Peer Reviewed Articles
Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Allow Citizens to Voice Opinions Publicly?
Why would an authoritarian regime allow citizens to voice opinions publicly if the exchange of information among citizens spurs social instability as has been often alleged? In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model and show that an authoritarian regime can strengthen its rule by allowing citizens to communicate with each other publicly. From the government’s perspective, such communication has two interrelated functions. First, if public communication reveals a shared feeling of dissatisfaction towards government policies among the citizens, the government will detect the danger and improve policies accordingly. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, public communication disorganizes the citizens if they find themselves in disagreement over the policies. We show that the government allows public communication if and only if it perceives sufficient heterogeneity in preferences among the citizens. The model also illustrates that public communication could serve as a commitment device ensuring government responsiveness when it faces high dissatisfaction, which in turn makes the government better off than with private polling. [PDF]
with Jidong Chen.
The Journal of Politics, forthcoming.
Generalized Synthetic Control Method: Causal Inference with Interactive Fixed Effects Models
Difference-in-differences (DID) is commonly used for causal inference in time-series cross-sectional data. It requires the assumption that the average outcomes of treated and control units would have followed parallel paths in the absence of treatment. In this paper, I propose a method that not only relaxes this often-violated assumption, but also unifies the synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller 2010) with linear fixed effect models under a simple framework, of which DID is a special case. It imputes counterfactuals for each treated unit in post-treatment periods using control group information based on a linear interactive fixed effect model that incorporates unit-specific intercepts interacted with time-varying coefficients. This method has several advantages. First, it allows the treatment to be correlated with unobserved unit and time heterogeneities under reasonable modelling assumptions. Second, it generalizes the synthetic control method to the case of multiple treated units and variable treatment periods, and improves efficiency and interpretability. Third, with a built-in cross-validation procedure, it avoids specification searches and thus is transparent and easy to implement. An empirical example of Election Day Registration and voter turnout in the United States is provided. [PDF, R Package (test version), Examples, Replication Files]
Political Analysis, forthcoming.
Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes
We develop a theory of how an authoritarian regime interactively uses information manipulation, such as propaganda or censorship, and policy improvement to maintain social stability. The government can depict the status quo policy more popularly supported than it actually is, while at the same time please citizens directly by enacting a costly reform. We show that the government's ability of making policy concessions reduces its incentive to manipulate information and improves its credibility. Anticipating a higher chance of policy concessions and less information manipulation, citizens are more likely to believe the government-provided information and support the regime. Our model provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that reform coexists with selective information disclosure in authoritarian countries like China. [PDF, Pre-print, Slides]
with Jidong Chen.
Political Science Research and Methods, First View (Online), June 2015.
Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China
Scholars have established that authoritarian regimes exhibit responsiveness to citizens, but our knowledge of why autocrats respond remains limited. We theorize that responsiveness may stem from rules of the institutionalized party regime, citizen engagement, and a strategy of preferential treatment of a narrow group of supporters. We test the implications of our theory using an online experiment among 2,103 Chinese counties. At baseline, we find that approximately one third of county level governments are responsive to citizen demands expressed online. Threats of collective action and threats of tattling to upper levels of government cause county governments to be considerably more responsive. However, while threats of collective action cause local officials more publicly responsive, threats of tattling do not have this effect. We also find that identifying as loyal, long-standing members of the Communists Party does not increase responsiveness. [PDF, Pre-print, Slides]
with Jidong Chen and Jennifer Pan.
American Journal of Political Science
, Vol. 60, Iss. 2, pp. 383-400, April 2016.
Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Goods Expenditure in Rural China
Do informal institutions, rules and norms created and enforced by social groups, promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the paper, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable. [PDF, Pre-print, Slides]
with Yang Yao.
American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, No. 2, pp. 371-91, May 2015.