a certain mountain is tallest).

(2DU) says I should know that no matter which world is actual, 'Mt Everest' refers to \( x \) iff \( x \) is the actually tallest mountain.

Now my knowledge of the referent must be presuppositionless, else it won't extend to worlds where the presuppositions are wrong.
Does the extra content help with the explanation?

The phenomenon to be explained has to do with "necessary" conditions on the referent: it is understood that to be the referent of 'n', a thing should have thus and such properties.

A good chunk of (2DU)'s extra content is "sufficient" conditions: whatever is so and so must be n. Sufficient conditions are no help in explaining necessary ones.
Is the extra content at least harmless?

No. (KRU) "explains" why it's a defect of understanding not to know that Kanchenjunga is Everest if Kanchenjunga is highest. But I understand without knowing this. In fact it can't be known, because it isn't true. My teacher used "tallest mountain" because she thought Everest satisfied it, not because whatever satisfies it counts as Everest.
The Epistemic Datum

Both sides want to explain why it is a priori that \( n \), if there is such a thing, is G -- that a meter, if there is such a length, is the length of S. Both point to the fact that given our understanding of '\( n \)',

\((*)\) '\( n \)' refers, if it does, to a G.

But they have different accounts of why our understanding of '\( n \)' leaves it no other options.
Kripkean account of why 'n' has no other options

(KRU) says that to understand 'a meter' is to know it stands for a meter while employing a normal meter-idea. Since there is now (at the baptism) only one sort of meter-idea around, that comes to knowing it stands for the length of stick S.

1. 'a meter' refers
2. 'a meter' is understood
3. It's known that 'a meter' refers to the length of S
4. 'a meter' refers to the length of S

By logic, 'a meter' refers, if it does, to the length of S.

2Dist insists \( x = \text{length of } S \) is (A) necessary and sufficient (B) no matter which world is actual, for 'a meter' refers to \( x \). All we need is that \( x = \text{length of } S \) is (a) necessary (b) in this world for \( x = 1 \) meter. The 2Dist explanation is overkill.
Explaining too much

The Kripke account makes (X) apriori but not (Y). The 2Dist treats (X) and (Y) alike. Which approach is correct?

(X) if there is such a length as a meter, it's the length of this stick.
(Y) if this stick has a length at all, the length is a meter.

"There is a certain length which he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an accidental property, namely that there is a stick of that length. Someone else might mark out the reference by another accidental property" (NN. 55).

The reference fixer starts with an idea of how long the stick really is, and leans on that idea in stipulating a reference. Should S turn out to be a mile long (due to some deception), then rather than a meter being a mile, the definition is off. Since that can't be a priori excluded, it is not a priori that if this stick has a length at all, the length is a meter.
"That just shows 'a meter' means 'the actual length of this stick, assuming it's about as long as it looks.' The corresponding conditional is

\[(Y')\] assuming it's about as long as it looks, S's length is a meter.

Unlike (Y), this conditional is a priori, so all is well. More generally, we can get a priori sufficient conditions for \(x = n\) by writing it into the rigidified description that we are not greatly misled about the empirical circumstances that the meaning-assignment trades on."
Return of Real Actuality

Does 'a meter' mean 'the length of this stick, unless it is a great deal longer than it looks to real me', or 'the length of this stick, unless it is a great deal longer than it looks to hypothetical me?'

Suppose the second. Then one meter = one mile if it turns out (i) the stick is a mile long, but (ii) my experience E is nonetheless veridical, because (iii) I have been moved unawares into an environment giving E the (broad) content that stick is a mile long

So 'a meter' means 'the length of this stick, unless it is longer than it looks to real me.' However this is not 2D-expressible. (Y') may be a priori, but the 2Dist cannot tell us why.
The Modal Datum, aka Illusions of Possibility

2D Explanation

It seems possible for $n$ to have been $P$ because there are worlds $w$ such that if $w$ is actual, then $n$ is $P$.

Initial worry. It seems possible for Queen Elizabeth to have had different parents from her actual ones. But there are no worlds $w$ such that if this is $w$, she does have different parents from her actual ones.

Kripke Explanation

It seems possible for $n$ to be $P$ because there are "qualitatively identical epistemic situations" are possible in which $n$'s epistemic counterpart is $P$.

Initial plus. There are qualitatively identical epistemic situations whose Queen-counterpart has parents distinct from the Queen's actual parents.
Kripke's Method

It is not enough to show how a suitably deluded person could, but that we plausibly do, fall under a modal misimpression by misinterpreting a different possibility. The test of plausibility is, can we be made to see it?

Psychoanalytic Standard of Success

Unless the conceiver is confused or resistant, ◊F explains E's seeming possibility only if he/she does or would accept it as an explanation, and accept that his/her intuition testifies at best to F's possibility, not E's.
What is a "qualitatively identical epistemic situation"?.

First try: Someone is in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation to mine if they enjoy the same narrowly drawn perceptual appearances

Does this meet the Psychoanalytical Standard? No way - I would never mistake the possibility of some nutcase misperceiving a regular block of ice as a table for the possibility of this table I am now veridically perceiving being ice.
What is a "qualitatively identical epistemic situation"?

Second try: Someone is in an identical epistemic situation to mine if they enjoy the same perceptual appearances and they are under no perceptual illusions.

Nah - I would never mistake the possibility of some Invert observing an overtly icy table for the possibility of this table being ice. (Zebra analogy.)
What is a "qualitatively identical epistemic situation"?

Third try: Someone is in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation to mine if the scene they confront has the same observable properties.

No, because the scene in \( w_3 \) replaces one observable property (yellow) with another (fool's yellow).
What is a "qualitatively identical epistemic situation"?

Proposal: Someone is in a qualitatively identical epistemic situation to mine iff the scene they confront is perceptually indistinguishable from the one I confront; if you substituted their scene for mine I wouldn't notice.
Facsimile (or Fool's Gold) Principle

It does not explain my illusion that $n$ could turn out to be $P$ to point to an other-worldly $x$ that is $P$, unless $x$ and $n$ are perceptually indistinguishable. You need fool's gold, not dunce's gold.
2-dimensionalists cannot express facsimilehood because it turns on real actuality

At least, they can't directly. They might try indirectly, by description. The illusion is *gold possibly being a compound*.

First: Determine empirically that our neurophysiology is □.

Second: '□-gold' =_df_ whatever presents goldishly to □-observers

Third: It seemed gold could be a compound because □-gold can be a compound.

This is what Kripke calls "mak[ing] the alleged definition into a scientific discovery" (140) □-gold can be a compound, but that doesn't explain why *gold* struck us as possibly composite, because who knew we were □?
Kripkea Culpa?

"the property by which we identify [heat] originally, that of producing such and such a sensation in us, is not a necessary property but a contingent one. This very phenomenon could have existed, but due to differences in our neural structures and so on, have failed to be felt as heat" (NN, 133)

If the (covertly icy) table in _w_, to explain our illusion, has to be substitutable for the real one without our noticing, shouldn't the (covertly high-energy) cold in _w_ have to be substitutable for real cold without our noticing? "Difference in our neural structures" are not allowed in the table case, so why now?
Because fool's cold is not possible -- only dunce's

@

To real Steve, low energy feels cold

To real Steve, high energy feels warm

Mmm...

To Twin-Steve high energy feels cold
Why the Twin-Steve explanation isn't psychoanalytically acceptable

How can it explain the seeming possibility of this cold turning out to be high energy to point to a world where Twin-Steve experiencing high energy as cold?

The Twin-Steve possibility is explanatory only to the extent that I can say "I could be feeling what he is and it would feel just the same." But it wouldn't.
Parting anti-dualist thought

Def. $X$ is "manifest" insofar as mucking with $X$'s constitution changes its appearance; it is hard to build a facsimile of $X$ out of other materials, even though it seems clearly possible that $X$ is built out of those materials.

If $X$ is manifest, then (by definition) seeming possibilities for $X$'s physical makeup are not backed by real possibilities for $X$-facsimiles.

Cold and pain are manifest. Just as we do not expect the seeming possibility of high-energy cold to be backed by the real possibility of high-energy fool's cold, we should not expect the seeming possibility of non-c-fiberish pain to be backed by the real possibility of non-c-fiberish fool's pain.
The end