24.501: Truth, Being, and All That

Fall 1998


There is a widespread practice in philosophy of writing unexpected sorts of "objects" into the truth-conditions of claims that are not intuitively about objects like that. For instance, the truth of is said to depend on the existence of But there are plenty of people who can't bring themselves to believe in models, worlds, numbers, and the rest, and plenty more who can't believe that such things need to exist for the quoted claims to be correct. Is it possible to do justice both to the naturalness, and the peculiarity, of allowing objects to "call the shot" in the way we routinely do?


Stephen Yablo, Philosophy
Office: E39-314
Phone: 258-0740
Office Hours: by appointment
E-mail: yablo@mit.edu


Mondays 3:00-6:00 (note new time!!) in E51-390