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Keywords: central bank intervention, strategic trading, price reversal, price volatility

JEL classification: G14, G18

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Strategic Trading When Central Bank Intervention Is Predictable

Abstract

Market prices are noisy signals of economic fundamentals. In a two-period model, we show that if the central bank uses market prices as guidance for intervention, large strategic investors (who benefit from high prices) may temporarily depress market prices to induce a market-supportive intervention. Stronger anticipated interventions lead to larger price depressions pre-intervention and sharper price reversals post-intervention. The presence of central bank intervention harms strategic investors even though it is the investors who try to mislead the central bank. The model provides a strategic explanation for asset price dynamics around central bank interventions.
1 Introduction

Central bank interventions have a material impact on financial markets. A hike or cut of the short-term risk-free interest rate affects the discount rate of all assets. To combat the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and its aftermath, not only did major central banks cut short-term interest rates to zero or negative territories, they have also conducted unprecedented asset purchases, including government securities, mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and even equities.1 These actions were aimed to offset the worsening market conditions and stimulate the economy. When central banks were still debating whether their balance sheets with trillions of dollars of assets should be unwound, the COVID-19 pandemic plunged financial markets and the global economy into another crisis. Once again, major central banks immediately cut short-term interest rates and have restarted aggressive asset purchases to stabilize the market.

In this paper, we study how strategic investors exploit central bank interventions that aim to mitigate perceived deterioration of economic fundamentals as inferred from asset price declines. We show that if the central bank is anticipated to support the market following a price decline, then strategic investors will produce such a price decline to induce the intervention. Although the central bank anticipates such “manipulation,” this strategic interaction still produces unintended consequences.

We consider a two-period economy with a single risky asset, say the stock market. The final payoff of the risky asset, which we refer to as the economic fundamental, is observed by a unit mass of risk-averse competitive investors who also receive endowment shocks. In period 1 of the economy, the competitive informed investors submit an endogenous demand schedule that balances profit-making and hedging motives to maximize their expected utility.

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1 Government securities are purchased by all major central banks during their quantitative easing operations, including the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BoE), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). MBS purchases were conducted by the Fed and the ECB. Corporate bond purchases were conducted by the ECB and the BoE. The BoJ has purchased equity ETFs.
There are also $J \geq 1$ risk-neutral strategic investors, and investor $j$ starts with $\lambda_j$ units of the risky asset. The total holding $\Lambda \equiv \sum_j \lambda_j$ is assumed to be common knowledge, but each individual $\lambda_j$ could be private information. The strategic investors are “large” in the sense that they take into account the price impact of their trades. Strategic investors do not observe economic fundamentals. Facing the unobserved demand curve of the informed investors, each strategic investor $j$ chooses an endogenous sale amount $x_j$, where a negative $x_j$ means a purchase. Investor $j$’s trade $x_j$ is determined in period 1 and is unobservable to anyone else, including the central bank. The equilibrium price $p_1$ equates the demand of the informed investors and the supply $\sum_j x_j$ of strategic uninformed investors. Because the price $p_1$ mixes informed investors’ information and their endowment shocks, $p_1$ is a noisy signal of the economic fundamental.

The central bank does not observe the economic fundamental, either, but it infers it from the price $p_1$ of the risky asset. The central bank is assumed to have an inherent preference to support asset prices if the perceived economic fundamental is weak (e.g., by cutting interest rates or purchasing assets in the open market), and to reduce asset prices if the perceived economic fundamental is strong (e.g., by hiking interest rates or selling assets). We refer to the central bank’s action broadly as “intervention,” which in practical terms include routine changes of the interest rate and more unconventional policies such as asset purchases. Intervention takes place at the very beginning of period 2, which is, of course, after $p_1$ is realized.

In period 2, the final realized asset price $p_2$ is the sum of the economic fundamental plus the effect of central bank intervention. Investors’ asset holdings are evaluated at $p_2$. There is no further action.

Before proceeding to the equilibrium characterization, it is useful to further motivate two features of the model. The first is the central bank’s preference. The literature has shown that central banks respond to stock prices. For example, Rigobon and Sack (2003) find that
“an unexpected increase in the S&P 500 index by 5 percent increases the federal funds rate expected after the next FOMC meeting by about 14 basis points.” Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) find that a real stock price increase of one percent leads to an increase in the Federal Reserve’s interest rate close to 4 basis points. Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020) find that “[a] 10% stock market decline predicts a reduction in the FFR target of 32 bps at the next meeting and 127 bps after one year.”

The second feature of the model is the focus on the strategic action of large uninformed investors. Central banks intervene predominantly at the market level, such as reducing the risk-free interest rate and conducting large-scale asset purchases. It is well known that the returns of stocks, bonds, and other major asset classes are difficult to predict at short horizons. Indeed, the majority of investors are mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutions, who hold diversified portfolios to earn long-term risk premia, rather than predicting the short-term asset returns. These investors are large and strategic.

We find that strategic investors who have (approximately) above-average initial holdings engage in “excessive sell-off” of the risky asset in period 1, in order to “persuade” the central bank to intervene and support asset prices. Intuitively, because the asset price is only a noisy signal of economic fundamentals, a larger sale amount may be read by the central bank as a weak fundamental, leading to interventions that are more supportive of asset prices. The resulting higher prices benefit those investors with large asset holdings. Due to their excessive sell-off, in equilibrium, the expected pre-intervention price $E(p_1)$ is below the expected post-intervention price $E(p_2)$. Therefore, strategic investors with large initial holdings suffer from selling the risky assets at too low a price. In contrast, strategic investors who have below-average initial asset holdings purchase the asset asset at $p_1$ as it is a profit opportunity. In equilibrium, large sellers dominate small buyers, so the pre-intervention net order flow is still a sale.

In equilibrium, the central bank correctly anticipates the net sale from strategic investors
and forms the correct expectation of fundamentals. But why would large strategic investors remain sellers despite the cost and their inability to mislead the central bank? The reason is that the central bank cannot observe off-equilibrium deviations. If the large investors refrained from selling, or if they sold too little, the smaller-than-expected sale amount would lead to a higher pre-intervention market price, reducing the central bank’s supportive intervention that these investor seek in the first place. In other words, large strategic investors sell despite the cost because not selling is even more costly. This nature of the equilibrium is reminiscent of the signal-jamming model of Stein (1989). The large strategic investors become the victim of their own strategic behavior.

The assumption that each strategic investor’s sale amount $x_j$ is unobservable by the central bank is, therefore, important for the equilibrium. In practice, large investors only disclose their positions infrequently. For example, institutional investors in the U.S. with assets above $100$ million need to file their asset holdings to the SEC only every quarter (form 13F, within 45 days of quarter-ends), and short positions are not reported. In addition, institutional investors may request further delays in disclosure, subject to SEC approval. Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013) find that these “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, in particular hedge funds, earn abnormal returns. Understandably, a complete disclosure of holdings and trading records can greatly reduce investors’ alpha (if any) and expose them to other predatory traders such as “front-runners.” For all these reasons, our assumption that $x_j^*$ is private information seems reasonable.

Our results predict that pre-intervention asset prices tend to drop “too much” relative to what is justified by economic fundamentals, followed by a reversal post-intervention. The more aggressive is the anticipated central bank’s intervention, the larger is strategic investor’s

\footnote{When a request is pending approval from the SEC, the institutional investor does not need to disclose.}

\footnote{Here, “alpha” refers to the excess returns of security selection, as in the vast literature of the cross section of stock returns. Investors who have positive alphas for picking securities may still be uninformed when it comes to predicting market returns. Indeed, many investors that are supposed to have positive alphas in security selection try to hedge out market exposure.}
net sale pre-intervention, the lower is the pre-intervention asset price, and the stronger is the price reversal post-intervention. In addition, strategic investors trade against each other pre-intervention. Large ones sell to induce a favorable intervention, whereas small ones buy to benefit from a temporarily depressed price. Both empirical predictions can be tested in the data.

Another unintended consequence of central bank intervention is its impact on asset volatility. In the equilibrium, the variances of $p_1$ and $p_2$ are both U-shaped functions of the aggressiveness of central bank intervention. Compared to a world without intervention, a moderate central bank intervention reduces asset price volatility, but a sufficiently aggressive intervention ends up increasing asset price volatility. As long as the intervention offsets shocks to perceived fundamentals no more than one-for-one, intervention reduces asset price volatility, as intended.

Our results contribute to the literature on the role of asset prices in setting monetary policy. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that “[monetary] policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation.” Fuhrer and Tootell (2008) find that the Federal Reserve’s rate decisions responded to equity markets only through their impact on the forecasts of inflation and output gap. Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020) find that negative stock returns predict changes in the Federal Reserve’s target interest rates “mostly due to their strong correlation with downgrades to the Fed’s growth expectations and the Fed’s assessment of current economic growth.”

Yet, we show that even when asset prices are used as monetary policy input only for their information content about economic fundamentals, central banks should nonetheless consider the possibility that strategic players in the market may artificially depress asset prices to induce favorable interventions. Although the central bank in our model is not misled by the market at all, in reality the central bank can at most guess it correctly on average. Errors in inference are unavoidable if any of the common-knowledge assumptions
is violated or if a group of market participants coordinate (“collude”) implicitly to influence the central bank’s action.

At the theoretical level, our paper is most related to the literature on feedback effects. The key idea of this literature is that financial markets affect the real economy by discovering important information. For this reason, the vast majority of papers in this literature focus on the strategic behavior of informed investors and how they affect the actions of firms’ managers and governments through price discovery. Key papers focusing on informed investors include Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), Khanna and Mathews (2012), Bond and Goldstein (2015), Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2015), Boleslavsky, Kelly, and Taylor (2017), and Ahnert, Machado and Pereira (2020), among others. In Benhabib, Liu, and Wang (2019), both the investors and the firms are informed (but not identically), and they learn from each other through prices. We show that uninformed investors can still strategically exploit the feedback effect—a step toward broadening the applicable scope of feedback theories.

Goldstein and Guembel (2008) study the strategic behavior of a large uninformed investor in a feedback-effect model. In their setting, the uninformed investor short-sells the stock, so that the depressed price may misguide the firm manager to take suboptimal investment actions. If successful, such manipulation will indeed worsen the firm’s fundamental, justifying the short selling to start with. The critical difference of our model is that the uninformed investors actually benefit from a higher market valuation, and yet they depress asset prices to induce favorable interventions and profit from a higher valuation of their remaining assets.
2 Model

There are two periods, $t = 1, 2$. For simplicity, we assume that there is zero time discounting. The traded risky asset has a fundamental value of

$$v = \theta + \varepsilon,$$

(1)

where $\theta \sim N(0, \tau^{-1}_\theta)$ and $\varepsilon \sim N(0, \tau^{-1}_\varepsilon)$ are independent.

There are three types of players in the model: a unit mass of infinitesimal informed investors who also receive endowment shocks, $J \geq 1$ large strategic uninformed investors, and a central bank. The informed investors and uninformed investors act simultaneously in period 1. The central bank acts in period 2, after observing the period-1 market-clearing price.

**Informed investors.** Each informed investor perfectly observes $\theta$. No one in the economy observes $\varepsilon$. In addition, each informed investor has a nontradable endowment that pays $-u\varepsilon$ in period 2, where $u \sim N(0, \tau^{-1}_u)$ is independent of $\theta$ and $\varepsilon$, and only informed investors observe $u$. Given the continuum of informed investors, it is without loss of generality to focus on one investor. Denote by $D$ the demand of the risky asset by a generic informed investor. Her wealth at period 2 is

$$w^i_2 = D(p_2 - p_1) - u\varepsilon,$$

(2)

where $p_2$ and $p_1$ are the prices at $t = 2$ and $t = 1$ respectively. Each informed investor has a constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility functions over wealth:

$$-\exp(-w^i_2/\rho),$$

(3)
where $1/\rho > 0$ is the risk aversion coefficient. She chooses the trading strategy in period 1, represented by a demand curve $D(p_1, \theta, u)$, to maximize the expected utility

$$E[- \exp(-w_2^i/\rho) \mid p_1, \theta, u]. \quad (4)$$

Here, the investor can condition on $p_1$ because the demand curve allows the investor to choose the optimal demand at each price. This CARA setting is a standard way to generate an endogenous demand curve. There are other ways to do this.

**Strategic uninformed investors.** The second type of investors are the strategic uninformed investors. There are $J \geq 1$ of them, and investor $j$ is endowed with $\lambda_j > 0$ shares of the risky asset at the beginning of period 1. The total asset holding of all uninformed investors is a commonly known constant

$$\Lambda \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{J} \lambda_j > 0. \quad (5)$$

Each uninformed investor chooses an endogenous and unrestricted amount $x_j$ to sell in period 1 at the market-clearing price $p_1$, taking into account the price impact. A negative sale is a purchase. As discussed in the introduction, the sale amount $x_j$ is unobservable to anyone else, including the central bank. The remaining amount $\lambda_j - x_j$ would be evaluated at the period-2 price $p_2$. The total wealth of uninformed investor $j$ in period 2 is

$$w_{2,j}^u \equiv x_j p_1 + (\lambda_j - x_j) p_2. \quad (6)$$

Each uninformed investor chooses $x_j$ to maximize her expected profit, where the expectation is unconditional because we assumed, for simplicity, that each uninformed investor uses a
market order that does not condition on the price $p_1$.\footnote{In Section 5 we allow the uninformed investors to submit demand schedules, and the qualitative results do not change.}

**Central bank.** The final player in the model is the central bank. The central bank is assumed to intervene in the market in a direction opposite to the perceived shocks in economic fundamentals. Specifically, denoting by $z$ the central bank’s action after observing $p_1$, we assume that the central bank’s maximization problem is

$$\max_z E \left[ z \left( \alpha_0 - \alpha_1 v \right) - \frac{c}{2} z^2 \right| p_1],$$

(7)

where $\alpha_0$ (no sign restriction), $\alpha_1 > 0$, and $c > 0$ are commonly known constants. Here, the marginal benefit of intervention $E(\alpha_0 - \alpha_1 v \mid p_1)$ is higher if the perceived economic fundamental $E(v \mid p)$ is lower, and the term $\frac{c}{2} z^2$ represents increasing marginal costs of central bank intervention (see also Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) and Bond and Goldstein (2015)).

The central bank intervention $z$ directly affects the period-2 price in a simple additive way:

$$p_2 = v + bz = \theta + \varepsilon + bz,$$

(8)

where $b > 0$ represents the effectiveness of central bank intervention. The assumption of $b > 0$ is a normalization, and a market-supporting intervention corresponds to an increase in $z$. For example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that “a hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes.” In this context, the intervention $z$ is the reduction in the target interest rate and $b$ is approximately $1\%/0.25\% = 4$. In a different context of asset purchases, D’Amico and King (2013) find that during the Large-Scale Asset Purchases of 2009, every $10$ billion of Treasuries bought is associated with a seven basis point increase in the price
of the purchased Treasury security. Here, $z$ is the amount of asset purchase in $\text{billions}$ and $b$ is approximately $0.07%/10 = 0.007\%$.

In practical terms, we may interpret $v = \theta + \varepsilon$ as the “no-intervention” price, and the intervention $z$ could represent a change in the central bank interest rate or government spending that add on top of the no-intervention price.

While this simplistic formulation of the central bank’s preference is reduced-form, it is not difficult to map it to reality. For example, an equity market crash during the COVID-19 pandemic contains bearish information about corporate earnings, investments, consumer demand, and employment. By directly cutting the benchmark interest rate (e.g. Fed Fund rate) or conducting asset purchases (e.g. Treasuries, MBS, and corporate bonds), the central bank aims to reverse these negative impact. Caballero and Simsek (2020) show theoretically that interest rate cuts and asset purchases can effectively mitigate the adverse economic consequences of large supply shocks. The term $E(z(\alpha_0 - \alpha_1 v) \mid p_1)$ represents how much the central bank “values” an action that offsets a perceived deterioration in fundamentals. The term $-\frac{\xi}{2} z^2$ represents the costs of intervention that is already taken into account by the central bank, such as potentially higher inflation, moral hazard, and the unequal benefits of asset appreciation accrued to different demographic groups.

The mitigation of perceived shocks to economic fundamentals is not the only purpose of central bank intervention in practice. Pasquariello (2018) and Pasquariello, Roush, and Vega (2020) study central bank intervention when the central bank tries to achieve a nonpublic “price target” while minimizing trading losses against informed investors. This different objective, however, is outside the scope of this paper.
3 Equilibrium

In this section we characterize a linear equilibrium of the following form:

Central bank’s intervention : \( z(p_1) = k_0 - k_1 p_1 \), \( (9) \)

Informed investors’ demand : \( D(p_1, \theta, u) = u + \delta \theta + \gamma_0 - \gamma_1 p_1 \), \( (10) \)

Uninformed investor \( j \)'s sale : \( x_j^*, \text{ for } j = 1, \ldots, J \), \( (11) \)

where \((k_0, k_1, \delta, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \{x_j^*\}_{j=1}^J)\) are endogenous constants.

As usual, each player takes as given other players’ strategies when maximizing her own conditional expected utility.

**Central bank.** The central bank chooses \( z \) to maximize \( E \left[ z (\alpha_0 - \alpha_1 v) - \frac{c}{2} z^2 \mid p_1 \right] \). Given this preference, the central bank’s optimal intervention is

\[
z^* = \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_1 E(\theta|p_1)}{c} = A_0 - A_1 E(\theta|p_1), \tag{12}\]

where

\[
A_0 \equiv \frac{\alpha_0}{c} \text{ and } A_1 \equiv \frac{\alpha_1}{c}. \tag{13}\]

By \( E(\theta) = 0 \), we have \( E[z(p_1)] = A_0 - A_1 E[E(\theta \mid p_1)] = A_0 \). Thus, the parameter \( A_0 \) represents the “dovish” \((A_0 > 0)\), “neutral” \((A_0 = 0)\), or “hawkish” \((A_0 < 0)\) leaning of the central bank. The parameter \( A_1 \) represents the sensitivity of the central bank’s action to the perceived economic fundamental, which we also referred to as the aggressiveness of central bank intervention.

To solve the central bank’s strategy, we need to solve the inference problem \( E(\theta \mid p_1) \).
Define the aggregate selling by the strategic uninformed investors as

\[ X^* \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{J} x_j^*. \]  \hfill (14)

Using the informed demand function (10) and the market-clearing condition \( X^* = D(p_1, \theta, u) \), the central bank infers the price from the following signal:

\[ s_p \equiv \frac{1}{\delta} (\gamma_1 p_1 - \gamma_0 + X^*) = \theta + \frac{1}{\delta} u. \]  \hfill (15)

By the usual projection theorem for the normal distribution, we obtain the following optimal intervention strategy of the central bank:

\[ z(p_1) = A_0 + \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_0 - X^*)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} - \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u \gamma_1}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} p_1. \]  \hfill (16)

Comparing (16) with the conjectured intervention strategy (9), we have

\[ k_0 = A_0 + \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_0 - X^*)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u}, \]  \hfill (17)

\[ k_1 = \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u \gamma_1}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u}. \]  \hfill (18)

**Informed investors.** A representative informed investor chooses \( D \) to maximize

\[ E \left[ - \exp \left( -\frac{w_2^i}{\rho} \right) \mid \theta, u, p_1 \right], \]  \hfill (19)

where

\[ w_2^i = D(p_2 - p_1) - u \varepsilon. \]  \hfill (20)
Solving the above problem, we can get the following demand function:

$$D(p_1, \theta, u) = u + \rho \tau \varepsilon (\theta + bz - p_1). \quad (21)$$

Inserting the conjectured intervention rule (9) into (21), we can compute

$$D(p_1, \theta, u) = u + \delta \theta + \delta bk_0 - \delta (bk_1 + 1) p_1. \quad (22)$$

Comparing (22) with the conjectured trading strategy (10), we have:

$$\delta = \rho \tau \varepsilon, \quad (23)$$
$$\gamma_0 = \delta bk_0, \quad (24)$$
$$\gamma_1 = \delta (bk_1 + 1). \quad (25)$$

**Strategic uninformed investors.** Without loss of generality, let us consider uninformed investor $j$. She takes as given central bank’s intervention strategy (9), informed investors’ demand function (10), and other uninformed investors’ selling $x^*_j$, to maximize her expected profits, $E(w^u_{2,j})$, where $w^u_{2,j} = x_j p_1 + (\lambda_j - x_j) p_2$.

Using the informed demand function (10) and the market-clearing condition $X^* = D(p_1, \theta, u)$, investor $j$ understands that

$$p_1 = \frac{1}{\gamma_1} \left( \gamma_0 + \delta \theta + u - x_j - \sum_{j' \neq j} x^*_{j'} \right). \quad (26)$$

This equation implies that investor $j$ may have an incentive to increase $x_j$ to reduce $p_1$, which in turn increases the central bank’s intervention $z(p_1)$. In addition, investor $j$ fully takes into account the price impact of her sales, $\frac{\partial p_1}{\partial x_j} = -\frac{1}{\gamma_1}$.

By $p_2 = \theta + bz + \varepsilon$, the central bank’s intervention rule (9), and investor $j$’s perceived
pricing function (26), we can compute
\[ E(w_{2,j}^a) = -\frac{1 + bk_1}{\gamma_1} x_j^2 + \left[ \frac{\lambda_j bk_1}{\gamma_1} + \frac{1 + bk_1}{\gamma_1} \left( \gamma_0 - \sum_{j' \neq j} x_{j'}^* \right) - bk_0 \right] x_j \\
+ \lambda_j \left( bk_0 - bk_1 \frac{\gamma_0 - \sum_{j' \neq j} x_{j'}^*}{\gamma_1} \right). \] (27)

By (23) and (25), the second-order coefficient in (27) is \(-1 + (1 + bk_1) / \gamma_1 = -1/(\rho \tau \varepsilon) < 0\). Thus, the optimal sale \(x_j^*\) of investor \(j\) is given by the usual first-order condition, which gives
\[ x_j^* = \frac{\lambda_j bk_1 + (1 + bk_1) \left( \gamma_0 - \sum_{j' \neq j} x_{j'}^* \right) - \gamma_1 bk_0}{2(1 + bk_1)}. \] (28)

From the system of equations (17), (18), (23), (24), (25), and (28), we can solve \(k_0, k_1, \delta, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \) and \(\{x_j^*\}_{j=1}^J\). The following proposition presents the solution.

**Proposition 1** There exists a unique linear equilibrium with the strategies given by equations (9)–(11), where

\[ k_0 = \frac{A_0 (J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) ^2 - b A_1^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u)}, \] (29)
\[ k_1 = \frac{A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \] (30)
\[ \delta = \rho \tau \varepsilon, \] (31)
\[ \gamma_0 = \frac{\delta^2 b A_0 (J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) ^2 - b A_1^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u)}, \] (32)
\[ \gamma_1 = \frac{\delta (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \] (33)
\[ x_j^* = \frac{b A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} \left( \lambda_j - \frac{\Lambda}{J + 1} \right), \forall j. \] (34)

The equilibrium total amount of sales by strategic uninformed investors is
\[ X^* \equiv \sum_{j=1}^J x_j^* = \frac{b A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} \frac{\Lambda}{J + 1}. \] (35)
We will defer the discussions of the equilibrium outcomes to the next section, but let us briefly discuss two features that already stand out from the characterization of equilibrium itself. The first is the strategic trading behavior of uninformed investors. The expression of $x_j^*$ reveals that uninformed investors with relatively large (small) initial asset positions submit sell (buy) orders in period 1. Intuitively, uninformed investors with large initial asset holdings sell to depress $p_1$ and draw out a favorable central bank intervention because supportive interventions increase the value of their remaining assets in period 2. But, as we see in the next section, their selling pressure will reduce the period-1 price, so that investors with small initial asset holdings find it attractive to buy. The aggregate sale amount by strategic uninformed investors, $X^*$, is always positive and decreases at the rate of $1/(J+1)$.

Although the central bank can correctly anticipate the aggregate sales $X^*$ on equilibrium paths, it cannot observe the off-equilibrium deviations. Thus, given the central bank’s belief about $X^*$, refraining from selling would give the central bank an incorrect bullish signal about fundamentals and reduce its supportive intervention, which would be self-defeating.

The second feature of the equilibrium is that the demand curves of the informed investors becomes upward-sloping if $\gamma_1 < 0$, or if $\tau_\theta + (1 - bA_1)\delta^2\tau_u < 0$. (Note that an upward-sloping demand curve does not violate the second-order condition.) This situation happens if $bA_1 > 1 + \tau_\theta/(\delta^2\tau_u)$, i.e., if the central bank intervention is sufficiently aggressive. Moreover, whenever $\gamma_1 < 0$, $k_1 < 0$ as well, so the central bank becomes a “momentum trader”: its action goes in the same direction of the period-1 price.

To get some intuition about what “aggressive” intervention means here, write

$$E(p_2 \mid p_1) = E(\theta \mid p_1) + b(A_0 - A_1E(\theta \mid p_1)) = bA_0 + (1 - bA_1)E(\theta \mid p_1). \quad (36)$$

If $bA_1 < 1$, the central bank’s intervention merely mitigates the perceived shock to fundamentals given $p_1$. If $bA_1 = 1$, the central bank’s intervention exactly offsets it. But if
$bA_1 > 1$, the central bank’s intervention will more than reverse the perceived shock in fundamentals, i.e., a lower perceived fundamental leads to a higher asset price. It is in this last situation that $\gamma_1 < 0$ and $k_1 < 0$ become possible. Intuitively, because the central bank intervention will more than offset the perceived shocks in fundamentals, a lower $E(\theta \mid p_1)$ is in fact “good news” for asset prices. Informed investors, who observe $\theta$, send a demand curve that is increasing in price $p_1$; equivalently, the price $p_1$ in (26) is decreasing in fundamentals. Hence, the central bank’s intervention $z(p_1)$ becomes increasing in $p_1$ as well (i.e., $k_1$ is negative).

### 3.1 Comparison with Benchmarks

Before analyzing the implications of the equilibrium, it is instructive to compare this equilibrium with two benchmarks. The first benchmark is that there is no central bank intervention, i.e., $b = 0$. The second is that there are infinitely many uninformed investors, i.e., $J \to \infty$. The corollary below summarizes both benchmarks.

**Corollary 1** (a) Suppose $b = 0$. Then:

$$
\gamma_0 = 0, \gamma_1 = \delta = \rho \tau \epsilon, \text{ and } x_j^* = 0 \text{ for all } j. \tag{37}
$$
(b) Fix $\Lambda$ and let $J \to \infty$. Then:

\begin{align*}
k_0 & \to \frac{A_0 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u - b \delta^2 \tau_u A_1}, \\
k_1 & = \frac{A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
\gamma_0 & \to \frac{b \delta A_0 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
\gamma_1 & = \frac{\delta (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
x^*_j & \to \frac{b A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} \lambda_j, \\
X^* & \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{J} x^*_j \to 0.
\end{align*}

In the benchmark without central bank intervention, strategic uninformed investors do not trade in period 1 at all. They can affect the price but there is no benefit of doing so. Obviously, the aggregate order flow from uninformed investors is also zero.

In the benchmark with infinitely many uninformed investors, the uninformed investors’ aggregate order flow $X^*$ converges to zero as well. But strategic uninformed investors with a sufficiently large initial holding $\lambda_j$ still sell in period 1 to depress the price and induce a supportive central bank intervention. Note that the uninformed investors need not diminish individually as $J \to \infty$. For example, if a large investor holds 10% of the risky asset for all $J$, then this investor will always be a large seller even if the remaining 90% of risky assets are dispersed across (possibly infinitely) many small investors. In equilibrium, the large investor sells and the remaining investors buy, leading to a zero net order flow from uninformed investors in the limit.

We can make the second benchmark yet more special by requiring that each $\lambda_j \to 0$ as $J \to \infty$. A common way of doing so is to impose symmetry: $\lambda_j = \Lambda / J$ for all $j$. In this case, all uninformed investors become “small” and each $x^*_j \to 0$ as well.

These two benchmarks reveal that the presence of central bank intervention is a necessary
condition for the strategic sales of assets by any uninformed investor. In contrast, the large initial asset holdings of some uninformed investors are sufficient to generate strategic sales by these investors, although the aggregate sale amount still converges to zero as the number of investors increases. Theoretically, the distinction of the two benchmarks can be seen in the trading behavior: all else equal, the benchmark equilibrium with many uninformed investors (and the central bank) would still see active transactions among the investors, whereas the benchmark without central bank intervention would not.

4 Properties of the Equilibrium

In this section, we discuss market outcomes and investor profits in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.

4.1 Market Outcomes

We start with the market outcomes, including the mean and variance of the prices in the two periods ($p_1$ and $p_2$) and the return between the two periods ($p_2 - p_1$).

Proposition 2 In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, the unconditional means and variances
The conditional mean and variance of the return $p_2 - p_1$ are:

\[
E(p_2 - p_1 | p_1) = b \frac{A_0 (J + 1) \tau_\theta (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) + \Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2 A_1 (1 - b A_1)}{(J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u)} - \frac{\tau_\theta}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u} p_1,
\]

\[
Var(p_2 - p_1 | p_1) = \frac{1}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} + \frac{1}{\tau_\epsilon},
\]

We denote the size of mean-reversion in the price by

\[
\eta \equiv \frac{\tau_\theta}{\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}.
\]

By the expressions of $k_1$ and $\gamma_1$ in Proposition 1, we have

\[
\eta > 0 \iff k_1 > 0 \iff \gamma_1 > 0 \iff b A_1 > 1 + \frac{\tau_\theta}{\delta^2 \tau_u}.
\]

As discussed before, the return exhibit momentum (a higher $p_1$ implies a higher $p_2 - p_1$) if and only if the central bank’s intervention is sufficiently aggressive. Conversely, if one reads
actual market prices in the context of the model, the size of mean-reversion can also be used to judge the aggressiveness of central bank intervention.

The comparative statics of the market outcomes are summarized in the following proposition.

Proposition 3 Suppose that $b > 0$ and $A_1 > 0$ (but $A_0$ has unrestricted signs). The comparative statics of the model are summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome of interest</th>
<th>$\frac{\partial}{\partial b}$</th>
<th>$\frac{\partial}{\partial A_0}$</th>
<th>$\frac{\partial}{\partial A_1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X^*$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x^*_j$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$ iff $\lambda_j &gt; \frac{A_1}{J+1}$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$ iff $\lambda_j &gt; \frac{A_1}{J+1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E(p_1)$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$ iff $A_0 (J+1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) &gt; \Lambda \delta \tau_u A_1$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td>$&lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Var(p_1)$</td>
<td>$&lt; 0$ iff $\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u &gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&lt; 0$ iff $\tau_\theta + (1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u &gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E(p_2)$</td>
<td>$A_0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Var(p_2)$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$ iff $b A_1 &gt; 1$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$ iff $b A_1 &gt; 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E(p_2 - p_1)$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Var(p_2 - p_1)$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$&gt; 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us now discuss the intuition of Proposition 3. Our primary variable of interest is $A_1$ (column 3 of Proposition 3), the aggressiveness of central bank intervention.

A more aggressive central bank intervention $A_1$ leads to a larger total sale amount $X^*$ by strategic investors, in an attempt to “persuade” the central bank to support the market. Again, although the equilibrium sale amount is anticipated, the central bank cannot observe the off-equilibrium deviation of strategic investors. Depending on the distribution of initial asset holdings $\{\lambda_j\}$ across investors, each individual $x^*_j$ may be positive or negative (see Proposition 1), but a larger $A_1$ always make the dispersion of $\{x^*_j\}$ more pronounced. Overall, the net “excessive sale” by strategic investors depresses the expected period-1 price $E(p_1)$. 21
But the strategic net sale of large investors and the anticipated central bank intervention offset each other perfectly, leading to a constant expected period-2 price \( E(p_2) \). Consequently, a higher \( A_1 \) increases the return \( E(p_2 - p_1) \) as well and the size of mean reversion \( \eta \). The model thus predicts that, around predictable central bank interventions, asset prices exhibit a V-shaped pattern, and this pattern is more pronounced the more aggressive is the intervention.

Implications for asset volatility are more nuanced. Presumably, central bank intervention aims to reduce asset price volatility. But the expression of \( \frac{\partial \text{Var}(p_2)}{\partial A_1} \) reveals that sufficiently aggressive intervention increases asset price volatility. To be specific, intervention minimizes \( \text{Var}(p_2) \) if \( bA_1 = 1 \), that is, if intervention aims to offset the change in economic fundamental one-for-one. A further increase in the aggressiveness of intervention, however, may end up increasing volatility. Indeed, if \( bA_1 > 2 \), \( \text{Var}(p_2) \) is higher under intervention than under no intervention. This result cautions against the use of “proactive” or “preemptive” interventions, which alludes to an implicit objective of supporting the market even when economic fundamentals do not yet warrant such aggressive measures \( (bA_1 > 1) \). It is those types of interventions that are most likely to increase market volatility.

A similar logic applies to pre-intervention variance \( \text{Var}(p_1) \). If \( \tau_\theta + (1 - bA_1)\delta^2\tau_u > 0 \), \( \text{Var}(p_1) \) is decreasing in the aggressiveness \( A_1 \) of intervention. Otherwise, \( \text{Var}(p_1) \) is increasing in \( A_1 \). Recall that \( \tau_\theta + (1 - bA_1)\delta^2\tau_u < 0 \) also implies that the investors’ demand curve is upward-sloping in price \( p_1 \) and the central bank intervenes in the same direction of market prices shocks.

The comparative statics with respect to \( b \) is very similar to those with respect to \( A_1 \). This is because the total impact of intervention is \( bz(p_1) = b(A_0 - A_1E(\theta \mid p_1)) \), so \( bA_1 \) often shows up as a pair. Yet, \( b \) and \( A_1 \) do not have fully identical effects because of \( A_0 \). If \( A_0 = 0 \), columns 1 and 3 would be identical. Indeed, the only difference between column 1 and column 3 of Proposition 3 is \( E(p_1) \) and \( E(p_2) \). Even there, under a market-neutral central bank \( (A_0 = 0) \), we have \( \partial E(p_1) / \partial b < 0 \) and \( \partial E(p_2) / \partial b = 0 \), just like \( \partial E(p_1) / \partial A_1 < 0 \).
and $\partial E(p_2)/\partial A_1 = 0$. Finally, the ex ante bias of the central bank $A_0$ directly affects the prices $E(p_1)$ and $E(p_2)$, but it does not affect asset volatility.

### 4.2 Investor Profits

We now analyze the impact of central bank intervention for uninformed investors’ profits and informed investors’ (risk-adjusted) profits.

We start with the strategic uninformed investors. Investor $j$’s profit is:

\[
U_{u,j}^* = E\left[(x_j^* p_1 + (1 - x_j^*) p_2\right] \\
= \lambda_j b A_0 - \left(\lambda_j - \frac{\Lambda}{J + 1}\right) \frac{A_1^2 b^2 \Lambda \delta^2 \tau_u^2}{(J + 1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}.
\]

(54)

The aggregate profit of all strategic uninformed investors is:

\[
U_u^* = \sum_{j=1}^{J} U_{u,j}^* = b A_0 \Lambda - \frac{A_1^2 b^2 \Lambda^2 \delta^2 \tau_u^2}{(J + 1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}.
\]

(55)

Next, let’s consider the informed investors. The ex-ante unconditional utility of the unit mass of investors is $E\left[-e^{-\frac{1}{\rho} (D(p_1, \theta, u)(p_2 - p_1) - u\epsilon)}\right]$. We can use the certainty equivalent to represent their utility, or risk-adjusted profit:

\[
U_i^* = -\rho \ln \left(-E\left[-e^{-\frac{1}{\rho} (D(p_1, \theta, u)(p_2 - p_1) - u\epsilon)}\right]\right).
\]

(56)

Direct computation gives:

\[
U_i^* = \frac{\rho}{2} \ln \left(\frac{\delta \rho \tau_u - 1}{\delta \rho \tau_u}\right) + \frac{A_1^2 b^2 \Lambda^2 \delta^2 \tau_u^2}{2 (J + 1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}.
\]

(57)
In order for the above to be well-defined, we require:

\[ \delta \rho \tau_u \equiv \rho^2 \tau_u \tau_u > 1. \]  \tag{58} 

Otherwise, \( U_i^* \) diverges. This kind of condition is standard in the literature (e.g., Vayanos and Wang, 2012).

The next proposition summarizes the comparative statics of investor profits.

**Proposition 4** In the equilibrium of Proposition 1, the profit \( U_{u,j}^* \) (i.e., expected profit) of large uninformed investor \( j \) and their aggregate profit \( U_u^* \) are respectively given by (54) and (55); and assuming \( \rho^2 \tau_u > 1 \), the certainty equivalent \( U_i^* \) of informed investors’ utility is given by (57).

Suppose that \( \Lambda > 0, b > 0 \) and \( A_1 > 0 \) (but \( A_0 \) has unrestricted signs). Then,

\[ \frac{\partial U_{u,j}^*}{\partial b} > 0 \iff \lambda_j A_0 > 2 \left( \lambda_j - \frac{\Lambda}{J+1} \right) \frac{A_1^2 b \Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J+1) (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}; \]  \tag{59} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_{u,j}^*}{\partial A_0} = \lambda_j b; \]  \tag{60} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_{u,j}^*}{\partial A_1} = -2 A_1 b^2 \Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2 \left( \frac{\lambda_j - \Lambda}{J+1} \right) < 0 \iff \lambda_j > \frac{\Lambda}{J+1}; \]  \tag{61} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_u^*}{\partial b} > 0 \iff A_0 > \frac{2 A_1^2 b \Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J+1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}; \]  \tag{62} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_u^*}{\partial A_0} = b \Lambda > 0; \]  \tag{63} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_u^*}{\partial A_1} = -2 A_1 b^2 \Lambda^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2 (J+1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2 < 0; \]  \tag{64} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_i^*}{\partial b} = \frac{A_1^2 b \Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J+1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2} > 0; \]  \tag{65} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_i^*}{\partial A_0} = 0; \]  \tag{66} 

\[ \frac{\partial U_i^*}{\partial A_1} = \frac{A_1 b^2 \Lambda^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(J+1)^2 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)^2} > 0. \]  \tag{67} 

24
We discuss the intuition of Proposition 4 under the natural special case of a market-neutral central bank $A_0 = 0$. This way, there are zero unconditional “windfall” gains or losses caused by central bank intervention. As before, we can interpret the absence of central bank intervention as $b = 0$. From the comparative statics of $U_u^*$ with respect to $b$, strategic uninformed investors are collectively harmed by the presence of intervention. This is because potential central bank intervention creates the incentive for the uninformed investors to collectively sell in period 1 at too low a price: $E(p_1) < E(p_2)$. But the impacts on individual uninformed investors are heterogeneous (see $\partial U_{u,j}^*/\partial b$). Those with sufficiently large initial holdings are sellers in period 1 and hence are worse off with central bank intervention. Others are net buyers in period 1 and hence are better off. Likewise, a more aggressive central bank intervention (a larger $A_1$) harms uninformed investors with large initial asset holdings and benefit those with small initial asset holdings (see $\partial U_{u,j}^*/\partial A_1$). The net effect remains negative ($\partial U_u^*/\partial A_1 < 0$).

The above result on uninformed investors suggests that, if our model were a complete characterization of the world, the large uninformed investors ought to refrain from selling and disclose to the central bank as such. The central bank, then, would not misinterpret a smaller-than-expected sale amount as a positive fundamental shock. In other words, full, credible, and continuous disclosures of asset positions and trades of large investors should solve the signal-jamming problem faced by the central bank. Yet, as discussed in the model section, institutional investors in reality have more severe concerns about the complete transparency of their asset holdings than convincing the central bank that they did not attempt to manipulate its belief. For instance, the leakage of valuable proprietary investment strategies inferred from transaction history can greatly reduce the alpha of the institutional investor (see Yang and Zhu (2020)). Even if an investor is uninformed, a full disclosure of trading patterns may also lead to “front-running” concerns of liquidity-driven orders. See also Stein (1989) for additional discussions of why full transparency of actions is not fully realistic in
all situations.

In contrast, the presence of central bank intervention \((b)\) benefits the informed investors, and so does an increase in the aggressiveness of intervention \((A_1)\). The intuition is the standard one. The presence of central bank intervention and its aggressiveness both increase the net sale by uninformed investors at too low a price, so informed investors can benefit from trading against them.

5 Price-Contingent Orders

So far, we have assumed that the strategic uninformed investors submit market orders. In this section, we consider a variant of the model in which uninformed investors submit demand schedules. For simplicity, we consider a single uninformed investor (i.e., \(J = 1\)). Our main results of the previous sections are robust to this variation in the model.

We still consider linear equilibria. The central bank’s intervention rule and the informed investors’ demand function are still given by (9) and (10), respectively. But the strategy of the uninformed investor changes from (11) to the following:

\[
x(p_1) = h_0 + h_1 p_1,
\]

where \(h_0\) and \(h_1\) are endogenous constants.

The derivation of the equilibrium is similar. The main difference is that the uninformed investor now needs to extract information from the market-clearing price \(p_1\) because her transaction can now condition on the price. The derivations are relegated to the appendix. We report the equilibrium strategies and outcomes in the following propositions.

**Proposition 5** There exists a unique linear equilibrium with the strategies given by equations

\[
x(p_1) = h_0 + h_1 p_1,
\]
(9), (10) and (68), where

\[
\begin{align*}
k_0 &= \frac{A_0 (\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u)^2 - 2\Lambda b A_1^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau \theta + 2(1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u)}, \\
k_1 &= \frac{2 A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau \theta + 2(1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
\delta &= \rho \tau \epsilon, \\
\gamma_0 &= \frac{\delta b A_0 (\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u)^2 - 2\Lambda b A_1^2 \delta^3 \tau_u^2}{(\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau \theta + 2(1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u)}, \\
\gamma_1 &= \frac{\delta (\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u)}{\tau \theta + 2(1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
h_0 &= -\frac{b \delta}{\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u} A_0 (\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) - 2\Lambda A_1 \delta \tau_u (\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u - b A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u), \\
h_1 &= \frac{\tau \theta \delta}{\tau \theta + 2(1 - b A_1) \delta^2 \tau_u}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Proposition 6** In the equilibrium of Proposition 5, we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
E [x (p_1)] &= \frac{b A_1 \Lambda \delta^2 \tau_u}{\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
\text{Var} [x (p_1)] &= \frac{\tau \theta}{4 \tau u (\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)}, \\
E (p_1) &= b \left( A_0 - \frac{\Lambda A_1 \delta \tau_u}{\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u} \right), \\
\text{Var} (p_1) &= \frac{(\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u - 2b A_1 \delta^2 \tau_u)^2}{4 (\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u) \tau u \tau \theta \delta^2}, \\
E (p_2) &= A_0 b, \\
\text{Var} (p_2) &= \frac{\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u (1 - b A_1)^2}{\tau \theta (\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)} + \frac{1}{\tau \epsilon}, \\
E (p_2 - p_1) &= \frac{\Lambda b A_1 \delta \tau_u}{\tau \theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u}, \\
\text{Var} (p_2 - p_1) &= \frac{\tau \theta + 4\delta^2 \tau_u}{4 \delta^2 \tau_u (\tau \theta + \delta^2 \tau_u)} + \frac{1}{\tau \epsilon},
\end{align*}
\]
and

\[
E(p_2 - p_1 | p_1) = b\tau_0 A_0 (\tau_0 + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) + 2\Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u A_1 (1 - bA_1) \\
\tau_0 (\tau_0 + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) (\tau_0 + 2(1 - 2bA_1)\delta^2 \tau_u) \\
- \frac{\tau_0 + 2(1 - 2bA_1)\delta^2 \tau_u}{p_1}. \tag{84}
\]

In addition, suppose that \(b > 0\) and \(A_1 > 0\) (but \(A_0\) has unrestricted signs). The comparative statics of the model are summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome of interest</th>
<th>(\frac{\partial}{\partial b})</th>
<th>(\frac{\partial}{\partial A_0})</th>
<th>(\frac{\partial}{\partial A_1})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(E[x(p_1)])</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E(p_1))</td>
<td>&gt; 0 iff (A_0 (\tau_0 + 2\delta^2 \tau_u) &gt; \Lambda A_1 \delta \tau_u) &gt; 0</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Var(p_1))</td>
<td>&lt; 0 iff (\tau_0 + 2\delta^2 \tau_u &gt; 2bA_1 \delta^2 \tau_u) &gt; 0 &lt; 0 iff (\tau_0 + 2\delta^2 \tau_u &gt; 2bA_1 \delta^2 \tau_u)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E(p_2))</td>
<td>(A_0)</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Var(p_2))</td>
<td>&gt; 0 iff (bA_1 &gt; 1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&gt; 0 iff (bA_1 &gt; 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(E(p_2 - p_1))</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Var(p_2 - p_1))</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The qualitative results in Propositions 5 and 6 are similar to those in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. In particular, even if the uninformed investor can use a demand schedule, she is still a net seller in expectation (since \(E[x(p_1)] > 0\)). On some equilibrium paths, the uninformed investor may end up being a buyer if \(p_1\) turns out to be very low due to the informed investors’ hedging demand. The use of demand schedule also allows the uninformed investor to better optimize against her price impact, so \(E[x(p_1)]\) is not identical to \(X^*\) in Proposition 1 for \(J = 1\). Despite these differences, the uninformed investor still expects to sell ahead of central bank intervention.

All other results in in Propositions 5 and 6 are also similar to their counterparts in the main model. There remains a V-shaped price pattern in the two periods \((E(p_2 - p_1) > 0)\),
and the price reversal is stronger if central bank intervention is more aggressive. If the central bank does not intervene ($b = 0$), the unconditional asset return $E(p_2 - p_1)$ would be zero. If central bank intervention becomes sufficiently aggressive, the demand schedule of informed investors again becomes upward-sloping in price ($\gamma_1 < 0$) and the central bank intervenes in the same direction as recent price movement ($k_1 < 0$). Aggressive intervention may increase price volatility as well.

6 Concluding Remarks: Empirical and Policy Implications

The model generates at least two empirical predictions. First, there is a V-shaped price pattern around central bank intervention. Second, before intervention, investors with higher-than-average holdings sell risky assets, and investors with lower-than-average holdings buy risky assets.

The first prediction about a V-shaped price pattern is consistent with empirical evidence on equity markets. Lucca and Moench (2015) find that U.S. equity prices tend to increase during the 24-hour window before scheduled FOMC announcements. Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2020) find that, additionally, there is a gradual drop in equity prices a few days before FOMC announcements, in particular before those associated with large pre-announcement drift. In other words, there is a salient V-shaped price pattern around the most important FOMC announcements, which is consistent with our prediction.\footnote{For our purposes here, it is not critical whether equity returns are realized shortly before or after the FOMC announcement itself. Krueger and Kuttner (1996) show that the Fed Funds futures market is accurate in predicting the rate decisions of the FOMC before the official announcement.}

That said, ours is not the only model that can generate a V-shaped price pattern. Models of Ai and Bansal (2018), Wachter and Zhu (2019), and Hu, Pan, Wang, and Zhu (2020) can all potentially explain the large equity return around FOMC announcements. The critical
difference is that in all those other theories, the central bank’s announcement (or intervention in our terminology) carries material information, so the high equity return is essentially a risk premium. In ours model, the central bank’s intervention does not carry incremental information beyond the pre-intervention price $p_1$. Thus, the intervention is predictable given $p_1$, and there is zero risk premium because the strategic investors are all risk-neutral. The price dynamics in our model are entirely driven by the strategic interactions between the central bank and market participants.

It is probably the second prediction on trading behavior that can better distinguish our theory from others. In the risk-based explanations of equity returns around central bank intervention, trading plays a negligible role. In ours, strategic trading is what generates the V-shaped price pattern: large investors sell and small investors buy pre-intervention. Here, “large” means that the institution’s wealth is highly sensitive to asset prices. In this sense, a financial intermediary whose profits depend heavily on the stock market is considered “large,” even if it holds little inventory of stocks on average. Testing this prediction, however, requires more granular data that contain the transaction records of investors, preferably at the daily or higher frequency. The Ancerno data is a possible testing ground, with the caveat that institutions self-select into the Ancerno data. Alternatively, supervisory data available to regulators are also suitable for this test.

A key normative implication of our results is that the central bank should not rely too much on noisy asset prices for its intervention decisions. In an ideal world, real-time economic data should reduce this reliance. But macroeconomic data in reality are released infrequently and with significant delays. A potential way forward for the central bank in the digital age is to exploit low-latency economic data that are already available on Big Tech platforms, such as Amazon, Google, and Alibaba Group. The COVID-19 crisis has, if anything, expedited the adoption of technology and the transition of economic activities online. Although not all economic activities can be digitized, a real-time economic indicator based on partial data
would already be helpful because it is the growth rate, not the absolute value, that matters the most. Perhaps this silver lining of the COVID-19 crisis will afford the central bank more accurate information about economic fundamentals when the next crisis comes.
Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1

Parameter $\delta$ is explicitly given by (23) in terms of exogenous deep parameters. So, we use equations (17), (18), (24), (25) and (28) to compute the remaining $J + 4$ parameters, $(k_0, k_1, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, \{x_j^*\}_{j=1}^J)$.

By equations (18) and (25), we can compute the expressions of $k_1$ and $\gamma_1$ in equations (30) and (33), respectively.

Using equations (24) and (25) to replace the expressions of $\gamma_0$ and $\gamma_1$ in (28), we can obtain

$$x_j^* = \frac{\lambda_j bk_1}{2(bk_1 + 1)} - \frac{\sum_{j' \neq j} x_j'^*}{2} = \frac{\lambda_j bk_1}{2(bk_1 + 1)} - \frac{\sum_j x_j^* - x_j^*}{2}, \forall j,$$

which further implies

$$x_j^* = \frac{\lambda_j bk_1}{bk_1 + 1} - \sum_j x_j^*, \forall j. \quad (A1)$$

Summing (A2) across $j$ gives

$$\sum_j x_j^* = \frac{bk_1}{bk_1 + 1} \sum_j \lambda_j, \quad (A2)$$

Inserting the expression of $k_1$ in (30) into (A3), we obtain the expression of $X^* \equiv \sum_{j=1}^J x_j^*$ in (14). Inserting (14) into (A2), we obtain the expression of $x_j^*$ in (34).

Finally, after computing $X^*$, we use equations (17) and (24) to pin down the expressions of $k_0$ and $\gamma_0$ in equations (17) and (24), respectively. QED.

Proof of Corollary 1

Part (a) follows from directly setting $b = 0$ in Proposition 1. Part (b) follows from letting $J \to \infty$ in Proposition 1. QED.
Proof of Propositions 2, 3, and 4

The results can be derived by direct computation of taking derivatives. QED.

Proof of Proposition 5

The central bank’s intervention rule, the informed investors’ demand function, and the uninformed investor’s demand function are given by (9), (10), and (68), respectively. We will examine each player’s optimization problem to figure out their respective implied optimal strategies to form the fixed point problem in terms of \((k_0, k_1, \delta, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, h_0, h_1)\).

Central bank. The central bank’s problem still implies the optimal intervention rule given by (12). But now the central bank needs to update \(E(\theta|p_1)\) in (12) differently, as the bank understands that the uninformed investor submits demand schedule (68). Specifically, by the demand functions \(D(p_1, u, \theta)\) in (10) and \(x(p_1)\) in (68), as well as the market-clearing condition, \(D(p_1, u, \theta) = x(p_1)\), the central bank reads the price as the following signal:

\[
\hat{s}_p = \frac{\gamma_1 + h_1}{\delta} p_1 - \gamma_0 + h_0 = \theta + \frac{1}{\delta} u. \tag{A4}
\]

Using signal \(\hat{s}_p\) to update \(E(\theta|p_1)\) in (12), we get the following implied intervention strategy:

\[
z(p_1) = A_0 + \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_0 - h_0)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} - \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_1 + h_1)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u} p_1. \tag{A5}
\]

Comparing (A5) with the conjectured intervention strategy (9), we have

\[
k_0 = A_0 + \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_0 - h_0)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u}, \tag{A6}
\]

\[
k_1 = \frac{A_1 \delta \tau_u (\gamma_1 + h_1)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u}. \tag{A7}
\]
**Informed investors.** Their decision problem does not change. Specifically, informed investors do not infer information from the price, so that the change in uninformed investor’s strategy does not directly affect the informed investors’ decision problem. Informed investors only need to consider how the central bank’s intervention affects period-2 price \( p_2 \), but the central bank’s intervention rule is still given by (9) and its form remains unchanged to informed investors. As a result, the implied optimal demand by informed investors is still given by equation (22). Comparing (22) with the conjectured trading strategy (10), we still obtain equations (23)–(25).

**Large uninformed investor.** The large uninformed investor’s problem changes to \( \max_x (p_1) E [w_u^2] \), where

\[
w_u^2 = xp_1 + (\Lambda - x)p_2 = xp_1 + (\Lambda - x)(\theta + \varepsilon + b(k_0 - k_1p_1)). \tag{A8}
\]

In this maximization problem, the uninformed investor needs to take into account her price impact and extract information from the price.

Following Kyle (1989), the uninformed investor’s problem is equivalent to choosing \( x \) against her residual supply function. Specifically, by demand function \( D(p_1, u, \theta) \) in (10) and the market-clearing condition, \( D(p_1, u, \theta) = x(p_1) \), the uninformed investor understands that

\[
p_1 = \frac{\gamma_0 + \delta \theta + u - x}{\gamma_1}. \tag{A9}
\]

This price function delivers the uninformed investor’s price impact,

\[
\frac{\partial p_1}{\partial x} = -\frac{1}{\gamma_1}. \tag{A10}
\]

In addition, understanding the price function (A9), the uninformed investor can obtain signal
\[ \delta \theta + u \text{ from the price } p_1, \text{ which further implies} \]

\[ E(\theta|p_1) = \frac{\delta \tau_u (\gamma_1 p_1 - \gamma_0 + x)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u}. \quad (A11) \]

Taking derivative of the objective function (A8) with respect to \( x \) and using the price impact (A10), we get the following first-order equation:

\[ E \left( \frac{\partial w_u^2}{\partial x} \bigg| p_1 \right) = p_1 - \frac{x}{\gamma_1} - E(\theta|p_1) - b(k_0 - k_1 p_1) + (\Lambda - x) \frac{b k_1}{\gamma_1} = 0 \quad (A12) \]

Replacing \( E(\theta|p_1) \) with (A11) in (A12), we obtain the implied demand schedule by the uninformed investor as follows:

\[ x = \frac{b \Lambda \tau_\theta k_1 - b \gamma_1 \tau_\theta k_0 + \delta \gamma_0 \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \Lambda \delta^2 \tau_u k_1 - b \delta^2 \gamma_1 \tau_u k_0}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 + \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1} + \frac{\gamma_1 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 - \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 + \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1} p_1. \quad (A13) \]

Comparing (A13) with the conjectured trading strategy (68), we have

\[ h_0 = \frac{b \Lambda \tau_\theta k_1 - b \gamma_1 \tau_\theta k_0 + \delta \gamma_0 \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \Lambda \delta^2 \tau_u k_1 - b \delta^2 \gamma_1 \tau_u k_0}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 + \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1}, \quad (A14) \]

\[ h_1 = \frac{\gamma_1 (\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 - \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1)}{\tau_\theta + \delta^2 \tau_u + b \tau_\theta k_1 + \delta \gamma_1 \tau_u + b \delta^2 \tau_u k_1}. \quad (A15) \]

**Solve the unknowns** \((k_0, k_1, \delta, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, h_0, h_1)\). Equations (A6), (A7), (23), (24), (25), (A14), and (A15) for the system of 7 unknowns \((k_0, k_1, \delta, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, h_0, h_1)\). Again, variable \( \delta \) is directly given by (23). So, we will use the remaining 6 equations to figure out \((k_0, k_1, \gamma_0, \gamma_1, h_0, h_1)\). The idea of solving this system is to first use (A7), (25), and (A15) to compute \((k_1, \gamma_1, h_1)\) and then to use the remaining three equations to compute \((k_0, \gamma_0, h_0)\).
Inserting (25) into (A15), we have

\[ h_1 = \frac{\tau_\theta \delta (bk_1 + 1)}{\tau_\theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u}. \]  

(A16)

Plugging (25) and (A16) into (A7), we obtain a single equation in terms of \( k_1 \). Solving this equation delivers the expression of \( k_1 \) in Proposition 5. Inserting the expression of \( k_1 \) into (25) and (A16), we obtain the expressions of \( \gamma_1 \) and \( h_1 \) in Proposition 5.

Inserting (24) and the expressions of (25) and (A16) into (A14), we have

\[ h_0 = \frac{b \delta \left( -\tau_\theta^2 k_0 - 2\delta^2 \tau_u \tau_\theta k_0 + 2\Lambda \delta^3 \tau_u^2 A_1 + 2\Lambda \delta \tau_u \tau_\theta A_1 \right)}{(\tau_\theta + 2\delta^2 \tau_u)^2}. \]  

(A17)

Plugging (24) and (A17) into (A6), we can compute \( k_0 \). Inserting the expression of \( k_0 \) into (24) and (A17), we obtain the expressions of \( \gamma_0 \) and \( h_0 \) in Proposition 5. QED.

**Proof of Proposition 6**

The results follow from direct computation. QED.
References

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