From Market Making to Matchmaking: Does Bank Regulation Harm Market Liquidity?

Gideon Saar, Jian Sun, Ron Yang, and Haoxiang Zhu

This version: May 2019

1Gideon Saar is from the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University (gs25@cornell.edu). Jian Sun is from MIT Sloan School of Management (jiansun@mit.edu). Ron Yang is from Harvard Business School (rnyang@g.harvard.edu). Haoxiang Zhu is from MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER (zhuh@mit.edu). We thank Dimitri Vayanos, Kumar Venkataraman, Stacey Jacobsen, and Zhuo Zhong as well as seminar participants at MIT, City University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong Shenzhen, University of British Columbia, Wharton, the University of Illinois, and the 4th Sydney Market Microstructure Meeting for helpful comments.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063
Abstract

Post-crisis bank regulations raised the market making costs of bank-affiliated dealers. We show that this can, somewhat surprisingly, improve the overall welfare of investors and reduce average transaction costs, despite the increased cost of immediacy. Bank dealers in OTC markets optimize between two parallel trading mechanisms: market making and matchmaking. Bank regulations that increase market making costs intensify competitive pressure from non-bank dealers and incentivize bank dealers to invest in technology that shifts their business towards matchmaking. Thus, post-crisis bank regulations have the (unintended) benefit of replacing the costly balance sheet of banks with a more efficient form of financial intermediation.
1 Introduction

The aftermath of the financial crisis saw several regulatory initiatives to curtail banks’ risk-taking desire, hindering proprietary trading and increasing the cost of market making. In part, these reflect a wide-spread belief in banking regulatory circles that the pre-crisis price of immediacy did not adequately incorporate the costs required to ensure that market makers are supported by sufficient capital and do not become a source of illiquidity contagion (see, for example, BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2014, 2016)). While meant to improve market maker resiliency, the post-crisis changes to the Basel framework (Basel 2.5 and Basel III) and the Volcker Rule have reduced banks’ willingness to accommodate corporate bond trades on their balance sheets and in general made their market making operations more costly. Some market observers portrayed these regulatory initiatives as introducing a trade-off between resiliency (or lessening contagion) in times of stress and liquidity during normal times.

Such a perspective, however, overlooks the microstructure aspects of liquidity. In particular, the over-the-counter corporate bond market features two parallel trading mechanisms corresponding to the dual capacity of broker-dealers. In the first mechanism, market making, a bank intermediary functions as a dealer that provides immediacy to customers by taking the bonds onto his balance sheet. In the second mechanism, matchmaking, a bank intermediary functions as a broker that searches for counterparties to affect customer trades.\(^1\) While regulations aimed at boosting resiliency have increased the cost of taking a bond onto the bank’s balance sheet, they did not increase the costs associated with the search process. In fact, technological innovations over the past several years have bolstered matching efficiency and reduced its costs, stimulating investment in matchmaking technology by bank dealers and attracting customers to the search process. Our focus in this paper is therefore not on the trade-off between resiliency in times of stress and liquidity during normal times. Rather, we investigate whether the regulatory push to increase resiliency could make investors better off during normal times by changing the market microstructure they experience when trading over-the-counter securities such as corporate bonds.

A growing body of empirical literature sets out to investigate the impact of post-crisis regulation on liquidity. The US corporate bond market is the most commonly studied in this context given its

\(^1\)The matchmaking mechanism therefore encompasses both agency and riskless principal trading. We elaborate on this issue in Section 3.1.
importance and dealer-centric nature. On balance, this literature finds improvement or at least no deterioration in the average transaction costs of corporate bond trades (Mizrach (2015), Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, and Vogt (2017), Anderson and Stulz (2017), Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018), and Trebbi and Xiao (2017)). Still, some papers document an increase in the cost of immediacy or transacting in times of stress (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Choi and Huh (2017), and Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018)). These studies also find a reduction in the amount of capital bank dealers commit to market making and a shift in their activity from market making towards matchmaking (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018), and Choi and Huh (2017)). In contrast, non-bank dealers appear to increase capital commitments and principal trading.

While the increase in the cost of immediacy is consistent with the regulation-induced higher cost of taking bonds onto the banks’ balance sheets, the decline in the average transaction costs could be taken to suggest that a shift from market making to matchmaking is beneficial to customers. However, the empirical evidence on the change in average transaction costs may be accompanied by two less measurable but potentially very important costs. First, the average time it takes to execute a transaction in the post-regulation era is likely longer. These execution delays may be costly to investors. Second, realized transaction costs only capture trades that were executed. If customers forgo transacting due to the higher costs of immediacy (and unwillingness to wait longer for execution), their welfare loss cannot be ascertained by observing executed trades. To assess these two potential costs, which are hard to measure empirically, one needs a model in which the trade-off between the cost of delay (matchmaking) and the cost of immediacy (market making) is explicitly considered, and customers take into account the various costs associated with trading in their decision whether to trade. This is the model we set out to investigate.

Our model features infinitesimal customers (buyers and sellers) who arrive at a constant rate and wish to trade bonds in an over-the-counter market. There are two representative broker-dealers standing for two groups of dealers: bank-affiliated dealers and non-bank-affiliated dealers (henceforth bank dealers and non-bank dealers, respectively). Our use of a representative bank dealer and a representative non-bank dealer is meant to recognize the market power dealers in the corporate bond market possess, while at the same time enables us to explicitly consider the changing nature of competition between the two broker-dealer groups as a result of bank regulations.
Bank dealers offer their customers two mechanisms for trading bonds. The first, market making, enables customers to trade immediately at a spread that reflects the bank dealers’ cost of market making. The second, matchmaking, involves the bank dealers helping customers search for a trading counterparty and earning a fee to facilitate such a trade.

Banks dealers optimally set the market making spread and the matchmaking fee as well as decide how much to invest in the search technology that determines the matching rate. Non-bank dealers offer market making services to customers at a spread that they set to reflect their cost of market making and the competitive environment. Customers are price takers and heterogeneous in their degree of patience (or the value they attach to immediacy), which we model with private values. They optimize on whether to trade as well as how to trade: immediately with the bank dealer, immediately with the non-bank dealer, or using the matchmaking search process facilitated by the bank dealer. Searching for a counterparty takes time, though, and the cost of using the matchmaking mechanism consists of both the cost of waiting for a match and the trading fee.

Our analysis focuses on investigating what happens to customer welfare, dealer behavior, and market outcomes when the regulatory costs imposed on bank market making go up. We show that if the market making costs of bank dealers are much lower than those of the non-bank dealers, a small increase in bank regulatory costs raises the cost of immediacy. While some customers shift to the matchmaking mechanism, bank dealers do not have sufficient incentives to significantly increase their investment in the matchmaking technology, and hence these customers incur high waiting costs and the combination of these effects could worsen overall customer welfare.

The economics of intermediation discussed thus far involve only customers and bank dealers when the cost of market making is low. An increase in regulatory costs on bank dealers beyond a certain point, however, renders market making by non-bank dealers viable, which injects a competitive environment for market making services into the picture. Initially, the profitability of bank dealers’ market making operations is squeezed by the competitive threat even as they maintain their dominance. They find it optimal to increase their investment in the matchmaking technology in order to serve customers who otherwise would be deterred by the high cost of market making, and some of these customers choose to engage in a time-consuming search process in order to transact

\[ \text{Non-bank dealers are typically smaller and are not subject to bank regulations that increase balance sheet costs (Bao, O'Hara, and Zhou (2018), Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018)).} \]
at a lower cost. Bank dealers may also lower their matchmaking fee, attracting customers who previously did not trade at all. The overall welfare of the population of customers therefore goes up as some customers are made better off even as others are worse off, and average transaction costs in the market can decrease despite the increase in the cost of immediacy.

The story does not end here, however. As bank regulatory costs rise even further, customers who require immediacy switch to non-bank dealers that offer a more attractive market making spread. Bank dealers in turn focus on extracting the most rents from the matchmaking mechanism. Increasing regulatory costs beyond this point only makes non-bank dealers more profitable as it reduces the competitive threat posed by bank dealers. This clearly makes those seeking immediacy worse off, without engendering benefits to customers who use the matchmaking mechanism. As such, overall customer welfare can go down and average transaction costs in the market may increase. Beyond a certain regulatory costs threshold, non-bank dealers set the market making spread as unconstrained monopolists, and further increases in bank regulatory costs have no impact on customer welfare or the cost of trading.

Our model demonstrates the complex and interesting economic interactions that evolve as bank regulatory costs increase, pointing to subtleties not fully recognized in the extant literature. Our contribution lies in characterizing how changes in bank regulatory costs, both in absolute terms and relative to the market making costs of non-bank dealers, affect the nature of equilibrium in the market, with each equilibrium giving rise to a set of implications for customer welfare, dealer behavior, and market outcomes. These complex interactions also highlight why empirical work thus far struggled to articulate the overall impact of increased bank regulatory costs on customer welfare in the corporate bond market.

Can our theory help evaluate how the post-crisis regulatory initiatives impacted customer welfare in the corporate bond market? We address this question towards the end of the paper by relating the wealth of empirical implications generated by the model to the findings of the empirical papers. As we increase bank regulatory costs in the model, our predictions for observable market outcomes change as we move from one equilibrium to another. We believe that the patterns uncovered by the empirical literature map into an equilibrium region in our model where an increase in bank regulatory costs improves overall customer welfare. While bank dealers are clearly worse off in the post-crisis regulatory environment, our model vividly demonstrates that there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the profitability of bank dealers on the one hand and the average transaction costs or overall customer welfare on the other hand. This wedge reflects bank dealers’ endogenous switch from using balance sheet to using search technology in liquidity provision. Hence, regulation that negatively impacts dealer profitability and capital commitment need not translate into lower overall customer welfare.

The regulation of banks’ proprietary trading is still a work in progress. In May 2018, the five agencies responsible for the administration of the Volcker Rule proposed changes to the rule. While most of the changes appear to be focused on simplifying reporting as opposed to significantly changing the operations of bank trading desks, some have the potential to affect market making incentives. Therefore, we believe that it is of paramount importance to understand how bank regulations that change the cost of market making impact the welfare of customers and the functioning of the corporate bond market.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief exposition of the relevant post-crisis bank regulatory changes, discuss the findings of the empirical papers that look at how liquidity has changed in the corporate bond market, and relate our paper to several recent theoretical models. Section 3 discusses the motivation behind the modeling approach we pursue and provides an exposition of the theoretical model. In Section 4 we formally solve for the different cases of equilibria that prevail as bank regulatory costs increase. Section 5 uses the insights of our model to address the question of whether post-crisis bank regulations harmed investors in the corporate bond market, and Section 6 presents our conclusions.

2 Background and Literature

2.1 Post-Crisis Bank Regulations and the Corporate Bond Market

The Basel regulatory framework and the Dodd-Frank Act are the cornerstones of post-crisis bank regulations that heavily impacted market making activities in the United States, including in the corporate bond market. Interviews with market participants suggest that the revisions to the Basel II market risk framework (“Basel 2.5”), finalized in June 2012 in the United States, increased inventory costs for corporate bonds by boosting regulatory capital charges through the incremental risk capital (IRC) charge and the trading book stressed VaR requirement (BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2014)). Furthermore, the Basel III framework, finalized in July 2013 in
the United States, not only raised the risk-based capital requirements on banks, but also raised the non-risk-based capital requirement through the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). For example, global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are required to maintain an SLR of 5% or higher at the bank holding company level and an SLR of 6% or higher at the depository subsidiary (see Davis Polk (2014) for more details). Greenwood, Hanson, Stein, and Sunderam (2017) and Duffie (2018) find that the leverage ratio requirement is the most binding constraint for most US G-SIBs, according to data from the Federal Reserve’s stress tests in 2017. Besides capital requirements, another pillar of Basel III is higher liquidity standards, including the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), which require banks to hold enough high-quality liquid assets or use sufficiently stable financing sources to guard against adverse conditions in the funding markets.

The most relevant part of the Dodd-Frank Act for trading in the corporate bond market is the Volcker Rule. While the Act was signed into law in July 2010, implementation of this rule was delayed until April 2014, with full compliance by July 2015. The Volcker Rule aims at discouraging banks with access to FDIC insurance or the Federal Reserve’s discount window from engaging in proprietary trading of risky securities. While it contains an exception for market making, the rule mandates the reporting of various measures (e.g., inventory turnover, standard deviation of daily trading profits, customer facing trade ratio) to aid regulators in distinguishing between market making and other forms of proprietary trading. The scrutiny that these measures receive from regulatory agencies changes the incentives of bank dealers and thereby increases market making costs.

The suite of post-crisis bank regulations discourage risk taking in order to strengthen the banks’ resilience to various risks (e.g., market, counterparty, and funding). As such, these rules have an impact on all trading activities by banks, including market making. Some market participants therefore warned that these rules would increase transaction costs in the corporate bond market, and these claims motivated subsequent empirical research examining post-crisis changes in corporate bond liquidity.
2.2 Post-Crisis Changes in Corporate Bond Liquidity: Empirical Evidence

Most empirical papers that look at corporate bond market liquidity following the financial crisis find no deterioration and even improvement in liquidity subsequent to the regulatory interventions. For example, Mizrach (2015) finds that bid-ask spreads and the price impact of trades dropped after the crisis to below pre-crisis level. Similarly, Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, and Vogt (2017) find that spreads and price impact declined. Furthermore, they document that trading volume and issuance are at a record level, though trade size and turnover have gone down. Anderson and Stulz (2017) look at a variety of measures, including price-based measures (price impact and bid-ask spreads) and trading measures. They find that overall, price-based measures are marginally better following the onset of regulation (2013-2014) relative to before the crisis. Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018) also document that average customer trade execution costs have not increased after these regulations were imposed. Trebbi and Xiao (2017) look for a structural break in various liquidity measures but find no evidence for deteriorating liquidity during the period that corresponds to the Dodd-Frank and Basel III regulatory interventions.3

Several papers find worsening of a particular dimension of trade execution: the cost of immediacy. Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018) use downgrades of bonds to junk status as stress events to examine the cost of immediacy, and find that it has increased after the implementation of the Volcker Rule. Similarly, Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018) use exclusions from the Barclays Capital investment-grade bond index as events that create demand for immediacy, and document an increase in the cost of immediacy after the financial crisis. Choi and Huh (2017) show that trading costs for unmatched (i.e., market making) trades increased substantially in the post-regulation period relative to pre-crisis levels, and this increase is driven by bank dealers.

Our model is able to reconcile these two lines of empirical evidence that seem at odd with each other, namely that average transaction costs in corporate bonds have declined while the cost of immediacy has gone up. The driving force behind these results in our theory is the bank dealers’ endogenous shift from market making to matchmaking. The empirical papers indeed provide ample evidence that matchmaking has increased following the crisis and the implementation of post-crisis

3To the best of our knowledge, the only exception appears to be Allah rakha, Cetina, Munyan, and Watugala (2018). They find higher costs when using Volcker Rule exemptions (e.g., trades in newly issued bonds for which the bank dealer is part of the bond’s underwriting group) to infer cost differentials. This paper cannot be found online (links are not alive). Should we cite it at all?
regulations (e.g., Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Choi and Huh (2017), Schultz (2017)). As a result of the shift to matchmaking, the execution of large trades now tends to require more time (BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2014, 2016)).

It is important to stress that there are differences in the manner in which bank dealers and non-bank dealers responded to the regulatory changes. Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018) find that dealers affected by the Volcker Rule increase their matchmaking activity while committing less capital to market making. At the same time, competition in market making from smaller non-bank dealers appears to intensify: they increase capital commitments and the amount of principal trading (see also Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018)). Non-bank dealer matchmaking, on the other hand, has decreased after the implementation of the Volcker Rule. We return to the findings of the empirical literature to motivate our modeling approach and guide our discussion of how bank regulations following the financial crisis affected customer welfare.

2.3 Market Making versus Matchmaking: Theory

Several recent theoretical papers recognize the importance of the dual mechanisms for trading bonds, namely market making and matchmaking, though each of these papers adopts a different approach to studying the two mechanisms. An, Song, and Zhang (2017) study intermediation chains by modeling the interaction between one seller, a finite number of dealers, and an infinite number of buyers. Their model shows how an intermediary rat race gives rise to an inefficient amount of principal trading. Our paper does not feature an inter-dealer market or intermediation chains, but rather focuses on what happens to customer welfare and the market environment if the cost of market making increases for bank dealers. An and Zheng (2017) look at how the dual capacity of broker-dealers (principal and agency trading) gives rise to a conflict of interest, which results in dealers holding too much inventory as a tool for extracting rent from customers. Unlike in our framework, customers in their model do not optimize and matchmaking is effortless and costless, leading An and Zheng to focus on inventory as a strategic variable. In contrast, we model a two-way market with balanced customer order flows and abstract away from inventory management—an approach orthogonal to An and Zheng (2017). Furthermore, we investigate the

---

4Ederington, Guan, and Yadav (2014) and Randall (2015) provide additional evidence about matchmaking in the corporate bond market.

5Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2017) investigate the nature of trades that dealers seek to offset versus those that they hold in inventory overnight.
endogenous evolution of trading mechanisms by (i) having customers optimally choose whether and how to trade and (ii) having dealers optimize not only the pricing of their services but also how much to invest in the matchmaking technology.

Li and Li (2017) model a trade-off between inventory costs (in market making) and verification costs (in matchmaking). Moral hazard in matchmaking arises in their model when a dealer gains by providing worse executions for the customer. Since dealers have better information than customers, transparency influences the prevalence of market making versus matchmaking. Transparency plays no role in our model because we assume homogeneous common-value information. Our emphasis, instead, is on competition from non-bank dealers and the role it plays in determining customer welfare and the amount of matchmaking.

The paper closest to ours in objective is Cimon and Garriott (2017). They examine the impact of changes in regulations using a multiple-dealer setting. In their model, market makers compete for quantity (Cournot) in separate buyer and seller markets, and issue equity and debt to fund their operations. Their paper demonstrates how regulation limiting market making could lead to lower bid-ask spreads. However, the shift from market making to matchmaking in Cimon and Garriott’s model is exogenously assumed rather than endogenously arising. Our model provides a rigorous microfoundation for this shift, as a result of the optimal decisions of both customers and dealers.

3 Model
3.1 Motivating Our Modeling Framework

Before going into the technical presentation of the model, we motivate our choices of its key modeling features. As our discussion of the theoretical literature in the previous section suggests, the choice of which features of the bond trading environment to include depends on the objective of the analysis.

Our goal is to investigate how structural changes in the corporate bond market—following bank regulation that increases the cost of market making—impact customer welfare and market liquidity. The empirical finding of a shift from market making to matchmaking for bank dealers tells us that including these two trading mechanisms and allowing both bank dealers and customers to make optimal choices are necessary components of a model that seeks to understand the evolution

\[6\] Li and Li also provide empirical results on the share of matchmaking around the financial crisis and how this share relates to transparency and volume.
of the bond market in the post-crisis era. Furthermore, the last several years have witnessed increased broker-dealer investment in fixed income electronic trading, giving rise to new trading venues and protocols (BIS Markets Committee (2016)). Enhancing matchmaking in the corporate bond market critically depends on bank dealers prioritizing investment in these technologies, and therefore our model requires bank dealers to optimally choose their level of investment.

It is important to acknowledge the difficulty involved in empirically measuring the extent of matchmaking. The empirical papers we cite in Section 2.2 use various forms of the TRACE database. An in-house cross—a dealer buying from a customer and immediately selling to another customer—is reported in TRACE as two transactions. Whether TRACE reports these two transactions as agency or principal depends on the internal accounts of the dealer. If the trade moves through a proprietary trading account, it is considered a principal trade by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Because TRACE does not currently support riskless principal reporting as a separate category, such trades will be reported as principal despite the fact that their economics are identical to those of agency trading. The use of agency or proprietary accounts appears to be idiosyncratic to specific dealers, and can be influenced by a dealer’s preference over reporting the price inclusive of the mark-up/mark-down or a separate commission. Given that agency and riskless principal have similar balance sheet implications, we lump them together under our matchmaking mechanism. In other words, matchmaking consists of all dealer-facilitated trading that does not involve taking the trade onto the bank dealer’s balance sheet.

An important aspect of liquidity provision in the corporate bond market that we choose to model explicitly is the competition between bank and non-bank dealers. The significant role non-bank dealers can play by stepping into the void left by banks was emphasized even before regulations were implemented (e.g., Duffie (2012)). The empirical findings, cited above, that non-bank dealers have increased their capital commitments and market making activity, must be allowed to arise endogenously in our model, and therefore we include non-bank dealers that offer market making services and compete with bank dealers.

A related choice we need to make is whether to allow non-bank dealers to operate a matchmaking

\[\text{7In particular, electronic trading grew in the dealer-client segment, typically based on permutations of the request for quote (RFQ) protocol.}\]

\[\text{8A recent FINRA rule implemented in May 2018 further changes incentives by requiring dealers to report the mark-up or mark-down from the prevailing market price for all trades of retail customers that are offset within a day.}\]
mechanism. The model in this paper does not include this feature so that we can obtain closed-form solutions for the clarity of intuition. Still, there are several reasons to believe that omitting the matchmaking mechanism for non-bank dealers does not detract from the external validity of the model’s implications. First, Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018) and Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018) find that most non-bank dealers are small. Many of these non-bank dealers are regional in focus, and it is reasonable to assume that most of them do not possess a vast network of customers that would allow them to operate an efficient matchmaking mechanism. Banks dealers, on the other hand, have long dominated the OTC markets and have rich information about a large group of customers. Second, Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018) find that non-bank dealers decrease their matchmaking activity following the implementation of the Volcker Rule (by about 40% of the pre-crisis level), which could suggest they are being crowded out by the bank dealers. The main dimension on which they inject competition into the corporate bond market following the financial crisis appears to be market making (by boosting both capital commitments and trading). As such, market making is the dimension we choose to explicitly model for the non-bank dealers.

Given that our focus is on bank regulation that applies to all bank dealers and, by the same token, does not apply to any non-bank dealers, we choose to model each type using a representative dealer that stands for the entire group of dealers. By doing so, we abstract from the inter-dealer market and competition within each group. While other papers (e.g., An, Song, and Zhang (2017)) focus on the inter-dealer market, we believe that the basic economics of intermediation chains did not materially change by the implementation of post-crisis bank regulations. Furthermore, while we stress competition from non-bank dealers as important to understanding the impact of bank regulations, we strongly believe that dealers in the corporate bond market have market power. It has long been established that per-share transaction costs in corporate bonds decline in trade size (e.g., Schultz (2001)), despite the fact that fixed costs do not appear to be very high. The usual explanation for this empirical regularity is dealer market power: large customers have greater bargaining power and hence obtain better prices or lower fees than small customers. In the model, the spread charged by a dealer does not depend on the identity of the customer. While clearly a simplification, we believe that specifying several types of customers with varying degrees of bargaining power would not materially change the main implications of our model. Hence, we choose to simplify the exposition by having only one type of customer and giving the full market
power to the dealer. In other words, each representative dealer optimally sets prices to maximize profits subject to competition from the other representative dealer.

Two elements of the model that are critical to evaluating the impact of post-crisis bank regulations on the corporate bond market involve the customers. First, we assume that customers are heterogeneous with respect to their degree of patience, or the private value they attach to trading immediately. Market making allows customers to trade immediately at a cost, while search via the matchmaking mechanism takes time. Given the ample empirical evidence that matchmaking is a viable option for some customers in the corporate bond market, it has to be the case that customers are heterogeneous with respect to their patience or their desire for immediacy. Our model provides for such heterogeneity.

Second, we let customers optimize over whether to trade and how to trade. Optimizing customers are an important feature of the model because we seek to contribute insights that are difficult to observe empirically. As we stress in the introduction, the empirical finding of lower average transaction costs can be accompanied by other outcomes that are not easily measured but that negatively impact customer welfare (e.g., delayed execution of trades or the loss of welfare of customers who choose not to trade because the cost of immediacy goes up). In the model, customers optimally choose between (i) not trading, (ii) using the matchmaking mechanism and incurring both a delay cost and a trading fee, and (iii) choosing to trade immediately with the dealer that posts the best spread (either the bank dealer or the non-bank dealer). This optimization is at the core of the model’s ability to speak to the manner in which bank regulations affect customer welfare through their impact on the microstructure of the corporate bond market.

Lastly, we model bank regulatory costs as per-share balance sheet costs imposed on all trades accommodated by the bank dealer in his capacity as a market maker. This is a parsimonious way to differentiate market making activity from trade facilitation via the matchmaking mechanism that is not subject to such regulatory costs. For symmetry, the non-bank dealer’s market making costs are also modeled as per-share costs. Given this specification of balance sheet costs and the risk neutrality of dealers in the model, the level of inventory does not play a role in pricing. As

---

9 We note that some bank dealers may find it optimal to stop offering market making services as bank regulatory costs go up, increasing the market power of the remaining bank dealers.

10 See An and Zheng (2017) for a model of the dual capacity of broker-dealers that focuses on the dealer’s choice of inventory level.
such, there is no loss of generality in assuming equal arrival rates of customers who wish to buy and customers who wish to sell, which simplifies the exposition of the model.

3.2 Model Setup

Time is continuous, $t \in [0, \infty)$. The traded asset has an expected fundamental value of $v$. All customers and dealers are risk neutral and have the same information about the fundamental value of the asset. The discount rate is $r > 0$.\(^{11}\)

**Customers and dealers.** Infinitesimal buyers arrive in the market at the rate $\mu$, that is, the mass of buyers arriving during the time $(t, t + dt)$ is $\mu dt$. Each buyer wishes to buy one unit of the asset, and the private benefit (or “value”) for trading immediately is a random variable $x \in [0, \infty)$, with cumulative distribution function $G$. Heterogeneity in this private value is the manner in which we model differences across buyers in their degree of patience. The arrival process of buyers is time invariant in the sense that the types of buyers arriving during each small time interval $(t, t + dt)$ are distributed according to $G$. Likewise, infinitesimal sellers arrive in the market at the same rate $\mu$, and their private benefit for selling the asset immediately is also distributed according to $G$. A customer’s private benefit for trading is not observable by others, and the customer exits the market upon trading.

There are two representative yet distinct strategic intermediaries, called dealers, who help customers trade this asset. One of the dealers is a bank affiliate, subject to bank regulations, whereas the other security dealer is unaffiliated with any bank and hence is not subject to bank regulations. In practice, all intermediaries face some types of regulatory constraints, but the specific post-crisis regulations we discuss in Section 2.1 (Basel 2.5, Basel III, and the Volcker Rule) only apply to banks and their broker-dealer affiliates.

**Trading protocols: market making and matchmaking.** There are two trading mechanisms (or protocols), which we call “market making” and “matchmaking.” Under the market making protocol, a dealer immediately fills a customer’s buy or sell order from his own balance sheet by incurring a balance sheet cost. The bank dealer’s balance sheet cost is assumed to be $c_B$ per unit

\(^{11}\)In our model, the discount rate $r$ captures two effects: the rate at which customers and dealers discount future profits as well as the rate at which trading opportunities decay over time.
of the asset regardless of whether he is accommodating a buy or a sell order (that is, the cost is incurred on the gross amount traded). The corresponding balance sheet cost for the non-bank dealer is $c_{NB}$. To immediately fill an order, the bank (non-bank) dealer charges customers a per-unit spread of $S_B > 0$ ($S_{NB} > 0$), which is publicly observable.

The bank dealer’s cost is conceptually comprised of three components:

$$c_B = OperatingCosts - ImplicitSubsidy + PostCrisisRegulatoryCosts.$$  

The first component reflects the direct operating costs involved in running the market making business. We assume that the bank dealer operates optimally to minimize this cost. This component is similar to the cost of the non-bank dealer, $c_{NB}$, and can be influenced by the same economic forces. The second component (ImplicitSubsidy) has been extensively discussed in regulatory circles in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The Committee on the Global Financial System of the Bank for International Settlements writes in its report on fixed income market liquidity that in the pre-crisis era, “Underpriced liquidity services were predicated on expectations of an implicit public sector backstop for major financial institutions” (BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2016)). This implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy lowers the capital costs of the bank dealer’s trading book relative to that of the non-bank dealer and hence could enable the bank dealer to offer cheaper liquidity. Post-crisis bank regulations, represented by the third component of $c_B$, were aimed at increasing the market making costs of bank dealers to counteract this implicit subsidy. Fixing the first two components, the imposition of post-crisis regulations unequivocally increases the bank dealer’s cost, but it unclear whether the sum of the three components is lower than, equal to, or greater than the cost of the non-bank dealer. We therefore investigate how post-crisis bank regulations impact dealer actions, investor choices, and market outcomes by looking at the effects of increasing $c_B$ over the entire relevant range (below and above $c_{NB}$).\footnote{Throughout the paper, when we discuss an increase in $c_B$ we mean an increase in the third component holding the other two components constant.}

Bank dealers can invest in developing a matchmaking mechanism. Under the matchmaking protocol, a dealer searches for a counterparty for the customer’s order, but the dealer does not use his balance sheet to accommodate the order. Using the matchmaking mechanism, a customer is matched with a counterparty at an exponentially distributed time $\tau$ with intensity $H$.\footnote{Specifically, $\tau$ has a cumulative distribution function $P(\tau < t) = 1 - e^{-Ht}$. The matching intensity in our model} While...
the dealer does the search, the customer incurs a delay cost by discounting the private benefit of trading. Given the exponential distribution of matching time $\tau$, we define the benefit customers obtain from matchmaking with intensity of $H$ as

$$\mathcal{H} \equiv E[e^{-r\tau}] = \int_{\tau=0}^{\infty} He^{-H\tau}e^{-ru}du = \frac{H}{r + H}. \quad (1)$$

Higher $\mathcal{H}$ implies a shorter waiting time (with a lower cost of delay) for the searching customers, and hence we refer to $\mathcal{H}$ as the speed of matchmaking.

To achieve the matchmaking speed $\mathcal{H}$, the bank dealer invests $K(\mathcal{H})$ at time 0, where $K(0) = 0$, $K'(0) = 0$, $K'(\mathcal{H}) > 0$ for all $\mathcal{H} \in (0, 1]$, and $K''(\mathcal{H}) > 0$ for all $\mathcal{H} \in [0, 1]$. This investment represents various aspects of operating a matchmaking mechanism such as the cost of installing trading technology and deploying sales people. Certain investments in trading technology have the potential to benefit both matchmaking and market making, and we assume that these are made optimally by the bank dealer to minimize the operating costs component of $c_B$. $K(\mathcal{H})$ is therefore the incremental investment that enhances only the matchmaking mechanism over and above other investments that benefit the entire operation of the bank dealer.

When a match is made, the bank dealer receives a fee of $f$ from both the buyer and the seller, which is publicly observable. As Choi and Huh (2017) note, a dealer searching for a counterparty may need to offer better terms of trade to the counterparty in order to affect a trade. Hence, the two sides of the trade need not be symmetric in the amount they pay for participating in the transaction, and one side may even buy (sell) at a lower (higher) price than the fundamental value. We view $2f$ as the net compensation earned by a dealer that executes both legs of such an agency (or riskless principal) cross.

does not depend on the mass of customers who choose matchmaking. This departure from the Duffie, Gărleanu, and Pedersen (2005) framework is made for analytical simplicity.

The assumptions on $K(\mathcal{H})$ are meant to ensure that the equilibrium investment in matchmaking technology is positive and finite.

14 The search technology we describe increases the matching speed for the bank dealer’s customers. While we use a representative dealer in the model, multiple bank dealers operate in the corporate bond market. The report on electronic trading in fixed income markets by the Markets Committee of the Bank for International Settlement notes that the growth in electronic trading occurred primarily in the dealer-client segment. Many of the systems in this segment are single-dealer platforms. Investment in such technology by one bank dealer does not increase the matching speed of another dealer. In practice, the search for a counterparty for a customer’s trade may take several forms. For example, a bank dealer may tap liquidity on MarketAxess, which is a large centralized system that currently executes about 20% of the volume in the corporate bond market (mostly in smaller trades). We view MarketAxess simply as one of the tools that bank dealers can use to search, though often not the tool of choice for large institutional trades that are our primary focus, and we do not model each such tool separately in this paper.
**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium consists of:

1. The bank dealer’s choices of market making spread $S_B$, matching speed $\mathcal{H}$, and matching fee $f$;
2. The non-bank dealer’s choice of market making spread $S_{NB}$; and
3. Each arriving customer’s choice between market making (with one of the dealers), matchmaking, and refraining from trade altogether;

such that dealers and customers maximize expected profits.\(^{16}\)

### 3.3 Customer and Dealer Objectives

The customer’s optimization problem is simple: she needs to choose between trading immediately with the bank dealer, trading immediately with the non-bank dealer, searching for a counterparty using the matchmaking service, or not trading. The bank’s and non-bank’s market making services are identical from the perspective of a customer. Therefore, a customer who opts to trade immediately will choose the market making service that charges the lower spread, which we denote by

$$S = \min(S_B, S_{NB}) \quad (2)$$

Recall that $x$ denotes the private benefit a customer obtains from trading immediately. The customer’s profit from using a market making service is $x - S$. Her expected profit from using the matchmaking mechanism offered by the bank dealer, which takes into account the expected waiting cost, is $(x - f)\mathcal{H}$. Her profit from leaving the market without trading is 0. Obviously, a customer prefers matchmaking to not trading if and only if $x \geq f$.

Let $b$ be the value of the marginal customer who is indifferent between matchmaking and market making. The indifference condition is

$$(b - f)\mathcal{H} = b - S, \quad (3)$$

\(^{16}\)Note that in our definition of equilibrium, all price decisions of the two dealers, $\{S_B, f, S_{NB}\}$, are made at time 0. That is, we assume that they can commit to the prices determined at time 0 and do not dynamically adjust them. In a stationary environment like ours, an equilibrium obtained under committed prices is also an equilibrium if we allow dealers to change their prices $\{S_B, f, S_{NB}\}$ dynamically, under off-equilibrium beliefs that deviations are “punished” sufficiently severely. We do not, however, claim that the equilibrium obtained under committed prices is the unique equilibrium if dealers can adjust prices over time.
and for $\mathcal{H} < 1$ we obtain

$$b = \frac{S - f\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

The customer’s optimization problem therefore results in a very simple behavior: do not trade if $x \in [0, f)$, choose matchmaking if $x \in [f, b]$, or choose market making with the dealer offering the lower spread if $x > b$.\(^{17}\)

Given the two thresholds $f$ and $b$, the overall welfare of customers aggregated across the three ranges of $x$ is:

$$\pi_c = \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \int_{x=0}^{f} 0 \cdot dG(x) + \int_{x=f}^{b} (x - f)\mathcal{H}dG(x) + \int_{x=b}^{\infty} (x - S)dG(x) \right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

The bank dealer’s profit is comprised of three components: the discounted matchmaking profit (that depends on the fee and the matching speed), the discounted market making profit (if the bank offers the lower spread), and the up-front cost $K(\mathcal{H})$, such that

$$\pi_B = \frac{2\mu}{r} [\mathcal{H}f(G(b) - G(f)) + (S - c_B)(1 - G(b))\mathbb{I}_{S=S_B}] - K(\mathcal{H}),$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $\mathbb{I}_{S=S_B}$ is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if $S = S_B$ (equivalently, $S_B \leq S_{NB}$) and 0 otherwise.

The market making profit of the non-bank dealer can be expressed as:

$$\pi_{NB} = \frac{2\mu}{r} [(S - c_{NB})(1 - G(b))\mathbb{I}_{S=S_{NB}}],$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $\mathbb{I}_{S=S_{NB}}$ is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if $S_{NB} < S_B$ and 0 otherwise.

4  Equilibrium

Before delving into the full equilibrium analysis, we provide an intuitive description of the equilibrium structure and how it evolves as bank regulatory costs increase. Readers wishing to see the formal statements first are invited to jump to Section 4.2 and then come back to Section 4.1.

\(^{17}\)In Section 4 we show that any equilibrium in which the bank dealer invests in matchmaking ($\mathcal{H} > 0$) must satisfy $f < S$ (i.e., the matchmaking fee is lower than the market making spread).
4.1 Properties of the Equilibrium: An Intuitive Exposition

A key qualitative insight of our model is that increasing the regulatory balance sheet cost of the bank dealer encourages investment in a matchmaking technology that the bank dealer otherwise shuns in order to preserve market making profits. Figure 1 illustrates this idea by plotting the customers’ transaction costs (Panel A), choice of trading mechanism (Panel B), and overall welfare (Panel C) as functions of the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_B$, holding all other model parameters constant. For this example, we use an exponential distribution for $x$ (the gains from trade) with a mean of 10 basis points and a quadratic function for the cost of the matchmaking technology $K(H) = kH^2$, where $k = 0.1$.\(^{18}\)

We observe that the equilibrium changes its properties as bank regulatory costs increase, and we distinguish between four regions (separated by the vertical dashed lines). In region 1, the bank dealer’s cost is sufficiently low that the optimal spread, $S_B$ (depicted by the blue line in Panel A), is lower than the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_{NB}$. In this region, the bank dealer has an unconstrained monopoly on the provision of immediacy. As the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost increases, the spread rises as well. Certain customers stop paying the spread and opt instead to use the matchmaking mechanism (the blue area shrinks and the green area expands in Panel B). Due to this endogenous shift, the rate of increase in customers’ average transaction costs is lower than the rate of increase in the bank dealer’s spread (dotted line in Panel A) and overall customer welfare decreases (dotted line in Panel C). Region 1 corresponds to the common intuition that a higher bank dealer balance sheet cost has negative consequences for market liquidity and customer welfare.

As the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost continues to rise and gets closer to (but is still lower than) the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, the bank dealer would have liked to set $S_B > c_{NB}$. However, the non-bank dealer now exerts competitive pressure on the bank dealer and therefore the market making spread, $S_B$, needs to equal the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_{NB}$ (Panel A). This is region 2 of the equilibrium. Because the bank dealer is now unable to increase his spread without losing the market making business, he seeks to extract more profits from the matchmaking business by making it more attractive to customers. Therefore, the bank dealer increases his

\(^{18}\)Other parameters we use for this numerical example are $\mu = 1$, $r = 0.01$, and $c_{NB} = 20$ bps.
investment in matching speed and lowers the matching fee. Certain customers who were previously excluded from this market start to trade, which can be observed as the shrinking “no trade” (red) area in Panel B. As a result, customers’ average transaction costs are now lower (Panel A) and their overall welfare is higher (Panel C). This region is the most interesting case in our model, where an increase in the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost encourages the bank to invest in the matchmaking technology and shift his business model towards the matching of buyers and sellers as an agent.¹⁹

Region 3 and region 4 of the equilibrium are obtained when the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_B$, exceeds the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_{NB}$. In these regions, the non-bank dealer takes over market making and the bank dealer only operates the matchmaking mechanism. In region 3, the non-bank dealer’s spread, $S_{NB}$ (red line in Panel A), is equal to the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost, $c_B$. As $c_B$ rises, the non-bank dealer increases his market making spread to extract more rents, creating an opportunity for the bank dealer to increase his matchmaking fee as well. As a result, average transaction costs increase (dotted line in Panel A) and overall customer welfare declines (dotted line in Panel C). In region 4, the bank dealer no longer exerts any competitive pressure on the non-bank dealer. Therefore, the non-bank dealer charges his unconstrained monopoly spread, and further increases in the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost no longer affect the equilibrium outcomes.

4.2 Equilibrium: Formal Statements

We begin by making the following assumption about the distribution of the private values customers attach to trading immediately:

**Assumption 1.** For all $x$, the distribution $G$ of customers’ values satisfies

$$\Phi(x) \geq 0, \quad \Phi'(x) \leq 0, \quad G''(x) \leq 0, \quad (8)$$

where

$$\Phi(x) \equiv G'(x) + \frac{(1 - G(x)) G''(x)}{G'(x)}. \quad (9)$$

¹⁹We emphasize that overall customer welfare increases in region 2 because the bank dealer possesses market power. His optimal response to the increased regulatory costs of market making is to shift business to the matchmaking mechanism, resulting in a decline in the rents he collects and a concomitant increase in overall customer welfare. Results would be quite different if the bank dealer were benevolent.
The first of these three conditions, $\Phi(x) \geq 0$, implies that the hazard rate $G'(x)/(1 - G(x))$ is weakly increasing in $x$. The hazard rate plays a role when we consider the bank dealer’s incentive to marginally increase the threshold $b$ between matchmaking and market making (through changes in $S_B$, $H$, and $f$) and it has a natural economic interpretation: the bank dealer collects market making revenues from a population of customers equal to $1 - G(b)$ but loses the market making revenues from the marginal customer who switches to matchmaking at the rate $G'(b)$. The technical conditions $\Phi'(x) \leq 0$ and $G''(x) \leq 0$ are useful for proving the existence of an equilibrium. Assumption 1 is not too restrictive and can be shown to hold for many distributions. For example, the uniform distribution has $G(x) = x/B$ for $B > 0$, and it satisfies the conditions in Assumption 1 because $\Phi(x) = 1/B$, $\Phi'(x) = 0$, and $G''(x) = 0$. The exponential distribution also satisfies this assumption with $G(x) = 1 - e^{-x/\beta}$, and therefore $\Phi(x) \equiv 0$ and $G''(x) = -e^{-x/\beta}/\beta^2 < 0$.

As we discuss in Section 4.1, the equilibrium structure is comprised of several distinct cases depending on the degree of competition between the bank and non-bank dealers (or the relative magnitudes of $c_B$ and $c_{NB}$). Case 1 occurs when the unconstrained monopoly spread of the bank dealer is lower than the market making cost of the non-bank dealer (and hence there is no competitive pressure from the non-bank dealer). In Case 2, the bank dealer still provides market making services but his spread is constrained to equal the non-bank dealer’s cost of market making. Case 3 is where the $c_B$ exceeds $c_{NB}$, and as a result market making services are supplied by the non-bank dealer. We go through the cases one by one. All proofs are provided in the appendix.

4.2.1 Case 1: Unconstrained Bank ($S_1^* < c_{NB}$)

We define the bank dealer’s unconstrained optimization problem as Problem 1:

$$\max_{S \geq f \geq 0, H \in [0,1]} \Pi_1 \equiv \frac{2\mu}{r} [Hf(G(b) - G(f)) + (S - c_B)(1 - G(b))] - K(H).$$

The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the solution to Problem 1.

**Proposition 1.** Suppose $K''(H) \geq \beta_1$ for all $H \in (0,1)$, where $\beta_1$ is a constant. Then, Problem 1

---

20 We have $\frac{d}{dx} \frac{1-G(x)}{G'(x)} = \frac{-G'(x)^2 - (1-G(x))G''(x)}{G'(x)^2} = -\frac{\Phi(x)}{G'(x)^2}$.

21 $\beta_1 \in \left(\frac{2\mu c}{\beta r}, \infty\right)$ is the solution of $\frac{r}{2\mu} \beta = \left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{\beta r}}\right)c_B \max_b \{bG'(b)\}$.

---
has a unique interior solution \((S^*_1, \mathcal{H}^*_1, f^*_1)\), where \(\mathcal{H}^*_1 \in (0, 1)\) and \(S^*_1 > f^*_1 > 0\). This solution satisfies the following first-order conditions:

\[
S^*_1 - c_B - \mathcal{H}^*_1 f^*_1 = \frac{1 - G(b^*_1)}{G'(b^*_1)} (1 - \mathcal{H}^*_1), \tag{11}
\]

\[
f^*_1 = \frac{1 - G(f^*_1)}{G'(f^*_1)}, \tag{12}
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K'(\mathcal{H}^*_1) = f^*_1 (1 - G(f^*_1)) - b^*_1 (1 - G(b^*_1)), \tag{13}
\]

where \(b^*_1 = \frac{S^*_1 - \mathcal{H}^*_1 f^*_1}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*_1}\) is the private value of the marginal customer who is indifferent between matchmaking and market making.

The three equations that characterize the equilibrium are the (rearranged) first-order conditions with respect to \(S\), \(f\), and \(\mathcal{H}\). The condition \(K''(\mathcal{H}) \geq \beta_1\) plays two roles. First, it guarantees an interior solution for matchmaking (i.e., \(\mathcal{H} < 1\)), which we believe is the more empirically plausible case. Second, it is a sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique. Note that our equilibrium definition from Section 3.2 reduces in Case 1 to merely solving the bank dealer’s optimization problem (given the simple discrete choice of the customers). As such, uniqueness means that the bank dealer’s objective function is single-peaked.

In order to establish how bank regulatory costs impact dealer behavior, market outcomes, and customer welfare over the entire range of \(c_B\), we need to investigate how these attributes change within each of the cases. Proposition 2 provides the comparative statics for Case 1. Specifically, we look at how an increase in \(c_B\) impacts the bank dealer’s optimal choices (spread, fee, and speed), the customers’ choice of trading outcome and venue (i.e., matchmaking, market making, or refraining from trade altogether), the average transaction costs of customers, bank dealer profits, and overall customer welfare.\(^{22}\)

**Proposition 2.** In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 1, if the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost \(c_B\) increases and all else are held equal, then:

1. The bank dealer’s spread \((S^*_1)\) increases, the matching speed \((\mathcal{H}^*_1)\) increases, and the matchmaking fee \((f^*_1)\) is unchanged.

\(^{22}\)The non-bank dealer has zero market share and makes zero profit in Case 1.
2. The fraction of customers using the market making service, $1 - G(b^*_1)$, decreases; the fraction of customers choosing the matchmaking mechanism, $G(b^*_1) - G(f^*_1)$, increases; and the fraction of customers who refrain from trading, $G(f^*_1)$, is unchanged.

3. Customers’ average transaction costs, \( \frac{1}{1-G(f^*_1)} \left[ (G(b^*_1) - G(f^*_1)) f^*_1 + (1 - G(b^*_1)) S^*_1 \right] \), increase if and only if the following condition holds at the equilibrium \((S^*_1, H^*_1, f^*_1)\):

\[
\frac{c_B G''(b^*_1)}{r^2 K''(H^*_1) (1 - H^*_1)^2} \leq \frac{1}{b^*_1 - f^*_1} - \frac{G'(b^*_1)}{1 - G(b^*_1)}.
\]  

Moreover, if \( K''(H) (1 - H)^2 \) is non-increasing in \( H \), then customers’ average transaction costs is a hump-shaped function of \( c_B \), and the decreasing region may not exist (depending on the parameters of the economy).

4. The Bank dealer’s profit, \( \pi_B \), decreases.

5. Overall customer welfare, \( \pi_c \) (defined in (5)), decreases if and only if the following condition holds at the equilibrium \((S^*_1, H^*_1, f^*_1)\):

\[
\frac{r}{2 \mu} K''(H^*_1) (1 - H^*_1)^2 \geq c_B G'(b^*_1) \int_{f^*_1}^{b^*_1} (1 - G(x)) \, dx.
\]  

Moreover, if \( K''(H) (1 - H)^2 \) is non-increasing in \( H \), then \( \pi_c \) is a U-shaped function of \( c_B \), and the increasing region may not exist (depending on the parameters of the economy).

The bank dealer sets the matchmaking fee and speed in this case to maximize unconstrained monopolist profit. Given a particular distribution of customers’ private value (or patience), a lower fee increases the number of customers who choose to trade while decreasing the compensation from each trade. This tradeoff results in a unique fee that maximizes the bank dealer’s expected profit from matchmaking that depends only on the distribution of private values customers attach to trading immediately (and hence does not change as bank regulatory costs increase). The bank passes any increase in regulatory costs to the market making customers by means of increasing the spread, leaving the bank dealer’s profit per trade in the market making mechanism unchanged. This means that increasing \( c_B \) shifts some customers from market making to matchmaking (as the spread increases), but the population of customers who refrain from trading (which depends only on the magnitude of the matchmaking fee) does not change.
Average transaction costs can be computed as the weighted average of the market making spread and the matchmaking fee weighed by the respective populations of customers who choose each of these mechanisms. When regulatory costs increase, the spread increases but the fraction of customers choosing the market making mechanism decreases, and hence the direction of the change in average transaction costs can go either way. For $c_B$ approaching zero, the right-hand-side of expression (14) approaches infinity while the left-hand-side is close to zero, ensuring that average transaction costs increase. As $c_B$ goes up, either the condition in (14) holds until the equilibrium reaches Case 2 or the condition is violated for all $c_B$ greater than a certain threshold, resulting in an inverse U-shape.

The last two comparative statics look at bank dealer profits and overall customer welfare. Bank dealer profits are unequivocally lower as regulatory costs increase (or put differently, as the bank dealer’s implicit “too-big-to-fail” subsidy is reduced). The rationale is clear: market making is more profitable for the bank dealer than matchmaking, and customers are shifting from the former to the latter. It is clear that some customers who wish to trade immediately are worse off when $c_B$ increases. Whether the overall population of customers is benefitting or not depends on the extent of bank dealer investment in the matchmaking technology. Both $H^*_1$ and $b^*_1$ increase when $c_B$ goes up in Case 1, and the right-hand-side (left-hand-side) of the condition in (15) is increasing (non-increasing) in $c_B$. When balance sheet costs are close to zero, this condition is satisfied. As regulatory costs increase, either the condition is satisfied until the equilibrium reaches Case 2 (and welfare decreases over the entire range of Case 1) or the condition is violated at some threshold and is violated for all $c_B$ larger than the threshold (resulting in welfare starting to increase in the interior of Case 1).

Case 1 corresponds to region 1 in the example depicted in Figure 1. For this particular choice of parameters, average transaction costs increase and overall customer welfare decreases over the entire region rather than having an interior maximum and minimum, respectively. The comparative statics with respect to transaction costs, the fractions of customers choosing each trading mechanism, and customer welfare are clearly visible in the three panels of the figure. The lack of competition from the non-bank dealer in Case 1 allows the bank dealer to push the increase in regulatory costs to customers who trade via the market making mechanism, making them worse off. In addition, the bank dealer does not have sufficient incentives in Case 1 to lower the matching fee to attracts more
cost-conscious customers to the market. These outcomes change dramatically when competition starts constraining the profit maximizing strategies of the bank dealer.

4.2.2 Case 2: Constrained Bank ($S_2^* = c_{NB}$)

Case 2 arises when the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost is high enough that his unconstrained optimal spread (from Case 1) would be higher than the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost $c_{NB}$. Given that for Problem 1 we would obtain $\frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial S} > 0$ at $S = c_{NB} < S_1^*$, the constraint binds. As a result, the bank dealer sets $S_2^* = c_{NB}$.

We define the bank dealer’s constrained optimization problem as Problem 2:

$$\max_{S \geq f \geq 0, H \in [0, 1]} \Pi_2 = \frac{2\mu}{r} [H f (G (b) - G (f)) + (S - c_B) (1 - G (b))] - K (H),$$

such that $S = c_{NB}$.

The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibrium in Case 2:

**Proposition 3.** If $K'' (H) \geq \beta_1$ for all $H \in (0, 1)$, then the solution for Problem 2 exists. Denote the solution as $(S_2^*, H_2^*, f_2^*)$. It satisfies $H_2^* \in (0, 1)$, $S_2^* = c_{NB}$, and the following first-order conditions:

$$G (b_2^*) - G (f_2^*) = -(c_{NB} - c_B - H_2^* f_2^*) G' (b_2^*) \frac{1}{1 - H_2^*} + f_2^* G' (f_2^*),$$

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} K' (H_2^*) = f_2^* (G (b_2^*) - G (f_2^*)) - (c_{NB} - c_B - H_2^* f_2^* G' (b_2^*) \frac{c_{NB} - f_2^*}{1 - H_2^*}),$$

where $b_2^* = \frac{c_{NB} - f_2^* H_2^*}{1 - H_2^*}$ is the private value of the marginal customer who is indifferent between matchmaking and market making.

While we do not require additional conditions (beyond $K'' (H) \geq \beta_1$ from Case 1) to establish existence of the equilibrium in Case 2, the constrained nature of the optimization problem prevents us from demonstrating uniqueness. Still, the lack of uniqueness does not preclude characterizing the comparative statics, and the following proposition provides very sharp predictions on the impact of an increase in $c_B$ on the economic environment in Case 2.

**Proposition 4.** In the equilibrium characterized by Proposition 3, if the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost $c_B$ increases and all else are held equal, then:
1. The bank dealer’s spread \((S^*_2)\) does not change, the matching speed \((H^*_2)\) increases, and the matchmaking fee \((f^*_2)\) decreases.

2. The fraction of customers using the market making service, \(1 - G(b^*_2)\), decreases; the fraction of customers choosing the matchmaking mechanism, \(G(b^*_2) - G(f^*_2)\), increases; and the fraction of customers who refrain from trading, \(G(f^*_2)\), decreases.

3. Customers’ average transaction costs, \(\frac{1}{1 - G(f^*_2)} [(G(b^*_2) - G(f^*_2)) f^*_2 + (1 - G(b^*_2)) S^*_2]\), decrease.

4. The bank dealer’s profit, \(\pi_B\), decreases.

5. Overall customers welfare, \(\pi_c\) (defined in (5)), increases.

The comparative statics in Case 2 are all unambiguously signed. As competition from the non-bank dealer constrains the bank dealer’s ability to pass the rising regulatory costs to the market making customers, the bank dealer seeks to extract more profit from the matchmaking business. For that purpose, he increases overall trading volume (which is equivalent in our setting to the fraction of customer types who trade, \(G(f^*_2)\)) by lowering the matching fee to attract customers who refrain from trading in Case 1. At the same time, he increases investment to achieve a higher matching speed in order to shorten the time it takes to collect the fee from each searching customer.

Shifting more customers to the less expensive matchmaking service lowers average transaction costs in the market, but even more notable is that overall customer welfare increases. The welfare loss of customers with a high need for immediacy who pay a higher spread is being offset by the welfare gains of two groups of customers: the first group contributed zero welfare in Case 1 (because these customers did not trade) but contributes a positive amount to welfare in Case 2 (by trading via the matchmaking mechanism), and the second group includes some of the switching customers who are better off in Case 2 with a lower fee and a higher matching speed than in Case 1 where they paid the spread. Case 2 corresponds to region 2 in the example depicted in Figure 1, and the patterns described by the comparative statics are very prominent in the figure. It is here where customers benefit the most from increased bank regulatory costs because the industrial organization angle (increased competition from the non-bank dealer) interacts with the market microstructure angle (improvements in the matchmaking mechanism that attract more customers to using it),
leading to reduced bank dealer rents and increased overall customer welfare. We return to discuss 
these comparative statics and how they map into the empirical evidence in Section 5.

4.2.3 Case 3: $c_B \geq c_{NB}$

When $c_B > c_{NB}$, the bank dealer does not provide market making services because the non-bank 
dealer can always charge $S_{NB} = c_B - \epsilon$ and attract all customers who are willing to pay the spread 
to trade immediately.\footnote{When $c_B = c_{NB}$, the only equilibrium spread possible is $S = c_B = c_{NB}$ and both bank and non-bank dealers 
make zero profits from market making. This boundary point can be included in either Case 2 or Case 3, and we could also assume that customers who would like to use the market making mechanism randomize between the bank 
and non-bank dealers at the boundary point.} Given the non-bank dealer’s choice of spread $S$, the optimization problem 
of the bank dealer is

$$\begin{equation}
\max_{H \in [0,1], f \geq 0} \Pi_{B,3} = \begin{cases} 
\frac{2\mu}{r} H f (G(b) - G(f)) - K(H) & \text{if } S \geq f, \\
0 & \text{if } S < f. 
\end{cases}
\tag{19}
\end{equation}$$

Given the bank dealer’s choice of matchmaking speed and fee, $(H, f)$, the optimization problem 
of the non-bank dealer is

$$\begin{equation}
\max_{c_B \geq S_{NB}} \Pi_{NB,3} = \begin{cases} 
\frac{2\mu}{r} [S_{NB} - c_{NB}] (1 - G(b)) & \text{if } S_{NB} \geq f, \\
\frac{2\mu}{r} [S_{NB} - c_{NB}] (1 - G(S_{NB})) & \text{if } c_{NB} < S_{NB} < f. 
\end{cases}
\tag{20}
\end{equation}$$

The strategy space for the two dealers is $\Lambda_0 = \{(S, H, f) | S \in [0, c_B], H \in [0, 1], f \geq 0\}$, where 
$S$ is set by the non-bank dealer and $H$ and $f$ are set by the bank dealer. The following lemma 
shows useful restrictions on the optimal strategies of the bank and non-bank dealers.

**Lemma 1.** In equilibrium, the optimal fee $(f)$ of the bank dealer and the optimal spread $(S)$ of the 
non-bank dealer satisfy $f < \min\{\tilde{f}, S\}$, where $\tilde{f}$ is the unique solution to

$$\frac{1 - G(\tilde{f})}{G'(\tilde{f})} - \tilde{f} = 0.\tag{22}$$

Given Lemma 1, the new strategy space can be written as

$$\Lambda_1 = \{(S, H, f) | S \in [f, c_B], H \in [0, 1], f \in \left(0, \min\{\tilde{f}, S\}\right)\}.\tag{21}$$

The bank dealer’s optimization problem can be rewritten as

$$\begin{equation}
\max_{H \in [0,1], f \in \left(0, \min\{\tilde{f}, S\}\right)} \Pi_{B,3} = \frac{2\mu}{r} H f (G(b) - G(f)) - K(H)
\tag{22}
\end{equation}$$

and the optimization problem of the non-bank dealer can be rewritten as

$$\begin{equation}
\max_{c_B \geq S_{NB} \geq f} \Pi_{NB,3} = \frac{2\mu}{r} [S_{NB} - c_{NB}] (1 - G(b)) .
\tag{23}
\end{equation}$$

The equilibrium definition from Section 3.2 can be formally restated in Case 3 as follows:
Equilibrium in Case 3. A triple \( (S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3) \) is called an equilibrium if

1. \( S^*_3 \in \arg \max_{c_B \geq S \geq f^*_3} \Pi_{NB,3}(S, H^*_3, f^*_3) \);

2. \( (H^*_3, f^*_3) \in \arg \max_{H \in [0,1], S^*_3 \geq f \geq 0} \Pi_{B,3}(S^*_3, H, f) \) and

3. Arriving customers maximize expected profit by choosing between the market making service of the non-bank dealer, the matchmaking service of the bank dealer, and refraining from trade altogether.

The bank dealer’s strategy space in the equilibrium definition is specified as \( S^*_3 \geq f \geq 0 \) because it is implied by \( \min \{ \tilde{f}, S^*_3 \} \geq f \geq 0 \). We call an equilibrium with \( S^*_3 = c_B \) a constrained equilibrium and an equilibrium with \( S^*_3 < c_B \) an unconstrained equilibrium. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.

**Proposition 5.** Suppose that \( K''(H) > \beta_2 \) for all \( H \in (0,1) \), where \( \beta_2 \) is a constant.\(^{24} \) Then, for \( c_B \geq c_{NB} \), the following results are true.

1. (Existence) There always exists at least one equilibrium \( (S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3) \).

2. (Structure) There exist \( \bar{c}_1 \) and \( \bar{c}_2 \) satisfying \( c_{NB} < \bar{c}_1 < \bar{c}_2 \) such that

   (a) If \( c_B \in [c_{NB}, \bar{c}_1) \), there exists a unique equilibrium, and the equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium.

   (b) If \( c_B \in [\bar{c}_2, \infty) \), all equilibria are unconstrained.

3. (Optimality) \( (S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3) \) satisfy the conditions below.

   (a) \( (H^*_3, f^*_3) \) satisfy the following first-order conditions for all possible equilibria:

   \[
   G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3) = f^*_3 G'(f^*_3) + f^*_3 \frac{H^*_3}{1 - H^*_3} G'(b^*_3),
   \]

   \[
   \frac{r}{2\mu} K'(H^*_3) = f^*_3 \left( G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3) \right) + \frac{S^*_3 - f^*_3}{(1 - H^*_3)^2} f^*_3 H^*_3 G'(b^*_3),
   \]

   where \( b^*_3 = \frac{S^*_3 - H^*_3 f^*_3}{1 - H^*_3} \).

---

\(^{24}\)\( \beta_2 \in \left( \frac{2\bar{c}_1}{5}, \infty \right) \) is the solution to

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \beta = \frac{1}{\left( 1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{\beta}} \right) \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{\beta}}^{5/2}} c_B \max_b \{ b G'(b) \}. \tag{24}
\]

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063
(b) In a constrained equilibrium, $S^*_3 = c_B$; in an unconstrained equilibrium, $S^*_3$ satisfies the following first-order condition:

$$1 - G(b^*_3) - (S^*_3 - c_{NB}) \frac{G'(b^*_3)}{1 - H^*_3} = 0. \quad (27)$$

Case 3 is more complex because the equilibrium definition does not reduce to the optimization problem of the bank (as in the two other cases). Rather, when $c_B$ exceeds $c_{NB}$ the bank and non-bank dealers need to take each other’s best responses into account when choosing their strategies. We can show uniqueness of the constrained equilibrium as long as the bank regulatory costs are not too high. However, if $c_B \in [\bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_2)$, a constrained equilibrium may exist but multiple equilibria are possible. In the unconstrained equilibrium, the bank regulatory costs are greater than the non-bank dealer’s optimal spread, and therefore nothing changes in the equilibrium if $c_B$ increases. In other words, since the non-bank dealer does not increase his spread, the bank dealer does not have an incentive to change his choices of matchmaking fee or speed. As such, customers do not alter their behavior and overall welfare is unchanged. While the unconstrained equilibrium appears somewhat extreme, the constrained equilibrium is more nuanced and we now turn to characterizing its comparative statics.

**Proposition 6.** In the case characterized by Proposition 5, when $c_B$ increases, if $(S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)$ is an unconstrained equilibrium, then nothing will be changed in the equilibrium; if $(S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)$ is a constrained equilibrium, then

1. The non-bank dealer’s optimal spread, $S^*_3$, increases and the bank dealer’s optimal fee, $f^*_3$, increases. The matching speed, $H^*_3$ increases if and only if the following condition holds at the equilibrium $(S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)$:

$$\frac{H}{1 - H} S G''(b) + f [G'(b) + H(b - f) G''(b)] \left[ - f G''(f) - 2 G'(f) \right] > 0. \quad (28)$$

If, in addition, $K''(H) > \beta_3$ for all $H \in (0, 1)$, where $\beta_3$ is a constant, then the bank dealer’s optimal speed $H^*_3$ increases in $c_B$.

$\beta_3 \in (\frac{2\mu\epsilon}{\bar{c}r}, \infty)$ is the solution to

$$\sqrt{2\mu} \sqrt{4\epsilon} = \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon \left( \frac{G''(0)}{G'(0)} \right)}. \quad 28$$

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063
2. The fraction of customers paying the spread, \(1 - G(b^*_3)\), decreases. The fraction of customers who refrain from trading, \(G(f^*_3)\), increases. The fraction of customers choosing matchmaking, \(G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3)\), increases if and only if the following condition holds at the equilibrium \((S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)\):

\[
\left(1 - \Gamma \frac{c_B}{1-H}\right) G'(b) - \frac{Hf''}{1-H} G''(b) < \frac{G'(f)}{G'(b)},
\]

where \(\Gamma = \frac{f G'(b)}{2 K''(H)(1-H)}\). In particular, \((G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3))\) increases if \(c_{NB}\) is sufficiently small and \(c_B\) is greater than but sufficiently close to \(c_{NB}\).

3. Customers’ average transaction costs \(\frac{1}{1-G(f^*_3)} [(G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3)) f^*_3 + (1 - G(b^*_3)) S^*_3]\) increase if \(c_{NB}\) is sufficiently small and \(c_B\) is greater than but sufficiently close to \(c_{NB}\).

4. The bank dealer’s profit \(\pi_B\) increases. The non-bank dealer’s profit, \(\pi_{NB}\), increases if \(c_{NB}\) is sufficiently small and \(c_B\) is greater than but sufficiently close to \(c_{NB}\). On the other hand, if \(c_B\) is sufficiently larger than \(c_{NB}\) (yet the equilibrium is still constrained) and \(K''\) is sufficiently large, the non-bank dealer’s profit, \(\pi_{NB}\), decreases.

5. Overall customer welfare, \(\pi_c\) (defined in (5)), decreases if \(K''\) is sufficiently large. \(\pi_c\) also decreases if \(c_{NB}\) is sufficiently small and \(c_B\) is greater than but sufficiently close to \(c_{NB}\).

It is clear that raising regulatory costs in this case works to weaken competition rather than strengthen it. As such, the non-bank dealer becomes less constrained as \(c_B\) goes up and can increase his spread. The bank dealer focuses on maximizing his profits from matchmaking and can do so by raising his fee. The higher fee means more customers choose to refrain from trading, which decreases volume and negatively affects welfare. The impact on average transaction costs and overall customer welfare in the constrained equilibrium depends on the investment in matching speed and the fraction of customers who choose to utilize the matchmaking service, both of which can go up or down depending on the parameters of the economy. Overall customer welfare declines if the rate at which the cost of speed goes up is sufficiently high. Also, if the market making cost of the non-bank dealer is sufficiently small and the bank dealer’s cost is greater than but not too far from that of the non-bank dealer, then the investment in speed cannot offset the negative impact of the increases in spread and fee, resulting in lower overall customer welfare. The clear winner in this case is the bank dealer, whose profits increase unequivocally. Both financial service firms
benefit (at least when $c_{NB}$ is sufficiently small and $c_B$ is greater than but sufficiently close to $c_{NB}$) when each dealer specializes in a different business (the non-bank dealer in market making and the bank dealer in matchmaking) and is able to use his market power to extract higher rents.\footnote{The non-bank dealer’s profits could potentially go down if the strategy of the bank dealer attracts enough customers to the matchmaking mechanism, but this can happen only for very high values of $c_B$ that are close to the boundary of the unconstrained equilibrium.}

Case 3 corresponds to region 3 and region 4 in the example depicted in Figure 1. Specifically, region 3 shows the patterns associated with the constrained equilibrium. For the parameters in this specific example, we observe that average transaction costs rise only slightly, but overall customer welfare decreases by a large amount due to the increase in the fraction of customers who choose to refrain from trading. Region 4 in this example is consistent with the unconstrained equilibrium, where further increases in $c_B$ have no impact on any of the outcomes.

4.2.4 Further Discussion of Welfare

Throughout the paper, we focus on customer welfare as the metric with which to evaluate the ultimate benefit or cost of post-crisis regulations. This quantity, defined in (5), reflects the gains from trade of the customers in the model (who represent the investor population in our economy). For us, this is a natural benchmark for regulators to consider.

Our customer welfare measure, however, lacks two components that one may care about. First, the too-big-to-fail subsidy the bank dealer receives—reflected in the difference of balance sheet costs between the bank and non-bank dealers—ultimately comes out of the pocket of investors (or the public in general), so we may want to include this adjustment. Second, both the bank and the non-bank dealers are agents in the economy, and one may want to include them in the welfare definition.

Therefore, we consider an alternative welfare measure as the sum of customer welfare and dealer profits, but adjusting for the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy of the bank dealer:

$$W = \pi_c + \pi_B + \pi_{NB} - \frac{2\mu}{r} \left(1 - G(b)\right) (c_{NB} - c_B) \mathbb{I}_{S=S_B}. \quad (30)$$

The first three terms of this expression are defined in Section 3.3, but the last term requires additional discussion. Our assumption is that without giving an implicit public subsidy to the bank dealer, the balance sheet costs of the bank dealer would be similar to those of the non-bank dealer, if $c_B < c_{NB}$.
dealer—that is, the same market making activity would require the same cost of capital regardless of who provides it.\textsuperscript{27} Hence, the difference between the two balance sheet costs, multiplied by the number of customers who trade using the market making services of the bank dealer, represents the welfare loss of investors associated with granting this subsidy to the bank dealer. As post-crisis regulations increase the market making costs of the bank dealer, the likelihood the dealer would need to be rescued decreases, and with it the implicit subsidy. As $c_B$ approaches $c_{NB}$, the subsidy given to the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost disappears. The indicator function at the end of the term is there to ensure that the subsidy is only considered when the bank dealer makes markets.

Because the subsidy of the bank dealer is relevant if and only if the bank dealer makes markets, we can get more transparent intuition by expanding (30) in Case 1 and Case 2 of the equilibrium, where $c_B < c_{NB}$ and $\pi_{NB} = 0$:

$$W = \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \int_{x=f}^{b} H x dG(x) + \int_{x=b}^{\infty} (x - c_{NB}) dG(x) \right] - K(H), \text{ if } c_B < c_{NB}. \quad (31)$$

This expression essentially measures investors’ gains from trades, after adjusting for the cost $K(H)$ of the technology investment and the non-bank dealer’s balance sheet cost $c_{NB}$, which is taken to be the market-determined, risk-based balance sheet cost of market making activity. While $c_B$ does not show up explicitly in (31), an increase in $c_B$ changes the equilibrium values of $f$, $b$, and $H$ as described in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. Overall, $W$ reflects the allocative efficiency of the market.

The following proposition shows what happens to $W$ as the bank dealer’s balance sheet costs increase in Case 1 and Case 2 of the equilibrium.

**Proposition 7.** In the equilibria characterized by Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, if the bank dealer’s balance sheet cost $c_B$ increases and all else are held equal, then the alternative welfare measure, $W$, increases.

Proposition 7 shows that the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy has substantial influence on how the alternative welfare measure behaves. We know from Proposition 2 that in Case 1, the bank dealer’s profit $\pi_B$ decreases in $c_B$ while customer welfare $\pi_c$ can decrease over the entire region or start increasing in the interior for some parameter values (the non-bank dealer does not trade in Case 1). Hence, the sum $\pi_B + \pi_c$ can either decrease or have an ambiguous sign for some parameter

\textsuperscript{27}Here, by the cost of capital, we mean the cost of capital of the activity, not the entire institution that may have many subsidiaries. In the data, the cost of capital for each business line could be difficult to observe.
values. In Case 2, we know from Proposition 4 that customer welfare $\pi_c$ increases while the bank dealer’s profit $\pi_B$ decreases when $c_B$ goes up. Again, the manner in which $\pi_c + \pi_B$ is changing as we increase $c_B$ could have an ambiguous sign. The unambiguous result in Proposition 7 that $W$ increases in both cases is therefore a testament to the importance of taking into account the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy, $2\mu (1 - G(b)) (c_{NB} - c_B) I_{S=S_B}$.

While the results using the alternative welfare measure are unambiguous, there are good reasons to focus our analysis on customer welfare, $\pi_c$, rather than $W$. First, we set out to model trading during normal times, not resiliency of dealers in times of stress or the valuation of the implicit public subsidy. Our goal is to show the mechanism through which post-crisis bank regulations can impact customer welfare by changing the market structure for trading. Without explicitly modeling dealer bankruptcy or the formation of the public subsidy, taking the difference between the bank and non-bank dealers’ market making costs to represent the implicit subsidy is clearly a simplification. In practice, part of the difference in market making costs may arise for other reasons such as operational efficiency, and we have no way in this model to evaluate the actual cost imposed on the public by the too-big-to-fail guarantee. Second, the profit of the bank dealer stems from his market power. While regulators clearly see improving investor welfare during normal times as one of their goals, it is hard to imagine the situation in which regulators justify their actions by appealing to the need to maximize banks’ market power rents. As such, we think that the most natural metric with which to judge the impact of post-crisis regulations during normal times is still customer welfare, and in the next section we use it to specifically evaluate the regulations’ impact on investors in the corporate bond market.

5 Did Post-Crisis Bank Regulations Harm Investors in the Corporate Bond Market?

We can use the model’s insights to evaluate whether bank regulations following the financial crisis lowered the overall welfare of investors. Given the wide availability of empirical evidence in the US corporate bond market, we focus our discussion on this market, but the model’s insights would similarly apply to other markets affected by post-crisis bank regulations. As we stress in the introduction, empirical estimations of transaction-based measures of liquidity cannot capture investors’ loss of welfare when finding a trading counterparty takes more time or when they forgo
trading due to the high cost of immediacy. In contrast, our theoretical model takes these potential welfare losses into account alongside the out-of-pocket cost of trading. Our analysis shows that the implications of bank regulations for overall customer welfare depend on the manner in which competition between the bank and non-bank dealers shapes the equilibrium. Hence, to evaluate the impact of post-crisis regulation on welfare we need to tie the equilibrium regions in our model to the state of affairs in the corporate bond market around the enactment of the bank regulations. In this section we attempt to do so by mapping the implications of our model for observable market outcomes to the findings of the empirical literature.

The first set of results involves price-based measures: average transaction costs and the cost of immediacy. The general finding in the empirical literature is that average transaction costs in the form of bid-ask spreads or price impacts have declined (Mizrach (2015), Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, and Vogt (2017), Anderson and Stulz (2017)) or have not changed (Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018), Trebbi and Xiao (2017)) following the enactment of post-crisis regulations. On the other hand, the cost of immediacy or the cost of trading via the market making mechanism has gone up (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Dick-Nielsen and Rossi (2018), Choi and Huh (2017)).

Referring back to the example in Figure 1, the blue line in Panel A traces the cost of immediacy (trading via the market making mechanism) as we increase bank regulatory costs \(c_B\) on the x-axis. We observe that the market making spread increases in region 1, remains constant in region 2 (where it is constrained by the market making cost of the non-bank dealer), increases further in region 3 (where the competitive pressure from the bank dealer is easing), and is constant again in region 4 as the non-bank dealer charges his unconstrained optimal spread. The matchmaking fee represented by the red line is constant in region 1, declines in region 2 (where competition from the non-bank dealer makes it optimal for the bank dealer to substantially increase his investment in the matchmaking technology), increases somewhat in region 3 (where the non-bank dealer’s market making spread goes up, enabling the bank dealer to extract more matchmaking rents) and remains constant at the unconstrained maximum in region 4. Average transaction costs, which take into account both the price charged to customers and the amount of trading in each mechanism, are shown by the black dotted line. They increase in region 1, decline in region 2, increase in region 3, and remain unchanged in region 4.
The empirical findings of an increase in the cost of immediacy together with a decline in average transaction costs around the enactment of post-crisis bank regulations must mean we have moved from the right portion of region 1 to region 2 (or from the left portion of region 2 to the left portion of region 3). Therefore, key to observing both an increase in the cost of immediacy and a decline in average transaction costs is that the market making costs of bank dealers move through region 2, where the gains from lower matchmaking fees materialize.\(^{28}\) Propositions 2, 4, and 6 show that this is a robust implication of our model that is not tied to a particular example.

Panel B plots the fraction of traders choosing the market making mechanism (light blue), trading via the matchmaking mechanism (light green), or refraining from trade altogether (red). A transition from region 1 to region 2 (or the left portion of region 3) implies a large increase in matchmaking volume accompanied by a decline in market making. These patterns also match the empirical findings: an increase in matchmaking volume driven by the bank dealers (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Choi and Huh (2017), Schultz (2017)) and a significant decline in capital commitment to market making by bank dealers that is not sufficiently offset by an increase in market making by non-bank dealers (Bao, O’Hara, and Zhou (2018), Bessembinder, Jacobsen, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2018)).\(^{29}\)

Proposition 4 predicts an increase in the overall volume of trading in region 2, where customers who refrain from trading in region 1 are drawn to the market by the lower matchmaking fee and higher matching speed. The empirical evidence on volume is somewhat nuanced. Overall trading volume in bonds has significantly increased as our model predicts, while turnover in each particular bond issue appears to have declined (increased) in more (less) active bonds (BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2014), Mizrah (2015), Adrian, Fleming, Shachar, and Vogt (2017)). Some market observers note that the low interest rate environment greatly boosted the attractiveness of bond financing, and business enterprises responded by issuing a record number of bonds. According to this explanation, the abnormal issuance, not a decline in the desire to trade, resulted

\(^{28}\)The figure also reflects the intuitive result that the fee charged to customers in the matchmaking mechanism is lower than the cost of trading in the market making mechanism, which is consistent with the empirical evidence in Choi and Huh (2017) and Schultz (2017).

\(^{29}\)In the model, there is a clear distinction between region 2, where bank dealers capture the entire market making business, and region 3, where non-bank dealers accommodate all customers who demand immediacy. We would expect a more gradual transition in reality. The empirical evidence of an increase (decline) in market making activity by non-bank (bank) dealers following the enactment of post-crisis regulations suggests that we are probably rather close to the border between region 2 and region 3 (where the cost differential between bank and non-bank dealers is very small).
in decreased turnover in each bond issue (BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2014)). In other words, the higher observed overall volume could be driven by lower average transaction costs that attract more customers to trade bonds (as in our model), but the record number of new issues means that each bond issue would be traded less often.

Summarizing, the empirical findings around the implementation of bank regulations in the aftermath of the financial crisis all point to the particular role that region 2 plays in our model. One possibility is that we were in region 1 in the pre-crisis period and ended up in region 2 (or the left portion of region 3) after bank regulations were imposed. We could have also started in the left portion of region 2 and ended up further to the right in region 2 (or the left portion of region 3). Either way, the empirical evidence suggests that the regulations caused a move across region 2. With this in mind, we can now consider our model’s predictions for overall customer welfare.

Panel C plots overall customer welfare (the dotted black line) as well as the welfare of customers who utilize market making (red line) and matchmaking (blue line). We observe for this particular example that welfare declines in region 1, increases in region 2, and declines again in region 3. Propositions 2, 4, and 6 show that welfare can actually start increasing already in the right portion of region 1 and continue to increase in the left portion of region 3 (before starting to decline) for some combination of parameters. Irrespective of parameter choices, however, overall customer welfare unequivocally goes up as the regulatory costs of bank dealers increase throughout region 2.

The clear mapping of the empirical findings to an increase in regulatory costs across region 2 in the model coupled with our welfare implications indicate that investors in the corporate bond market are likely better off under the current bank regulatory regime compared to the one that prevailed before the financial crisis. We believe that this insight is an important contribution of our work to the debate on the merits of bank regulations that were imposed in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

6 Concluding Remarks

Our paper highlights the complex and multifaceted consequences that post-crisis bank regulations have for market liquidity and investor welfare. While the explicit goal of those regulations is to enhance financial stability in times of stress, our work shows that these regulations can improve market efficiency even during normal times by nudging a change in the nature of liquidity provision.
Pre-crisis, bank dealers underinvest in matchmaking technology because they wish to keep their profitable market making business, even though technology investments would benefit investors. Post-crisis regulations eliminate obstacles to competition in the most profitable business (market making) and incentivize bank dealers to invest in the less profitable but more efficient market structure (matchmaking). The industrial organization angle combines here with the market microstructure angle to deliver this positive outcome.

The key insight we offer in this paper is that an increase in regulatory costs imposed on banks can make customers in the corporate bond market better off. Specifically, our focus is on balance sheet costs that were imposed on banks following the financial crisis to deter proprietary trading and as a result increased the costs of market making. A notable aspect of our work is that we do not focus on whether these costs decrease the likelihood or severity of a crisis, which are presumably the stated goals of the regulation. Rather, we show that the increase in regulatory costs can lower average transaction costs during normal times and, more importantly, increase the overall welfare of customers. The driving forces behind our results are four elements that characterize the corporate bond market: the coexistence of two distinct trading mechanisms (market making and matchmaking), the market power enjoyed by bank dealers, potential competition in market making from non-bank dealers, and the investment in technology that is reshaping the trading environment. Although our paper is motivated by and specifically speaks to observations in the corporate bonds market, the model we present can be applied to other over-the-counter markets that feature these four elements, like Treasuries, repos, and derivatives.

How can customers be made better off by regulations that deter market making? The rationale is that while market making is a very profitable form of intermediation for bank dealers, it can be an expensive form of intermediation for customers. When regulation increases the cost of market making for bank dealers and competition prevents them from transferring the cost increase to the customers, bank dealers are incentivized to develop their matchmaking business. They do so by lowering fees and investing in technology that makes matchmaking more efficient, thereby rendering it more attractive to customers. The increase in welfare of customers who get better execution using the matchmaking mechanism can be greater than the decline in the welfare of customers who must pay more for market making when regulation increases its cost. This aggregate increase in welfare is not a Pareto improvement—some customers are worse off—but the overall population of customers
benefits.

Regulators always worry about the unintended consequences of their regulatory interventions. While increasing the costs of market making was meant to enhance bank dealers’ resiliency in times of market stress, we believe that one (perhaps) “unintended” benefit of these bank regulations was to push bank dealers to invest in matchmaking. This can improve overall customer welfare during normal times and therefore materially changes the supposed tradeoff between resiliency in times of stress and day-to-day liquidity. The market microstructure angle in this case is crucial to delivering this result. It is also important to stress that the improvement in customer welfare in our model is likely underestimating the extent of the true effect. Our model intentionally shuts off one of the routes through which customers are made better off when they switch to matchmaking. Specifically, bank dealers in our model directly specify the matching rate by their investment in technology. While this simplification allows us to present analytic solutions, waiting costs in a more general search model would also go down as more customers switch to trade through the matchmaking mechanism, further enhancing the overall welfare of customers.

Inevitably, raising regulatory costs beyond a certain level would worsen welfare. A natural question is whether we can help regulators identify the optimal level of such costs. While one could calibrate our model with specifics on observable quantities to arrive at a prescription for the optimal level of regulatory costs, we caution against taking an admittedly simplified theoretical model and requiring it to provide such a prescription. Nonetheless, our model does point to an approach that could help bank regulators. In particular, we show that beneficial investment in matchmaking technology is boosted by competition in market making as the cost differential between bank and non-bank dealers shrinks. Bank regulators can therefore look at the market making costs of non-bank dealers to help them judge the level they should impose on banks in order to ensure sufficient competition.

Five regulatory agencies—the Fed, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, SEC and CFTC—are currently contemplating revising the Volcker Rule to ease some restrictions. We stress that simply lowering the regulatory costs of bank dealers need not help liquidity in the corporate bond market nor would it necessarily raise the welfare of customers. Our analysis suggests that in addition to looking at the market making costs of non-bank dealers as a benchmark, regulators should scrutinize their proposed revisions to ensure that they would not result in bank dealers
reducing their investment in matchmaking technology. In fact, regulators could specifically incentivize further investments in matchmaking to help ensure customers continue to benefit even as bank regulatory costs decline. It is this investment, and the partial shift from market making to matchmaking, that is key in our model to generating higher overall customer welfare.

All theoretical models employ simplifications in the process of creating the appropriate structure and deriving the results. Our model is no different. Aiming for robustness and clarity while obtaining closed form solutions necessitates abstracting from some features of the economic environment. One example is that we do not model the matchmaking business of non-bank dealers. Several other such features—intermediation chains, dealer inventory, the nature of dealer funding, and the moral hazard problem that arises when a customer employs an agent for searching—have recently been discussed in other papers (An, Song, and Zhang (2017), An and Zheng (2017), Li and Li (2017), and Cimon and Garriott (2017)). Partially for that reason we forgo incorporating them in our model (e.g., we abstract from the inventory consideration by having the same arrival rates for buyers and sellers). Instead, we focus on dimensions we deem critical to understanding how customer welfare in the corporate bonds market changes when regulation increases the costs of market making by bank dealers: the dual trading mechanisms, dealer market power, and the nature of competition between bank and non-bank dealers. The resulting model provides insights that we hope capture the more salient trade-offs. Nonetheless, integrating additional economic features and specifying a more general search model in which the size of the pool of searching customers impacts the match rate could be valuable extensions of the work we pursue in this paper.

Crucial to our analysis are customers who optimize over several key choices—from the basic decision of whether to trade to the tradeoff between search time and the cost of execution in the two trading mechanisms—but we recognize that we could not capture all aspects of customer behavior. For example, increased market making costs could incentivize customers to shift their trading to newly issued securities in order to minimize transaction costs. Furthermore, the low interest rate environment following the financial crisis encouraged new bond issues and made such substitutions more easily accomplished. Such coping strategies may limit portfolio flexibility and adversely affect welfare. Similarly, customers may choose to reduce their average trade size in response to the higher cost of market making. The implications of a reduction in trade size for customer welfare are ambiguous: larger trades have traditionally exhibited lower transaction costs in the corporate
bonds market but the increase in electronic trading could make order splitting optimal (as has
been the case in equity markets). We believe that these aspects of customer behavior (choosing
newer issues or a smaller trade size) play a lesser role in determining customer welfare than the
pronounced shift from market making to matchmaking, but nonetheless they suggest a complexity
to the manner in which customers respond to changes in their economic environment.

The evolving regulatory frameworks and the breathtaking pace at which technology impacts
securities markets continue to dominate the agenda of regulators, practitioners, and academics.
We hope that our work—studying how regulation impacts incentives to invest in technology and
as a consequence alters the market structure for trading securities—would serve to both highlight
important tradeoffs and spur additional work on the changing nature of our securities markets.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1

First, we want to show $\mathcal{H}_1^* > 0$. If the bank dealer chooses $\mathcal{H}_1^* = 0$, then it has zero matchmaking capacity and its profit is invariant to $f_1^*$. Suppose, in this case, the bank dealer chooses $(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}^* = 0, f^*)$, where “NM” means no matching. Now let’s think about $\partial \Pi_1(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}, f^*)/\partial \mathcal{H} |_{\mathcal{H} = 0}$. If this derivative is positive for some reasonable $f^*$, then it is profitable for the bank dealer to choose a positive $\mathcal{H}$. It is easy to show

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_1(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}, f^*)}{\partial \mathcal{H}} |_{\mathcal{H} = 0} \propto f^* (G(b^*) - G(f^*)) - (S_{NM}^* - c_B) G'(b^*) (S_{NM}^* - f^*),$$

where $b^*$ is the cutoff value $b$ evaluated at $(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}^*, f^*)$. In this case $b^* = S_{NM}^*$ because we set $\mathcal{H}^* = 0$. Then with $K'(0) = 0$, we have

$$\frac{\partial \Pi_1(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}, f^*)}{\partial \mathcal{H}} |_{\mathcal{H} = 0} \propto f^* (G(S_{NM}^*) - G(f^*)) - (S_{NM}^* - c_B) G'(S_{NM}^*) (S_{NM}^* - f^*)$$

$$\propto (S_{NM}^* - f^*) \left( f^* \frac{G(S_{NM}^*) - G(f^*)}{S_{NM}^* - f^*} - (S_{NM}^* - c_B) G'(S_{NM}^*) \right).$$

We only need to find one $f^*$ such that the above equation is positive. Now let’s set $f^* \uparrow S_{NM}^*$, then $(S_{NM}^* - f^*) > 0$, $\frac{G(S_{NM}^*) - G(f^*)}{S_{NM}^* - f^*} \rightarrow G'(S_{NM}^*)$, and $f^* > S_{NM}^* - c_B$. Thus, in this case, $\frac{\partial \Pi_1(S_{NM}^*, \mathcal{H}, f^*)}{\partial \mathcal{H}} |_{\mathcal{H} = 0} > 0$. So it is never optimal to choose $\mathcal{H} = 0$.

With the assumption $K'' > \beta_1$, we can show that it is not optimal to choose $\mathcal{H}_1^* = 1$ (if $\mathcal{H}_1^* = 1$, the bank dealer’s profit would be negative). So the optimal solution must satisfy $\mathcal{H}_1^* \in (0, 1)$, i.e., $\mathcal{H}_1^*$ is an interior solution.

To characterize the equilibrium, let’s make the following change of variables

$$\begin{bmatrix} S \\ f \\ \mathcal{H} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} b \\ f \\ \mathcal{H} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $b = \frac{S - fH}{1 - H}$. It is easy to show that $S = (1 - H) b + fH$. The optimization problem now becomes

$$\max_{S \geq f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0, 1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ Hf(G(b) - G(f)) + (S - c_B)(1 - G(b)) \right] - K(H)$$

$$\iff \max_{b \geq f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0, 1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ Hf(G(b) - G(f)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + fH - c_B)(1 - G(b)) \right] - K(H).$$

It can be shown that if $b \leq f$, we must have $S \leq f$, and in this case the value from the above formula must be less than or equal to the case in which the bank dealer only offers the market making service, and we have already proven that it is not optimal for the bank dealer to abandon matchmaking completely. So without loss of generality, we just need to consider the following relaxed problem:

$$\max_{b \geq 0, f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0, 1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ Hf(G(b) - G(f)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + fH - c_B)(1 - G(b)) \right] - K(H).$$
Rewriting the problem, we get
\[
\max_{b \geq 0, f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0,1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \mathcal{H}f (G(b) - G(f)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + f \mathcal{H} - c_B) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K(\mathcal{H})
\]
\[
\iff \max_{b \geq 0} \max_{f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0,1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \mathcal{H}f (G(b) - G(f)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + f \mathcal{H} - c_B) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K(\mathcal{H})
\]
\[
\iff \max_{b \geq 0} \tilde{\Pi}_1(b),
\]
where
\[
\tilde{\Pi}_1(b) = \max_{f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0,1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \mathcal{H}f (G(b) - G(f)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + f \mathcal{H} - c_B) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K(\mathcal{H})
\]
\[
= \max_{f \geq 0, \mathcal{H} \in [0,1]} \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b).
\]

Let’s consider the first-order derivative of the above equation:
\[
\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial f} = \frac{2\mu}{r} \mathcal{H} \left[ (G(b) - G(f)) - fG'(f) + 1 - G(b) \right]
\]
\[
= \frac{2\mu}{r} \mathcal{H} \left[ 1 - G(f) - fG'(f) \right] \quad (38)
\]
\[
= \frac{2\mu}{r} \mathcal{H}G'(f) \left[ 1 - G(f) \right] - f. \quad (39)
\]

Given the assumption $\Phi \geq 0$, we know $\frac{1-G(f)}{G'(f)}$ is weakly decreasing in $f$, $\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial f}|_{f=0} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial f}|_{f=\infty} < 0$. So, there exists a unique $f^*_1 > 0$ such that $\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial f} > 0$ if $f < f^*_1$ and $\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial f} < 0$ if $f > f^*_1$. And $f^*_1$ is independent of $(b, \mathcal{H})$. Thus, $f^*_1$ is the global optimal value. Then
\[
\tilde{\Pi}_1(b) = \max_{\mathcal{H} \in [0,1]} \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \mathcal{H}f^*_1 (G(b) - G(f^*_1)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}) b + f^*_1 \mathcal{H} - c_B) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K(\mathcal{H}). \quad (41)
\]

And the first-order derivative of $\tilde{\Pi}(f^*_1, \mathcal{H}; b)$ with respect to $\mathcal{H}$ is
\[
\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f^*_1, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial \mathcal{H}} = \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ f^*_1 (G(b) - G(f^*_1)) + (-b + f^*_1) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K'(\mathcal{H}). \quad (42)
\]

We know that $K$ is strictly convex, so there must exist a unique $\mathcal{H}^*(f^*_1, b)$, such that $\frac{\partial \tilde{\Pi}(f^*_1, \mathcal{H}; b)}{\partial \mathcal{H}}|_{f=f^*_1} > 0$ if and only if $\mathcal{H} < \mathcal{H}^*(f^*_1, b)$, where $\mathcal{H}^*(f^*_1, b)$ is solved by
\[
K'(\mathcal{H}^*) = \max \left\{ \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ f^* (G(b) - G(f^*_1)) + (-b + f^*_1) (1 - G(b)) \right], 0 \right\} \quad (43)
\]
\[
= \max \left\{ \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ f^*_1 (1 - G(f^*_1)) - b (1 - G(b)) \right], 0 \right\}. \quad (44)
\]

Then
\[
\tilde{\Pi}_1(b) = \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \mathcal{H}^* f^*_1 (G(b) - G(f^*_1)) + ((1 - \mathcal{H}^*) b + f^*_1 \mathcal{H}^* - c_B) (1 - G(b)) \right] - K(\mathcal{H}^*). \quad (45)
\]
By the envelope theorem,

$$\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} = \frac{2\mu}{r} G'(b) \left(1 - \mathcal{H}^*\right) \left[\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*} - \left(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\right)\right].$$  \hspace{1cm} (46)

If \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\) \leq 0, we would have \(\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} > 0\). In particular, at \(b = 0\), \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} = -\frac{1}{G'(0)} < 0\) and \(\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} \big|_{b=0} > 0\). In the region \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} > 0\), we can show that \(\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*}\) is non-decreasing in \(b\).

To see this, note that the expression \(\tilde{\Pi}(f^*_1, \mathcal{H}; b)\) is equal to zero at the optimal solution. Then we can take total derivative again to get

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*) d\mathcal{H} + \left[\frac{1 - G}{G'(b)} - b\right] G'(b) db = 0 \iff \frac{d\mathcal{H}^*}{db} > 0.$$

(47)

Then \(c_B/(1 - \mathcal{H})\) is also increasing in \(\mathcal{H}\).

Lemma 2 below shows that if \(K''(\cdot) \geq \beta_1\), then

$$\frac{d}{db} \left[\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*} - b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\right] < 0$$

if \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} > 0\), and if \(\lim_{b \to \infty} \frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} < 0\), then there must exist a unique \(b^*\) such that \(\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} > 0\) if \(b < b^*\), this is because

$$\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} > 0 \iff \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*} - \left(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\right) > 0.$$

Define \(y(b) = \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*} - \left(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\right)\). First we know that \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\) is increasing in \(b\), so there exists a threshold \(b_1\) such that \(\{b | b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} \leq 0\} = [0, b_1]\). (Actually \(b_1 = f^*_1\), as shown before.)

Then \(y(b) > 0\) when \(b \in [0, b_1]\). In region \(b \in (b_1, \infty)\), we know \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} > 0\). With the assumption \(K'' > \beta_1\), Lemma 2 below shows that \(y'(b) < 0\) if \(b \in (b_1, \infty)\). From the assumption \(K'' > \beta_1\), we know there exists a \(\mathcal{H} < 1\) such that the optimal \(\mathcal{H}^*\) satisfies \(\mathcal{H}^* < \mathcal{H} < 1\). Then as \(b \to \infty\), \(\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*}\) must be bounded. Moreover, we know both \(b\) and \(-\frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}\) are increasing in \(b\), and \(-\frac{1 - G(0)}{G'(0)}\) is bounded, so \(b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} \to \infty\) as \(b \to \infty\). Then we must have \(y(\infty) = -\infty\). Together with the conditions \(y(b_1) > 0\) and \(y'(b) < 0\) for all \(b \in (b_1, \infty)\), there must exist a \(b_1^*\) such that \(y(b) > 0\) if and only if \(b < b_1^*\), which is equivalent to \(\frac{d\tilde{\Pi}_1(b)}{db} > 0\) if and only if \(b < b_1^*\).

Therefore, the global optimal solution is \((b_1^*, f^*_1, \mathcal{H}^* (f^*_1, b_1^*))\), and from the above derivation we know the global optimal solution can be solved by the first-order approach. Because the one to one mapping from \((S, f, \mathcal{H})\) to \((b, f, \mathcal{H})\), we also know that the global optimal solution for the original problem can also be solved by the first-order approach and the solution is unique.

**Lemma 2.** Let \(\beta_1\) be the unique solution of

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} \beta = \frac{1}{\left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4c_B}{\beta}}\right)^2} c_B \max_b \left\{b G'(b)\right\}.$$

(49)
If $K''(\mathcal{H}) \geq \beta_1$ for all $\mathcal{H}$, then

$$d \left[ \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*(b)} \right] db < d \left[ b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} \right] db$$

(50)

for all $b$ that satisfies $\left( b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} \right) > 0$.

**Proof.** The LHS is

$$d \left[ \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}^*(b)} \right] db = \frac{c_B}{(1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2} \frac{d\mathcal{H}^*}{db} = \frac{c_B}{(1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2} \frac{bG'(b) - (1 - G(b))}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*)}.$$  

The RHS is

$$d \left[ b - \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} \right] db = 2 + \frac{(1 - G(b)) G''(b)}{(G'(b))^2}.$$  

Then

$$\frac{c_B}{(1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2} \frac{bG'(b) - (1 - G(b))}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*)} < 2 + \frac{(1 - G(b)) G''(b)}{(G'(b))^2} \iff \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*) (1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2 \geq c_B \frac{bG'(b) - (1 - G(b))}{2 + \frac{(1-G(b)) G''(b)}{(G'(b))^2}} < c_B bG'(b).$$

(51)

Thus, a sufficient condition for the desired inequality is

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*) (1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2 \geq c_B \max_b bG'(b).$$

(52)

Now we want to show that (52) is implied by $K'' \geq \beta_1$. Given $K(0) = 0$ and $K'(0) = 0$, for any $\beta$ such that $K'' > \beta$, we must have $K(\mathcal{H}) > \frac{1}{2} \beta \mathcal{H}^2$. The total profit from the bank dealer’s liquidity provision in market making and matchmaking is less than $\frac{2\mu}{r} 2\bar{c}$ (a customer pays the bank dealer no more than the non-bank dealer’s cost $c_{NB} < \bar{c}$). Then in any equilibrium, we must have $\frac{1}{2} \beta \mathcal{H}^2 < \frac{2\mu}{r} 2\bar{c}$ (the bank dealer’s profit is non-negative), which is $\mathcal{H} < \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4\bar{c}}{\beta}}$. This implies that, if $K'' > \beta$, then $\mathcal{H}^* < \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4\bar{c}}{\beta}}$. Now assume that $K'' > \beta_1$. Then the LHS of (52) becomes

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}^*) (1 - \mathcal{H}^*)^2 > \frac{r}{2\mu} \beta_1 \left( 1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4\bar{c}}{\beta_1}} \right)^2 = c_B \max_b bG'(b),$$

that is, (52) is satisfied. 

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2

1. **Spread, fee, and speed.** Because $f_1^* - \frac{1 - G(f_1^*)}{G'(f_1^*)} = 0$, $f_1^*$ is a constant.
Consider the first-order condition \( \frac{d\hat{b}}{db} = 0 \), which is
\[
\frac{c_B}{1 - \hat{H}^*} - \left( b_1^* - \frac{1 - G(b_1^*)}{G'(b_1^*)} \right) = 0. \tag{53}
\]

Take the total derivative of the above equality, we have
\[
dc_B \frac{1}{1 - \hat{H}^*} + c_B \frac{d}{db^*} \frac{d}{db^*} = \frac{d}{db^*} = 0. \tag{54}
\]

From Lemma 2 we know
\[
c_B \frac{d}{db^*} \frac{1 - \hat{H}^*}{db^*} < \frac{d}{db^*} \frac{\left( b_1^* - \frac{1 - G(b_1^*)}{G'(b_1^*)} \right)}{db^*}. \tag{55}
\]

Rearranging the expressions in the total derivative, we have \( \frac{db^*}{d\hat{b}} > 0 \).

We already show that \( \frac{d\hat{b}}{db} > 0 \), so \( \hat{H}^* \) also increases.

Moreover, because the function \( x - \frac{1 - G(x)}{G'(x)} \) is increasing in \( x \), we know that \( b_1^* > f_1^* \).

We know \( S_1^* = (1 - \hat{H}^*) b_1^* + f_1^* \hat{H}^* \), then
\[
\frac{dS_1^*}{db_1^*} = (1 - \hat{H}^*) - b_1^* \frac{dH^*}{db_1^*} + f_1^* \frac{dH^*}{db_1^*}
= (1 - \hat{H}^*) + (f_1^* - b_1^*) \frac{b_1^* G''(b_1^*) - (1 - G(b_1^*))}{r \mu K''(\hat{H}^*)}.
\]

Given the assumption \( K'' \geq \beta_1 \), we have
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\hat{H}^*) (1 - \hat{H}^*)^2 > c_B \sup_{b} b G'(b) > c_B \left[ b_1^* G'(b_1^*) - (1 - G(b_1^*)) \right], \tag{56}
\]

Because \( f_1^* - b_1^* < 0 \), we have
\[
\frac{dS_1^*}{db_1^*} > (1 - \hat{H}^*) + (f_1^* - b_1^*)(1 - \hat{H}^*)^2 \frac{1}{c_B}. \tag{57}
\]

A sufficient condition for \( \frac{dS_1^*}{db_1^*} > 0 \) is \( \frac{c_B}{1 - \hat{H}^*} > b_1^* - f_1^* \). This condition holds because
\[
\frac{c_B}{1 - \hat{H}^*} = b_1^* - \frac{1 - G(b_1^*)}{G'(b_1^*)} > b_1^* - \frac{1 - G(f_1^*)}{G'(f_1^*)} = b_1^* - f_1^*, \tag{58}
\]

where we have used the Assumption 1 that \( \frac{1 - G(x)}{G'(x)} \) is weakly decreasing in \( x \).

2. Customers’ choices. By the change of variables, \( b = \frac{S - \hat{H} f}{1 - \hat{H}} = f + \frac{S - f}{1 - \hat{H}} \). As shown in the previous part, as \( c_B \) increases, \( S_1^* \) increases, \( \hat{H}^* \) increases, and \( f_1^* \) stays the same. So \( b_1^* \) also increases and the fraction of customers paying the market making spread, \( 1 - G(b_1^*) \), decreases.

The fraction of customers doing matching, \( G(b_1^*) - G(f_1^*) \), increases because \( b_1^* \) increases.
The fraction of customers not trading, \( G(f^*_1) \), remains the same because \( f^*_1 \) is invariant to \( c_B \).

3. Customers’ average transaction costs.

As \( c_B \) increases, the change in customers’ average transaction costs is

\[
\frac{1}{1 - G(f^*_1)} [(1 - G(b^*_1)) dS^*_1 - (S_1 - f) G'(b^*_1) \, db^*_1],
\]

so the average transaction costs increases if and only if

\[
(1 - G(b^*_1)) dS^*_1 \geq (S^*_1 - f^*_1) G'(b^*_1) \, db^*_1.
\]

From \( S = H_f + (1 - H) b \), we have

\[
dS^*_1 = (f^*_1 - b^*_1) \, dH^*_1 + (1 - H^*_1) \, db^*_1,
\]

then

\[
(1 - G(b^*_1)) dS^*_1 \geq (S^*_1 - f^*_1) G'(b^*_1) \, db^*_1
\]

\[
\iff (1 - G(b^*_1)) \left( db^*_1 - \frac{b^*_1 - f^*_1}{1 - H^*_1} \, dH^*_1 \right) \geq (b^*_1 - f^*_1) G'(b^*_1) \, db^*_1
\]

\[
\iff \frac{dH^*_1}{db^*_1} \leq (1 - H^*_1) \left( \frac{1}{b^*_1 - f^*_1} - \frac{G'(b^*_1)}{1 - G(b^*_1)} \right).
\]

From the proof in Proposition 1, we know

\[
\frac{dH^*_1}{db^*_1} = \frac{b^*_1 G'(b^*_1) - (1 - G(b^*_1))}{\frac{1}{2} K''(H^*_1)},
\]

so

\[
\frac{dH^*_1}{db^*_1} \leq (1 - H^*_1) \left( \frac{1}{b^*_1 - f^*_1} - \frac{G'(b^*_1)}{1 - G(b^*_1)} \right)
\]

\[
\iff \frac{b^*_1 G''(b^*_1) - (1 - G(b^*_1))}{\frac{1}{2} K''(H^*_1)} \leq (1 - H^*_1) \left( \frac{1}{b^*_1 - f^*_1} - \frac{G'(b^*_1)}{1 - G(b^*_1)} \right).
\]

In equilibrium we have \( \frac{c_B}{1 - H^*_1} = \frac{b^*_1 G''(b^*_1) - (1 - G(b^*_1))}{G'(b^*_1)} \), and substituting this condition into the above result, we have

\[
\frac{c_B G''(b^*_1)}{\frac{1}{2} K''(H^*_1)} \leq \frac{1}{b^*_1 - f^*_1} - \frac{G'(b^*_1)}{1 - G(b^*_1)}.
\]

We proved (from the above result) that as \( c_B \) increases, average transaction costs increase if and only if (65) holds. Rewriting this condition to

\[
\frac{c_B}{\frac{1}{2} K''(H^*_1) (1 - H^*_1)^2} \leq \frac{1}{G'(b^*_1) (b^*_1 - f^*_1)} - \frac{1}{1 - G(b^*_1)}.
\]

As \( c_B \) increases, both \( H^*_1 \) and \( b^*_1 \) increase, so the LHS is non-decreasing based on the assump-
tion stated in the proposition. Now we want to show that the RHS is a decreasing function of $b_1^*$. To show this, define

$$y(b_1^*) = \frac{1}{G'(b_1^*) (b_1^* - f_1^*)} - \frac{1}{1 - G(b_1^*)}.$$  \hfill (67)

Then

$$\frac{dy}{db_1^*} = \frac{-1}{(G'(b_1^*) (b_1^* - f_1^*)^2)} \left( G''(b_1^*) (b_1^* - f_1^*) + G'(b_1^*) \right) - \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{(1 - G(b_1^*))^2}. \hfill (68)$$

From our Assumption 1, we know

$$- \frac{G''(b_1^*)}{G'(b_1^*)} \leq \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)}. \hfill (69)$$

Then we have

$$\frac{dy}{db_1^*} \leq \frac{1}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \frac{1}{b_1^* - f_1^*} - \frac{1}{G'(b_1^*) (b_1^* - f_1^*)^2} - \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{(1 - G(b_1^*))^2} \hfill (70)$$

$$= \frac{1}{G'(b_1^*)} \left[ G'(b_1^*) \frac{1}{1 - G(b_1^*)} b_1^* - f_1^* - \frac{1}{(b_1^* - f_1^*)^2} - \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{(1 - G(b_1^*))^2} \right].$$

We know

$$\frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \frac{1}{b_1^* - f_1^*} - \frac{1}{(b_1^* - f_1^*)^2} - \left( \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \right)^2 \leq 2 \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \frac{1}{b_1^* - f_1^*} - \frac{1}{(b_1^* - f_1^*)^2} - \left( \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \right)^2 \hfill (71)$$

$$= - \left( \frac{1}{b_1^* - f_1^*} - \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \right)^2 < 0,$$

so we must have $\frac{dy}{db_1^*} < 0$. Then the RHS of (66) is decreasing in $c_B$. As $c_B \to 0$, the LHS of (66) is close to zero, while the RHS converges to infinity (because in this case $b \to f$). So if $c_B$ is close to zero, customers’ average transaction costs must be increasing in $c_B$. As $c_B$ increases, either the condition (66) holds until the equilibrium reaches Case 2, or the condition is violated at some point of $c_B$ and will be violated for all $c_B$ larger than that point. So customers’ average transaction costs is a hump-shaped function of $c_B$, and the decreasing region may not exist.

4. **Bank dealer’s profit.** By the envelope theorem, $\frac{d\pi_B}{dc_B} = \frac{\partial \pi_B}{\partial c_B} = \frac{2\mu}{\tau} (-1) (1 - G(b_1^*)) < 0$.

5. **Customer welfare.**

As $c_B$ increases, we have

$$d\pi_c = \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (x - f_1^*) dH_1^* G(x) - \int_{b_1^*}^{\infty} dS_1^* dG(x). \hfill (72)$$
By $S_1^* = (1 - H_1^*) b_1^* + H_1^* f_1^*$, we have

$$d\pi_c = dH_1^* \left( \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} x dG(x) \right) - f_1^* (1 - G(f_1^*)) dH_1^* - (-dH_1^* b_1^* + (1 - H_1^*) db_1^*) (1 - G(b_1^*)).$$

(73)

Using

$$\int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} x dG(x) = -b_1^* (1 - G(b_1^*)) + f_1^* (1 - G(f_1^*)) + \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (1 - G(x)) dx,$$

we have

$$d\pi_c = dH_1^* \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (1 - G(x)) dx - (1 - H_1^*) (1 - G(b_1^*)) db_1^*.$$  (74)

By $\frac{dH_1^*}{db_1^*} = \frac{b_1^* G'(b_1^*) - (1 - G(b_1^*))}{\pi K''(H_1^*)}$ and $\frac{c_B}{1 - H_1^*} = \frac{b_1^* G'(b_1^*) - (1 - G(b_1^*))}{G'(b_1^*)}$ we have

$$d\pi_c \leq 0$$

$$\iff \frac{dH_1^*}{db_1^*} \leq \frac{(1 - H_1^*) (1 - G(b_1^*))}{\int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (1 - G(x)) dx}$$

$$\iff \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H_1^*) (1 - H_1^*)^2 \geq c_B \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (1 - G(x)) dx.$$  (76)

From the above proof, we know $\pi_c$ decreases if and only if

$$\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H_1^*) (1 - H_1^*)^2 \geq c_B \frac{G'(b_1^*)}{1 - G(b_1^*)} \int_{f_1^*}^{b_1^*} (1 - G(x)) dx.$$  (77)

In the unconstrained bank dealer case, as $c_B$ increases, both $H_1^*$ and $b_1^*$ increase, so the RHS of condition (77) is increasing in $c_B$ and, by assumption stated in the proposition, the LHS is non-increasing in $c_B$. When $c_B$ is close to zero, condition (77) must be satisfied. As $c_B$ increases from zero, there are two possibilities: first, the condition is satisfied until the equilibrium becomes the constrained bank dealer case; second, the condition is violated at some point and it will be violated for all $c_B$ larger than that point.

### A.3 Proof of Proposition 3

We prove the result in the following steps.

1. The solution must exist because the domain is a closed set and the objective function is continuous.

2. We must have $H_2^* \in (0, 1)$, i.e., $H_2^*$ is an interior solution. The proof is the same as in Proposition 1.

3. We must have $S_2^* = c_{NB}$. If $S_2^* < c_{NB}$, then $(S_2^*, H_2^*, f_2^*)$ must be a local maximum in the unconstrained problem. However, we’ve already shown that the objective function in the unconstrained problem is single-peaked with a unique local maximum (under the assumption $K'' > \beta_1$), so in this constrained problem, we must have $S_2^* = c_{NB}$. 

47
4. We must have \( f_2^* \in (0, c_{NB}) \). If \( f_2^* = 0 \), we must have \( \mathcal{H}_2^* = 0 \), which is not optimal, as proven before. It is also impossible to have \( f_2^* = S_2^* = c_{NB} \) because in this case, no customer would choose matching and the optimal speed becomes \( \mathcal{H}_2^* = 0 \), which again is not optimal.

5. \((\mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)\) satisfies the first-order conditions. From the previous steps, we know that \( S_2^* = c_{NB} \) and \((\mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)\) is an interior solution, and because the objective function is continuously differentiable, the optimal solution must satisfy the first-order conditions.

### A.4 Proof of Proposition 4

1. **Spread, fee, and speed.** \( S_2^* = c_{NB} \) is invariant to \( c_B \).

\((\mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)\) satisfies the first-order conditions for \( \Pi_2 (\mathcal{H}, f; c_B) \). By the implicit function theorem,

\[
\frac{\partial f_2^*}{\partial c_B} \propto \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial \mathcal{H}} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H} \partial c_B} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} \right) \bigg|_{(\mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)}.
\]

For the simplicity of notations, we drop the subscripts “2” in the remaining of the proof wherever it is not ambiguous. At the optimal solution, we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial \mathcal{H}} = \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} (S - f) (S - c_B - f \mathcal{H}) \frac{G''(b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} - \left[ f G' (f) - G (b) + G (f) \right]
\]

\[
+ \frac{G' (b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} (S - c_B - f \mathcal{H}) + \frac{G' (b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \mathcal{H} (S - f - f (1 - \mathcal{H})).
\]

From the first-order conditions, we have \((S - c_B - f \mathcal{H}) = \frac{1 - \mathcal{H}}{G'(b)} [f G' (f) - G (b) + G (f)], then the above expression becomes

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial \mathcal{H}} = \frac{f G' (f) - G (b) + G (f)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \mathcal{H} \left[ (S - f) \frac{G''(b)}{G'(b)} + 1 - \mathcal{H} \right] + \mathcal{H} \frac{G' (b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} (S - f - f (1 - \mathcal{H})).
\]

Besides, we can solve the following results at the optimum \((S_2^*, \mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)\):

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H} \partial c_B} = \frac{S - f}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} G' (b) > 0,
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} = \frac{S - f}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^4} \left[ -(S - f) (S - c_B - f \mathcal{H}) G''(b) - 2 (1 - \mathcal{H}) (S - c_B - f) G' (b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} K'' (\mathcal{H}),
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} = - \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G' (b) < 0.
\]

The necessary and sufficient condition for \( \frac{\partial f_2^*}{\partial c_B} < 0 \) is

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial \mathcal{H}} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H} \partial c_B} < \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} \iff \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial \mathcal{H}} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} \frac{\partial f}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} < - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2}.
\]
Using \( b - f = \frac{S - f}{1 - H} \), we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} = \left( f G'(f) - G(b) + G(f) \right) \frac{H}{1 - H} \left[ (b - f) \frac{G''(b)}{G'(b)} + 1 \right] + G'(b) \frac{H}{1 - H} (b - 2f). \tag{84}
\]

By the first-order condition (17), we know at the optimum,

\[
f G'(f) - G(b) + G(f) = \frac{S - cB - Hf}{1 - H} \frac{\mu K}{1 - H} = \left( b - \frac{cB}{H} \right) G'(b).
\]

Substituting this into (84), we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} = G'(b) \frac{H}{1 - H} \left[ (b - \frac{cB}{1 - H}) \left[ (b - f) \frac{G''(b)}{G'(b)} + 1 \right] + (b - 2f) \right]. \tag{85}
\]

Similarly, we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H^2} = \frac{S - f}{(1 - H)^4} \left[ - (S - f) (S - cB - fH) G''(b) - 2 (1 - H) (S - cB - f) G'(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H)
\]

\[
= \frac{b - f}{(1 - H)^2} \left[ - (b - f) (S - cB - fH) G''(b) - 2 (S - cB - f) G'(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H). \tag{86}
\]

Using the following relations

\[
S - cB - fH = (1 - H) \left( b - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right), \tag{87}
\]

\[
S - cB - f = (1 - H) \left( b - f - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right), \tag{88}
\]

we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H^2} = \frac{b - f}{1 - H} \left[ - (b - f) \left( b - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right) G''(b) - 2 \left( b - f - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right) G'(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H). \tag{89}
\]

Substituting (85) and (89) into (83), the condition becomes

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H) - \frac{b - f}{1 - H} \left[ - (b - f) \left( b - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right) G''(b) - 2 \left( b - f - \frac{cB}{1 - H} \right) G'(b) \right]
\]

\[
\geq \frac{b - f}{H} G'(b) \frac{H}{1 - H} \left[ (b - f) \frac{G''(b)}{G'(b)} + 1 \right] + (b - 2f). \tag{90}
\]

Simplifying the above condition, we get

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(H) (1 - H)^2 \geq cB (b - f) G'(b). \tag{91}
\]

If \( K''(H) \geq \beta_1 \), we can verify that the above holds, and \( f_2^* \) is decreasing in \( c_B \).
Now we move on to $H^*_2$. By the implicit function theorem, we have

$$\frac{\partial H^*_2}{\partial c_B} \propto \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H \partial c_B}. \tag{92}$$

At the optimum, we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f^2} = \frac{H^2 [-(S - c_B - fH) G''(b) - 2 (1 - H) G'(b)] + H (1 - H)^2 (-f G''(f) - 2G'(f))}{(1 - H)^2} \tag{93}$$

Substituting equations (80), (81), (82), and (93) into equation (92), we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H \partial c_B} \propto \left\{ - \left[ (S - c_B - fH) - c_B \frac{H}{1 - H} \right] G'(b) + (1 - H) (fG'(f) - G(b) + G(f)) \right\}
+ \left\{ (S - f) (fG''(f) + 2G'(f)) \right\}. \tag{94}$$

Simplifying the terms in the first pair of braces using the following first-order condition,

$$G(b^*_2) - G(f^*_2) = -(c_{NB} - c_B - H f^*_2 f^*_2) G'(b^*_2) \frac{H}{1 - H} + f^*_2 G'(f^*_2), \tag{95}$$

we can get

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H \partial c_B} \propto c_B \frac{H}{1 - H} G'(b) + \left\{ (S - f) (fG''(f) + 2G'(f)) \right\}. \tag{96}$$

Because $f G''(f) + 2G'(f) > f G''(f) + G'(f) > 0$ at the optimum,\(^\text{30}\) we must have

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial H} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f \partial c_B} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_2}{\partial H \partial c_B} > 0. \tag{97}$$

Thus $\frac{\partial H^*_2}{\partial c_B} > 0$.

2. Customers’ choices. We know $b = c_{NB} - \frac{fH}{1 - H} = c_{NB} + (c_{NB} - f) \frac{H}{1 - H}$. So as $f$ decreases and $H$ increases in $c_B$, $b$ increases, and the fraction of customers paying the spread, $(1 - G(b^*_2))$, decreases.

Because $b^*_2$ increases and $f^*_2$ decreases in $c_B$, the fraction of customers using the matchmaking service, $G(b^*_2) - G(f^*_2)$, increases.

Because $f^*_2$ decreases in $c_B$, the fraction of customers not trading decreases.

3. Customers’ transaction costs. Define $\xi = \frac{1 - G(b^*_2)}{1 - G(f^*_2)}$, then average transaction costs are $(1 - \xi) f^*_2 + \xi S^*_2$. If $c_B$ increases, the above comparative statics imply that $f^*_2$ decreases and $(1 - G(b^*_2))$ decreases and thus $\xi$ decreases. Then the change of average transaction costs is

$$(1 - \xi) df^*_2 + f^*_2 (-d\xi) + \xi S^*_2 d\xi = (1 - \xi) df^*_2 + d\xi (S^*_2 - f^*_2). \tag{98}$$

\(^\text{30}\)This can be proved by $\Phi \geq 0$ and $f < \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)}$ at the optimum.
We know \( df_2^* < 0 \), \( (S_2^* - f_2^*) > 0 \) and \( d\xi < 0 \), so average transaction cost decrease.

4. **Bank dealer’s profit.** Bank dealer’s profit is \( \pi_B = \Pi_2 (S_2^*, \mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*) \). By the envelope theorem,

\[
\frac{d\pi_B}{dc_B} = -\frac{2\mu}{r} (1 - G(b_2^*)) < 0.
\]

5. **Customer welfare.** Customer welfare is

\[
\pi_c = \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ \int_{f_2^*}^{b_2^*} (b - f_2^*) \mathcal{H}_2^* dG(b) + \int_{b_2^*}^{\infty} (b - c_{NB}) dG(b) \right],
\]

so

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{d\pi_c}{dc_B} = (b_2^* - f_2^*) \mathcal{H}_2^* \frac{\partial b_2^*}{\partial c_B} + \int_{f_2^*}^{b_2^*} \frac{\partial [(b - f_2^*) \mathcal{H}_2^*]}{\partial c_B} dG(b) - \frac{\partial b_2^*}{\partial c_B} (b_2^* - c_{NB}) \mathcal{G}'(b_2^*)
\]

\[= \int_{f_2^*}^{b_2^*} \frac{\partial [(b - f_2^*) \mathcal{H}_2^*]}{\partial c_B} dG(b) > 0,
\]

where in the second equality we have used \( b_2^* = \frac{c_{NB} - \mathcal{H}_2^*}{1 - \mathcal{H}_2^*} \).

### A.5 Proof of Lemma 1

As proven in previous propositions, we can show that for any \( S \), it is never optimal for the bank dealer to choose \( \mathcal{H} = 0 \) or \( f > S \), i.e., the bank dealer can always make a weakly positive profit by choosing \( f \leq S \). (The bank dealer can make a strictly positive profit if \( S > 0 \) and the bank dealer sets some \( f < S \).)

So without loss of generality, the optimization problem for the bank dealer given the non-bank dealer’s spread \( S \) is

\[
\max_{\mathcal{H} \in [0,1], S \geq f \geq 0} \Pi_{B,3} = \frac{2\mu}{r} \mathcal{H} f (G(b) - G(f)) - K(\mathcal{H}).
\]

Given \( S \),

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, \mathcal{H}, f)}{\partial f} \propto \mathcal{H} \left[ G(b) - G(f) - f \left( \frac{G'(b)}{1 - \mathcal{H}} + G'(f) \right) \right]
\]

\[
\propto \mathcal{H} \left[ G(b) - fG'(b) \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}} - 1 + G'(f) \left[ \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \right] \right].
\]

By Assumption 1, \( \left( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \right) \) is decreasing in \( f \). Since \( \hat{f} \) solves \( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - \hat{f} = 0 \), we know that whenever \( \mathcal{H} > 0 \), \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, \mathcal{H}, f)}{\partial f} < 0 \) if \( f \geq \hat{f} \). And we have shown before that the optimal \( \mathcal{H} > 0 \). This implies that the optimal \( f < \hat{f} \).

Now we show that the non-bank dealer never wants to choose \( S \leq f \), conditional on \( f < \hat{f} \). If the non-bank dealer chooses \( S < f \), then

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{NB,3}}{\partial S} \propto \left[ \frac{1 - G(S)}{G'(S)} - S + c_{NB} \right].
\]
By the definition of \( \tilde{f} \), we must have \( \frac{1 - G(S)}{G(S)} - S + c_{NB} > 0 \) for any \( S \leq f < \tilde{f} \). So the optimal \( S \) must be greater than \( f \).

### A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We prove the result in the following steps:

1. Both the bank dealer and the non-bank dealer’s best response functions are single-valued.
2. Use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to show equilibrium existence.
3. Discuss equilibria if \( c_B \) is very small or very large.

Based on the assumption \( K'' > \beta_2 \), we know there exists an upper bound \( \bar{H} < 1 \) that the bank dealer will never choose any \( H > \bar{H} \) (see the derivations for \( \beta_1^* \) for details). So we just focus on the strategy space

\[
\Omega = \{ (S, H, f) | c_B \geq S \geq f \geq 0, H \in [0, \bar{H}] \} .
\]

(105)

**Step 1-1: Non-bank dealer’s best response function**

Let’s first consider the non-bank dealer’s best response function \( BR_{NB} (H, f) \).

\[
BR_{NB} (H, f) = \arg \max_{c_B \geq S \geq f \geq 0} \frac{2\mu}{r} [(S_{NB} - c_{NB}) (1 - G(b))] .
\]

(106)

It is obvious that the objective function is continuous in all arguments, and the correspondence \( (H, f) \to [f, c_B] \) is a compact-valued correspondence and is continuous at any \((H, f)\). Then the best response function (correspondence) \( BR_{NB} \) is non-empty, compact-valued, and upper hemicontinuous (by the maximum theorem). Besides, we can show that \( BR_{NB} \) is single-valued. To see this, we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial \Pi_{NB,3} (S, H, f)}{\partial S} = 1 - G(b) - (S - c_{NB}) G'(b) \frac{1}{1 - H} \\
= G'(b) \left[ \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} - S \frac{fH}{1 - H} + \frac{c_{NB} - fH}{1 - H} \right] \\
= G'(b) \left[ \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} - b + \frac{c_{NB} - fH}{1 - H} \right] .
\]

(107)

We know that \( b \) is increasing in \( S \), and \( \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} - b \) is decreasing in \( b \). So given \((H, f)\), \( \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)} - b \) is decreasing in \( S \). Then, there exists a unique best response value \( S_{NB} (H, f) \in [f, \infty) \) for each \((H, f)\).

**Step 1-2: Bank dealer’s best response function**

Let’s look at the bank dealer’s best response function \( BR_S (S) \):

\[
BR_B (S) = \arg \max_{H \in [0, \bar{H}], S \geq f \geq 0} \frac{2\mu}{r} H f (G(b) - G(f)) - K(H) .
\]

(108)

It is obvious that the objective function is continuous in all arguments, and the correspondence \( S \to \{ (H, f) | H \in [0, \bar{H}], S \geq f \geq 0 \} \) is a compact-valued correspondence and is continuous at
any \( S \). Then, the best response function (correspondence) \( BR_S \) is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous. Next, we will show that \( BR_B \) is a single-valued function when \( K''(H) \) is large enough. To see this, we will find a new and concave strategy space for the bank dealer, and show that the bank dealer’s objective function is always strictly concave in this strategy space. Let’s first look at

\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, H, f)}{\partial f} = \mathcal{H} \left[ G(b) - G(f) - f \left( \frac{G'(b)}{1 - \mathcal{H}} + G'(f) \right) \right]
\]

\[
\alpha = \mathcal{H} \left[ G(b) - fG'(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} - 1 + G'(f) \left( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \right) \right].
\] (109)

First we know \( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \) is decreasing in \( f \). Recall \( \hat{f} \) is the unique solution to \( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - \hat{f} = 0 \). If \( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \leq 0 \), i.e., if \( f \geq \hat{f} \), we must have \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, H, f)}{\partial f} < 0 \) as the RHS of the above expression is negative. In the interval \( f \in [0, \hat{f}] \), given \( (S, H) \), \( G(b) \) is decreasing in \( f \), \( -fG'(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \) is decreasing in \( f \), \( G'(f) \) is decreasing in \( f \), and \( \frac{1 - G(f)}{G'(f)} - f \) is positive and decreasing in \( f \). With these results, we can show that given \( H \neq 0 \), if \( f \in [0, \hat{f}] \), \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, H, f)}{\partial f} \) is decreasing in \( f \), and if \( f \in [\hat{f}, S] \), \( \frac{\partial \Pi_{B,3}(S, H, f)}{\partial f} \) is always negative. By iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, the bank dealer will never choose \( f \geq \hat{f} \), so we can focus on the new strategy space for the bank dealer:

\[
\Omega_0(S) = \left\{ (H, f) | H \in (0, \bar{H}) ; f \in \left( 0, \min \left\{ \hat{f}, S \right\} \right) \right\}.
\] (110)

and it is obvious that \( \Omega_0(S) \) is a convex set for any \( S \).

Now let’s show that the bank dealer’s objective function

\[
\Pi_{B,3} = \frac{2\mu}{r} \mathcal{H} \left( G(b) - G(f) \right) - K(H)
\] (111)

is a strictly concave function in \( \Omega_0(S) \). To show this, let’s consider its Hessian matrix

\[
H_B = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} & \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial H} \\
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H \partial f} & \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H^2}
\end{bmatrix}.
\] (112)

The sufficient and necessary condition for \( \Pi_{B,3} \) to be strictly concave is that \( H_B \) is negative definite, which is equivalent to the following conditions

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} < 0,
\] (113)

and

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H^2} - \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H \partial f} \right)^2 > 0.
\] (114)

To check these conditions, first we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} = \mathcal{H} \left[ \frac{-2\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'(b) + \frac{f \mathcal{H}^2}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} G''(b) - 2G'(f) - fG''(f) \right].
\] (115)
In \( \Omega_0(S) \), we must have \( fG''(f) + G'(f) > 0 \) (derived from \( f < \frac{1-G(f)}{G'(f)} \) and \( \Phi \geq 0 \), so \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} < 0 \) for all \((\mathcal{H}, f) \in \Omega_0(S)\).

To check condition (114), first we derive the following results:

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H^2} = \frac{(b-f) f}{(1-H)^2} \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b-f) G''(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} \mathcal{H}''(\mathcal{H}),
\]
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial H} = \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1-H)^2} \left[ -\mathcal{H}f(b-f) G''(b) + (S-2f) G'(b) \right].
\]

Let’s define

\[
LHS_1 = \left[ -\frac{2\mathcal{H}}{1-H} G'(b) + \frac{f\mathcal{H}^2}{(1-H)^2} G''(b) - 2G'(f) - fG''(f) \right] \left[ (b-f) f \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b-f) G''(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} \mathcal{H}''(\mathcal{H}) (1-H)^2 \right],
\]
\[
RHS_1 = \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1-H)^2} \left[ -\mathcal{H}f(b-f) G''(b) + (S-2f) G'(b) \right]^2.
\]

Then it is easy to verify

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H^2} - \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H \partial f} \right)^2 > 0 \iff LHS_1 > RHS_1.
\]

Expanding \( LHS_1 \),

\[
LHS_1 = LHS_{1-1} + LHS_{1-2} + LHS_{1-3},
\]

where

\[
LHS_{1-1} = \left\{ -2G'(f) - fG''(f) \right\} \left\{ (b-f) f \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b-f) G''(b) \right] - \frac{r}{2\mu} \mathcal{H}''(\mathcal{H}) (1-H)^2 \right\},
\]
\[
LHS_{1-2} = -\frac{r}{2\mu} \mathcal{H}''(\mathcal{H}) (1-H)^2 \left[ \frac{-2\mathcal{H}}{1-H} G'(b) + \frac{f\mathcal{H}^2}{(1-H)^2} G''(b) \right],
\]
\[
LHS_{1-3} = (b-f) f \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b-f) G''(b) \right] \left[ \frac{-2\mathcal{H}}{1-H} G'(b) + \frac{f\mathcal{H}^2}{(1-H)^2} G''(b) \right].
\]
Expanding $LHS_{1-3}$ and $RHS_{1}$, we get

$$LHS_{1-3} = (b - f)^2 f^2 (b) \left( \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \right)^2 G''(b) - (b - f) f \frac{4 \mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G''(b)$$

$$+ (b - f) f \left[ 2f \left( \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \right)^2 - \frac{2 \mathcal{H}^2}{1 - \mathcal{H}} (b - f) \right] G'(b) G''(b), \quad (125)$$

$$RHS_{1} = (b - f)^2 f^2 \left( \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \right)^2 G''(b) - \frac{2 \mathcal{H}^2 f \mathcal{H} (b - f) (S - 2F) G'(b) G''(b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2}$$

$$+ \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} (S - 2f)^2 G''(b), \quad (126)$$

$$RHS_{1} - LHS_{1-3} = G''(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} S^2. \quad (127)$$

So

$$LHS_{1} = LHS_{1-1} + LHS_{1-2} + LHS_{1-3} > RHS_{1} \iff LHS_{1-1} + LHS_{1-2} > G''(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} S^2. \quad (128)$$

Expanding $LHS_{1-1} + LHS_{1-2}$, we get

$$LHS_{1-1} + LHS_{1-2} > G''(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} S^2 \iff \frac{r}{2 \mu} K''(\mathcal{H}) (1 - \mathcal{H})^2 \cdot LHS_{2} > RHS_{2} \quad (129)$$

where

$$LHS_{2} = 2G'(f) + fG''(f) + \frac{2 \mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'(b) - \frac{f \mathcal{H}^2}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} G''(b), \quad (130)$$

$$RHS_{2} = G''(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} S^2 + (b - f) f \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b - f) G''(b) \right] \left[ 2G'(f) + fG''(f) \right]. \quad (131)$$

We know $LHS_{2} > 0$ in $\Omega_0(S)$, so the condition (129) is equivalent to

$$\frac{r}{2 \mu} K''(\mathcal{H}) (1 - \mathcal{H})^2 > \frac{RHS_{2}}{LHS_{2}}. \quad (132)$$

Consider the sufficient condition for the above inequality

$$\frac{RHS_{2}}{LHS_{2}} < \frac{G''(b) \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} S^2}{2 \mathcal{H}} + (b - f) f \left[ 2G'(b) + \mathcal{H}(b - f) G''(b) \right]$$

$$< \frac{1}{2} \frac{S^2 G'(b)}{1 - \mathcal{H}} + 2fbG'(b). \quad (133)$$

By $S < c_B$ and $S < b$, we know

$$\frac{1}{2} \frac{S^2 G'(b)}{1 - \mathcal{H}} + 2fbG'(b) < \frac{5 c_B G'(b)}{2} \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}}. \quad (134)$$
From assumption $K'' > \beta_2$ and the definition of $\beta_2$, we know
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^3 \geq \frac{5}{2} c_B \max_b \{bG'(b)\}
\]
holds in the whole space $\Omega_0(S)$, so in this space
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^2 > \frac{5}{2} \frac{c_B bG'(b)}{1 - \mathcal{H}} > \frac{RHS_2}{LHS_2}
\]
which means
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \mathcal{H}^2} - \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \mathcal{H} \partial f} \right)^2 > 0.
\]
So the Hessian matrix in $\Omega_0(S)$ is negative definite. Thus, the bank dealer’s objective function is strictly concave in $\Omega_0(S)$ for all $S$. Then, the bank dealer’s best response function $BR_B(S)$ must be single-valued.

**Step 2: Applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem**

Now let’s consider a new function defined on $(\mathcal{H}, f) \in [0, \overline{H}] \times [0, \min \{\bar{f}, S\}]$
\[
BR((S, \mathcal{H}, f)) = (BR_{NB}(\mathcal{H}, f), BR_B(S)).
\]

- Both $BR_{NB}$ and $BR_B$ are upper hemicontinuous; thus, $BR$ is also upper hemicontinuous.
- By the Closed Graph Theorem, because $BR$ is hemicontinuous, the domain is closed, then the graph for $BR$ (denoted as $Gr(BR)$) is closed.
- Because both $BR_{NB}$ and $BR_B$ are single valued, $BR((S, \mathcal{H}, f))$ is single valued for any $(S, \mathcal{H}, f)$. Thus $BR((S, \mathcal{H}, f))$ is convex set for any $(S, \mathcal{H}, f)$.
- Then by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, because the domain is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of Euclidean space, $BR$ has closed graph and $BR((S, \mathcal{H}, f))$ is non-empty and convex for all $(S, \mathcal{H}, f)$, then $BR$ must have a fixed point. And by the definition of equilibrium, this fixed point is the equilibrium.

**Step 3: Effect of $c_B$ on the equilibrium structure**

Next, we will show that if $c_B > c_{NB}$ but close enough, the equilibrium must be a constrained equilibrium with $S^*_3 = c_B$. And from the above we know that the bank dealer’s best response function is single-valued, so the equilibrium is unique. To see this, suppose the bank dealer chooses $(\mathcal{H}, f)$, then the non-bank dealer’s first order derivative is
\[
\frac{\partial \Pi_{NB,3}(S, \mathcal{H}, f)}{\partial S} = 1 - G(b) - (S - c_{NB}) G'(b) \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}}
\]

31 See Proposition 1.4.8 of Aubin and Frankowska (2009).
32 See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Then if the non-bank dealer chooses $S = c_B$ and $\frac{\partial \Pi_{NB,3}(S,H,f)}{\partial S} > 0$, then it is still optimal for the non-bank dealer to choose $S = c_B$. We have

$$1 - G(b) - (c_B - c_{NB}) G'(b) \frac{1}{1 - H} > 0$$

$$\iff c_B - c_{NB} < (1 - H) \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}. \tag{140}$$

The RHS of above inequality is decreasing in $H$ and decreasing in $S$. And based on our assumption $K''(H) > \beta_2$, we know in any equilibrium the bank dealer will always choose $H < \bar{H} = \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4c}{\beta_2}}$, so if we define $\bar{c}_1$ as the unique solution of

$$\bar{c}_1 - c_{NB} = \left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4c}{\beta_2}}\right) \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}, \tag{141}$$

where $b = \frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{4c}{\beta_2}}}$, then if $c_B \in [c_{NB}, \bar{c}_1]$, there exists a unique constrained equilibrium.

If $c_B$ is very large, we want to show that $\frac{\partial \Pi_{NB,3}(S,H,f)}{\partial S}{\bigg|}_{S=c_B} < 0$ is always true for any plausible $(H, f)$. Then any equilibrium must be an interior equilibrium. To see this, note

$$1 - G(b) - (c_B - c_{NB}) G'(b) \frac{1}{1 - H} < 0 \tag{142}$$

$$\iff c_B - c_{NB} > (1 - H) \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}. \tag{143}$$

We know $\frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}$ is decreasing in $b$, so if $c_B - c_{NB} > \frac{1}{G'(0)}$, then all equilibria must be interior. Let $\bar{c}_2 = c_{NB} + \frac{1}{G'(0)}$.

A.7 Proof of Proposition 6

First it is obvious that for an unconstrained equilibrium, the change of $c_B$ has no impact on the equilibrium. Now we prove results for the constrained equilibrium.

1. Spread, fee, speed. Because $S^*_3 = c_B$, an increase in $c_B$ obviously increases the spread.

   By the implicit function theorem, we have

   $$\frac{\partial f^*_3}{\partial c_B} \propto \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H \partial c_B} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H^2 \partial f} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B}{\bigg|}_{(S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)}. \tag{144}$$
At \((S'_3, \mathcal{H}_3, f'_3)\), by direct calculation, we get
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B} = \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \left[ (1 - \mathcal{H}) G' (b) - \mathcal{H} f G'' (b) \right], \tag{145}
\]
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial f} = \frac{\mathcal{H}}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \left[ -f \mathcal{H} (b - f) G'' (b) + (S - 2f) G' (b) \right], \tag{146}
\]
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial c_B^2} = \frac{(b - f) f}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \left\{ 2G' (b) + \mathcal{H} (b - f) G'' (b) \right\} - \frac{r}{2\mu} K'' (\mathcal{H}), \tag{147}
\]
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial c_B} = \frac{f G' (b) + \mathcal{H} f (b - f) G'' (b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2}. \tag{148}
\]
At \((S'_3, \mathcal{H}_3, f'_3)\), it is obvious that \(\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B} > 0\), so
\[
\left( \frac{r}{2\mu} \right)^2 \left( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial f} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial c_B} \right) > 0 \iff \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial c_B} > \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial f}. \tag{149}
\]
Here, we have
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial f} = \frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{[ -f \mathcal{H} (b - f) G'' (b) + (S - 2f) G' (b)] [ f G' (b) + \mathcal{H} f (b - f) G'' (b)]}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \left( \mathcal{H} G' (b) - \frac{\mathcal{H} G'}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'' (b) \right). \tag{150}
\]
It is easy to verify the following results (using \(S - f = (1 - \mathcal{H}) (b - f)\)):
\[
f G' (b) + \mathcal{H} f (b - f) G'' (b) = SG' (b) - (b - f) \left[ (1 - \mathcal{H}) G' (b) - \mathcal{H} f G'' (b) \right], \tag{151}
\]
\[-f \mathcal{H} (b - f) G'' (b) + (S - 2f) G' (b) = -f G' (b) + (b - f) \left[ (1 - \mathcal{H}) G' (b) - \mathcal{H} f G'' (b) \right]. \tag{152}
\]
Then
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial f} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial c_B} \frac{\partial \partial f}{\partial \partial f} = \frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{[ -f G'' (b) ]}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \left\{ \frac{S G' (b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H}) G' (b) - \mathcal{H} f G'' (b)} + (S + f) (b - f) G' (b) - (b - f) \left[ (1 - \mathcal{H}) G' (b) - \mathcal{H} f G'' (b) \right]^2 \right\}. \tag{153}
\]

58
Using the above expression and the expression for \( \frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H}^2} \), we have

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H}^2} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f} \partial \bar{c}_B} > \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f} \partial \bar{c}_B} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H}^2} \quad (154)
\]

\[
\iff \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\bar{H}) (1 - \bar{H})^2 \geq (b - f) f \left\{ 2G'(b) + \bar{H}(b - f) G''(b) \right\} \quad (155)
\]

\[
+ \frac{SfG''(b)}{(1 - \bar{H})G'(b) - \bar{H}fG''(b)} - (S + f)(b - f)G'(b) + (b - f)^2 [(1 - \bar{H})G'(b) - \bar{H}fG''(b)]^2
\]

\[
\iff \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\bar{H}) (1 - \bar{H})^2 \geq \frac{SfG''(b)}{(1 - \bar{H}) - \bar{H}fG''(b)}
\]

\[
\iff \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\bar{H}) (1 - \bar{H})^3 \geq SfG''(b). \quad (156)
\]

By the assumption \( K''(\bar{H}) > \beta_2 \) and the expression of \( \beta_2 \), we know at the equilibrium \((S^*_3, \bar{H}_3, f^*_3)\), we must have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\bar{H}) (1 - \bar{H})^3 \geq \frac{5}{2} c_B b G'(b).
\]

This is a sufficient condition for

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\bar{H}) (1 - \bar{H})^3 \geq SfG'(b). \quad (158)
\]

Thus we must have

\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{c}_B \partial \bar{f}} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H} \partial \bar{c}_B} > \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f} \partial \bar{c}_B} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H}^2} \quad (159)
\]

in this case, which implies that

\[
\frac{df^*_3}{dc_B} > 0. \quad (160)
\]

By the implicit function theorem, we have

\[
\frac{\partial \bar{H}_3}{\partial c_B} \propto \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f} \partial \bar{c}_B} \partial \bar{H} \partial \bar{f} - \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{c}_B \partial \bar{f}} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H} \partial \bar{c}_B} \bigg|_{(S^*_3, \bar{H}_3, f^*_3)}.
\]

By direct calculation, we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f} \partial \bar{c}_B} = \frac{\bar{H}}{(1 - \bar{H})^2} \left[(1 - \bar{H})G'(b) - \bar{H}fG''(b)\right], \quad (162)
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{H} \partial \bar{f}} = \frac{\bar{H}}{(1 - \bar{H})^2} \left[-f\bar{H}(b - f)G''(b) + (S - 2f)G'(b)\right], \quad (163)
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{c}_B \partial \bar{f}} = \frac{fG'(b) + \bar{H}f(b - f)G''(b)}{(1 - \bar{H})^2}, \quad (164)
\]

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial \bar{f}^2} = \bar{H} \left[-fG''(f) - 2G'(f) + \left(\frac{\bar{H}}{1 - \bar{H}}\right)^2 fG''(b) - \frac{2\bar{H}}{1 - \bar{H}} G'(b)\right]. \quad (165)
\]
Then
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B \partial H \partial f} = \left( \frac{H}{1-H} \right)^2 \left\{ \frac{H}{1-H} (S-2f) G^2 (b) - \left( \frac{fH^2}{1-H} (b-f) + \frac{fH^2}{1-H} (S-2f) \right) G' (b) G'' (b) + \frac{f^2 H^3}{1-H} (b-f) G'' (b) \right\}. \tag{166}
\]

Let’s write \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2 \partial H \partial c_B} \) as
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2 \partial H \partial c_B} = \text{RHS}_1 + \text{RHS}_2, \tag{167}
\]
where
\[
\text{RHS}_1 = \frac{Hf}{(1-H)^2} \left[ G' (b) + H (b-f) G'' (b) \right] \left[ \left( \frac{H}{1-H} \right)^2 f G'' (b) - \frac{2H}{1-H} G' (b) \right] \tag{168}
\]
\[
= \frac{Hf}{(1-H)^2} \left\{ -\frac{2H}{1-H} G'^2 (b) + \left[ H (b-f) \left( \frac{-2H}{1-H} \right) + \left( \frac{H}{1-H} \right)^2 f \right] G' (b) G'' (b) + H (b-f) \left( \frac{H}{1-H} \right)^2 f G'^2 (b) \right\},
\]
\[
\text{RHS}_2 = \frac{Hf}{(1-H)^2} \left[ G' (b) + H (b-f) G'' (b) \right] \left[ -f G'' (f) - 2G' (f) \right]. \tag{169}
\]

Then
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B \partial H \partial f} > \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f^2 \partial H \partial c_B} \iff \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B \partial H \partial f} - \text{RHS}_1 > \text{RHS}_2. \tag{170}
\]

We can directly check
\[
\frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3} \partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial f \partial c_B \partial H \partial f} - \text{RHS}_1 = \frac{H}{(1-H)^2} \frac{H}{1-H} S G'^2 (b), \tag{171}
\]
then \( \mathcal{H}_3^* \) increases if and only if at the optimum \((S^*_3, \mathcal{H}_3^*, f_3^*)\)
\[
\frac{H}{(1-H)^2} \frac{H}{1-H} S G'^2 (b) > \text{RHS}_2 = \frac{Hf}{(1-H)^2} \left[ G' (b) + H (b-f) G'' (b) \right] \left[ -f G'' (f) - 2G' (f) \right].
\]

At the optimum, from equation (25), we know that \( f G' (f) + G (f) < 1 \), with the assumption on \( \Phi \) we can show \(-f G'' (f) - 2G' (f) < 0 \). So a sufficient condition for the above inequality is
\[
G' (b) + H (b-f) G'' (b) > 0 \iff G' (b) + \frac{H}{1-H} (S-f) G'' (b) > 0
\]
\[
\iff \mathcal{H} < \frac{1}{1+(S-f) \left( -\frac{G''(b)}{G'(b)} \right)}, \tag{172}
\]
which is equivalent to \( \frac{\partial^2 \Pi_{B,3}}{\partial H \partial c_B} > 0 \). With the assumption \( K'' > \beta_3 \), we know the equilibrium speed \( \mathcal{H}_3^* \) must satisfy
\[
\mathcal{H}_3^* < \sqrt{\frac{2\mu}{r}} \sqrt{\frac{4c}{\beta}} < \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{\mathcal{E}} \left( \frac{G''(0)}{G'(0)} \right)} \tag{173}
\]
60
From the assumption $\Phi' < 0$, we can show that $-\frac{G''(x)}{G'(x)}$ is a decreasing function of $x$, so the above inequality is a sufficient condition for (172). Then with the assumption $K'' > \beta_3$, $\mathcal{H}_3$ increases in $c_B$.

2. Customers’ choices. From equilibrium conditions (25) and (26), we have

$$b (G(b) - G(f)) - (b - f) fG'(f) = \frac{r}{2\mu} K'(\mathcal{H}).$$

Taking the total derivative of the above condition, we have

$$[G(b) + bG'(b) - G(f) - fG'(f)] \frac{db}{dc_B} = (b - f) \left[2G'(f) + fG''(f)\right] \frac{df}{dc_B} + \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}) \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B}.\number{176}$$

Using equation (25), the above result becomes

$$\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'(b) \frac{db}{dc_B} = (b - f) \left[2G'(f) + fG''(f)\right] \frac{df}{dc_B} + \frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H}) \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B}.\number{177}$$

Then taking the total derivative of equation (25), we have

$$\left[G'(b) - f \frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G''(b)\right] \frac{db}{dc_B} = \left[\frac{\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'(b) + 2G'(f) + fG''(f)\right] \frac{df}{dc_B} + \frac{fG'(b)}{(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B}.\number{178}$$

Finally, taking the total derivative of $b = \frac{c_B - \mathcal{H}f}{1 - \mathcal{H}}$, we have

$$\frac{db}{dc_B} = \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}} + \frac{-\mathcal{H}}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \frac{df}{dc_B} + \frac{b - f}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B}.\number{179}$$

From (176) and (177), we can get

$$\frac{df}{dc_B} = \frac{fG'(b)}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G'(b) - G'(b) + \frac{\mathcal{H}f}{1 - \mathcal{H}} G''(b)$$

Then we get (consider $c_B \geq S \geq f$)

$$\frac{fG'(b)}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^2} \frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}} < 1,$$

and

$$\frac{fG'(b)}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^3} = \frac{(S - f) fG'(b)}{\frac{r}{2\mu} K''(\mathcal{H})(1 - \mathcal{H})^3} < 1.$$
So both the numerator and denominator of the RHS of (179) are negative. Then

\[ \frac{df^*_3}{dc_B} > 0. \]  

(183)

Because we already show that \( \frac{df^*_3}{dc_B} > 0 \), we must have \( \frac{db^*_3}{dc_B} > 0 \). That is, the fraction of customers who refrain from trading goes down.

At the equilibrium \((S^*_3, H^*_3, f^*_3)\), \((G(b) - G(f))\) increases if and only if

\[ \frac{df}{db} < \frac{G'(b)}{G'(f)}. \]  

(184)

Define \( \Gamma = \frac{fG'(b)}{K''(H)(1-H)^2} \) and by \((176) \times \Gamma - (177)\), we can solve

\[ \frac{df}{db} = \frac{\left(1 - \Gamma \frac{c_B}{1-H}\right)G'(b) - \frac{Hf}{1-H}G''(b)}{(1 - \Gamma (b - f)) (2G'(f) + fG''(f)) + \frac{H}{1-H}G'(b)}. \]  

(185)

So \((G(b) - G(f))\) increases if and only if

\[ \frac{\left(1 - \Gamma \frac{c_B}{1-H}\right)G'(b) - \frac{Hf}{1-H}G''(b)}{(1 - \Gamma (b - f)) (2G'(f) + fG''(f)) + \frac{H}{1-H}G'(b)} < \frac{G'(b)}{G'(f)}. \]  

(186)

When \(c_{NB} \to 0\) and \(c_B \downarrow c_{NB}\), there is no matchmaking because in equilibrium \(S^*_3 = c_B \to 0\). As \(c_B\) increases, \(S^*_3\) increases and some customers start to use the matchmaking mechanism. Because \(G(b^*_3) - G(f^*_3)\) is a continuous function of \(c_B\), in the region that \(c_{NB}\) is small enough and \(c_B\) is mildly above \(c_{NB}\), the share of matchmaking must increase.

Because \(f^*_3\) increases in \(c_B\), the fraction of customers who refrain from trading increases.

3. Customers’ average transaction cost can be rewritten as

\[ f + \frac{1 - G(b)}{1 - G(f)} (S - f). \]  

(187)

As \(c_B\) increases, we know \(f^*_3\) increases, so at the equilibrium, we must have

\[ d \left( f + \frac{1 - G(b)}{1 - G(f)} (S - f) \right) > df + \frac{d[(1 - G(b)) (S - f)]}{1 - G(f)} \]

\[ = df + \frac{1}{1 - G(f)} \{d[(1 - G(b)) S] - d[(1 - G(b)) f]\} \]

\[ = df + \frac{1}{1 - G(f)} \{d[(1 - G(b)) S] + G'(b) f db - (1 - G(b)) df\} \]

\[ > \frac{d[(1 - G(b)) S]}{1 - G(f)} + \frac{G(b) - G(f)}{1 - G(f)} df. \]  

(188)
So a sufficient condition for \( d \left( f + \frac{1-G(b)}{1-G(f)} (S - f) \right) > 0 \) is
\[
d \left[ (1 - G(b)) S \right] > 0
\]
which is equivalent to
\[
(1 - G(b)) dS - G'(b) S dB > 0 \iff S \frac{dB}{dS} < \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}.
\]
If \( c_{NB} \) is small enough and \( c_B \downarrow c_{NB} \), we have a constrained equilibrium, so the above condition becomes
\[
\frac{dB}{dc_B} < \frac{1 - G(b)}{G'(b)}.
\]
Here, \( \frac{dB}{dc_B} \) can be solved by (176), (177), and (178). So if \( c_B - c_{NB} \) is small enough, the above inequality must hold (because the LHS \( \to 0 \) while the RHS is positive). In this case, average transaction costs must increase.

4. **The profits of dealers (bank dealer and non-bank dealer).** By the envelope theorem, we have
\[
r \frac{d\pi_B}{dc_B} = \mathcal{H}_3 f_3 G'(b_3^*) \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}_3^*} > 0.
\]
Now we turn to the non-bank dealer’s profit. First, we have
\[
r \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} = 1 - G(b_3^*) - G'(b_3^*) (c_B - c_{NB}) \frac{dB}{dc_B}.
\]
Then if \( \frac{dB}{dc_B} \) is bounded and \( c_B \downarrow c_{NB} \), we must have \( \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} > 0 \). Let’s show that \( \frac{dB}{dc_B} \) is bounded. By (176), (177) and (178), as \( c_B \downarrow c_{NB} \), \( \frac{dB}{dc_B} \) can be solved and must be bounded.\(^{33}\)

Then, we must have
\[
\lim_{c_B \downarrow c_{NB}} \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} > 0.
\]
For the case in which \( c_B \) is close to the unconstrained level, let’s use
\[
\frac{dB}{dc_B} = \frac{1 - H_3^*}{1 - H_3^*} + \frac{dH_3^*}{dc_B} + \frac{c_B - f_3^*}{(1 - H_3^*)^2} \frac{dH_3^*}{dc_B}.
\]
If \( c_B \) is large enough, \( 1 - G(b_3^*) - G'(b_3^*) (c_B - c_{NB}) \frac{1}{1 - H_3^*} \to 0 \) (this is the non-bank dealer’s first-order condition). In this case, if \( \frac{dH_3^*}{dc_B} + \frac{c_B - f_3^*}{(1 - H_3^*)^2} \frac{dH_3^*}{dc_B} > 0 \), we have \( \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} < 0 \). We claim that this is true when \( K'' \) is large enough. We now show it.

Suppose that \( K'' \) is sufficiently high (the equilibrium speed \( K \) is close to zero) and \( c_B \) is sufficiently high so that it is close to the unconstrained equilibrium level. From Proposition 5, define \( c_B^0 = \inf_{c_B} \{ \text{there exists at least one unconstrained equilibrium for } c_B = c_B^0 \} \). First \( c_B^0 \) is well defined and is greater than \( c_{NB} \). Second, at the unconstrained equilibrium \( S_3^* = c_B^0 \), the non-bank dealer’s first-order condition satisfies
\[
1 - G(b_3^*) - G'(b_3^*) (c_B^0 - c_{NB}) \frac{1}{1 - H_3^*} = 0.
\]
\(^{34}\)the exception is when the coefficient matrix for the system is singular when \( c_B = c_{NB} \), but this is a degenerate case.
Besides, for any \( c_{NB} < c_B < c_B^* \), there exists only one constrained equilibrium with \( S^*_3 = c_B \). If \( K'' \) is sufficiently high (say \( K'' \to \infty \)), then in any equilibrium \( H^*_3 \to 0 \). In this case \( b_3^* \to S^*_3 \) and the equilibrium \( S^*_3 \) can be solved from the non-bank dealer’s first-order condition. \( f_3^* \) can be solved by (taking \( H^*_3 \to 0 \))

\[
G (S^*_3) - G (f_3^*) = f_3^* G' (f_3^*) > 0. \tag{196}
\]

From (26) we know

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K' (H^*_3) \to f_3^* (G (S^*_3) - G (f_3^*))
\]

is finite. Then, we must have \( \frac{dH^*_3}{dc_B} \to 0 \) because \( K'' (H^*_3) \frac{dH^*_3}{dc_B} = \frac{d(K' (H^*_3))}{dc_B} \). Then (177) becomes

\[
G' (b) \frac{db}{dc_B} = [2G' (f) + fG'' (f)] \frac{df}{dc_B}. \tag{197}
\]

Substituting this into (176), we have (taking \( H^*_3 \to 0 \))

\[
fG' (b) \frac{db}{dc_B} = \frac{r}{2\mu} K'' (H) \frac{dH}{dc_B}. \tag{198}
\]

Consider (26), we have

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} K' (H) = f \frac{G (b) - G (f)}{b - f} \to \frac{r}{2\mu} K'' (H). \tag{199}
\]

Then \( \frac{df}{dc_B} < (b - f) \frac{dH}{dc_B} \) because

\[
\frac{df}{dc_B} < \frac{b - f}{H} \frac{dH}{dc_B} \quad \implies f \frac{G (b) - G (f)}{b - f} \frac{df}{dc_B} < \frac{r}{2\mu} K'' (H) \frac{dH}{dc_B} \quad \implies \frac{G (b) - G (f)}{b - f} < G' (f) + (G' (f) + fG'' (f)). \tag{200}
\]

If \( K'' (H) \) is sufficiently large, we must have

\[
H \frac{df}{dc_B} < (b - f) \frac{dH}{dc_B} \tag{201}
\]

in any equilibrium. Now consider

\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} = 1 - G (b) - G' (b) (c_B - c_{NB}) \frac{db}{dc_B}
\]

\[
= 1 - G (b) - G' (b) (c_B - c_{NB}) \left[ \frac{1}{1 - H} + \frac{-H \frac{df}{dc_B} + b - f \frac{dH}{dc_B}}{1 - H \frac{dH}{dc_B}} \right]. \tag{202}
\]

If \( K'' \) to be sufficiently high, \( \left( \frac{-H \frac{df}{dc_B} + b - f \frac{dH}{dc_B}}{1 - H \frac{dH}{dc_B}} \right) \) is always positive and bounded away from zero. This is because \( \frac{df}{dc_B} \) is bounded away from zero and \( H \) increases in \( c_B \) if \( K'' \) is sufficiently high (from the comparative statics of \( H^*_3 \)).
Then, we move \( c_B \) to the unconstrained level \( c_B^* \) (given \( K'' \)), in this case
\[
1 - G (b) - G' (b) (c_B - c_{NB}) \frac{1}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \to 0,
\]
and
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} \frac{d\pi_{NB}}{dc_B} \to -G' (b) (c_B - c_{NB}) \left( \frac{-\mathcal{H} \frac{df}{dc_B} + \frac{b - f}{1 - \mathcal{H}} \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B}}{1 - H} \right) < 0.
\]


As \( c_{NB} \to 0 \) and \( c_B \downarrow c_{NB} \), the only equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium with \( S_3^* = c_B \), and \( b_3^* \to 0 \) so all customers choose market making with zero cost. Then, customers welfare reaches the maximum in this case. Now, if \( c_B \) increases, the spread will increase because \( S_3^* = c_B \). In the meantime \( f_3^* \) also increases, so the customer welfare decreases. Customer welfare is a continuous function of both \( c_B \) and \( c_{NB} \), so it decreases if \( c_{NB} \) is small enough and \( c_B - c_{NB} \) is sufficiently small (and positive).

Using \( \mathcal{H} (b - f) = b - S \), we can get
\[
\frac{d\pi_c}{dc_B} = \int_f^b \mathcal{H} \left( -\frac{df}{dc_B} \right) G' (x) dx + \int_f^b (x - f) \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B} G' (x) dx - (1 - G (b)) \]
\[
< \int_f^b (x - f) \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B} G' (x) dx - (1 - G (b)).
\]

From the analysis in the proof for the comparative statics of \( \pi_{NB} \), we know that when \( K'' \) is sufficiently high, \( \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B} \to 0 \), and both \( b \) and \( f \) converge to constant numbers. Then in this case, we must have
\[
\frac{dc_c}{dc_B} < \int_f^b (x - f) \frac{d\mathcal{H}}{dc_B} G' (x) dx - (1 - G (b)) \to (1 - G (b)) < 0.
\]

This is intuitive: when \( c_B \) increases, both the matchmaking fee \( f \) and market making spread \( S \) increase, and both make consumers worse off. The only possible benefit that consumers can get is from the increase of matching speed \( \mathcal{H} \), but if the cost of the matching technology is very high, the increase in matching speed will be very small, and the overall customer welfare will decrease.

A.8 Proof of Proposition 7

Case 1 of the equilibrium:

Based on previous results, in this case, we know at the equilibrium \( (S_1^*, \mathcal{H}_1^*, f_1^*) \),
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} d\pi_c = d\mathcal{H} \int_f^b (1 - G (x)) dx - (1 - \mathcal{H}) (1 - G (b)) db,
\]
\[
\frac{r}{2\mu} d (\pi_B + (c_B - c_{NB}) (1 - G (b))) = -(c_B - c_{NB}) G' (b) db,
\]
\[
\pi_{NB} \equiv 0.
\]
Then $d\Pi_1 > 0$ is equivalent to

$$
\frac{dH}{db} \int_f^b (1 - G(x)) \, dx - (1 - \mathcal{H}) (1 - G(b)) - (c_B - c_{NB}) G'(b) > 0. 
$$

(208)

We know at the equilibrium,

$$
\frac{c_B}{1 - \mathcal{H}} = \frac{bG'(b) - (1 - G(b))}{G'(b)},
$$

(209)

so

$$(1 - \mathcal{H}) (1 - G(b)) + c_B G'(b) = (1 - \mathcal{H}) bG'(b).$$

(210)

Then

$$
\frac{dH}{db} \int_f^b (1 - G(x)) \, dx - (1 - \mathcal{H}) (1 - G(b)) - (c_B - c_{NB}) G'(b) > 0
$$

$$\iff \frac{dH}{db} \int_f^b (1 - G(x)) \, dx > (1 - \mathcal{H}) bG'(b) - c_{NB} G'(b).$$

(211)

From previous results we know at the equilibrium

$$
\frac{dH}{db} > 0.
$$

(212)

So the LHS of (211) is positive. The RHS of (211) becomes

$$(1 - \mathcal{H}) bG'(b) - c_{NB} G'(b) = G'(b) [S - \mathcal{H} f - c_{NB}].$$

(213)

In Case 1, we have $S - \mathcal{H} f - c_{NB} < 0$, so (211) always holds. Thus, $d\Pi_1 dc_B > 0$.

**Case 2 of the equilibrium:**

Based on our previous results, at the equilibrium $(S_2^*, \mathcal{H}_2^*, f_2^*)$, we have

$$
\frac{d\pi_B}{dc_B} = -\frac{2\mu}{r} \,(1 - G(b)),
$$

(215)

$$
d\pi_c = \frac{2\mu}{r} \int_f^b \partial \left[ (x - f) \mathcal{H} \right] \frac{\partial G}{\partial c_B} \, dx,
$$

(216)

$$
\pi_{NB} \equiv 0.
$$

(217)

So

$$
\frac{d\Pi_2}{dc_B} = -\frac{2\mu}{r} \,(1 - G(b)) + \frac{2\mu}{r} \int_f^b \frac{\partial [(x - f) \mathcal{H}]}{\partial c_B} \, dG(x) + \frac{2\mu}{r} \frac{d((c_B - c_{NB}) (1 - G(b)))}{dc_B}
$$

$$= \frac{2\mu}{r} \left[ - (c_B - c_{NB}) G'(b) \frac{db}{dc_B} + \int_f^b \frac{\partial [(x - f) \mathcal{H}]}{dc_B} \, dG(x) \right].$$

(218)

(219)

In Case 2, we have $c_B - c_{NB} < 0$, $\frac{db}{dc_B} > 0$, $\frac{df}{dc_B} < 0$, and $\frac{dH}{dc_B} > 0$, so $d\Pi_1 dc_B > 0$. 

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063
References


Davis Polk. 2014. Supplementary Leverage Ratio. Memo.


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063
Figure 1: Example Panel A presents the market making spread, matchmaking fee, and average transaction costs. Panel B plots the fractions of traders choosing market making, matchmaking, or refraining from trade. Panel C depicts overall customer welfare and separately its market making and matchmaking components. The dashed vertical lines in each panel indicate the transitions between regions 1, 2, 3, and 4. The example uses an exponential distribution for customer private values, $G(b)$, and a quadratic function with parameter $k$ for the cost of speed, $K(H)$. The parameters used in the example are $\mu = 1$, $r = 0.01$, $c_{NB} = 20$bps, and $k = 0.1$. 

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399063