"Generalized Synthetic Control Method for Causal Inference with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data" (coming soon)
Abstract:Do informal institutions promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of the challenges of defining informal institutions, measuring them, and identifying their effects. This paper attempts to address those challenges. We focus on informal institutions -- the rules created and enforced by social groups -- that could possibly facilitate local public goods provision and explore two mechanisms: (1) informal institutions help local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods and (2) informal institutions hold local officials accountable by providing extra incentives or better monitoring. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that local public goods expenditure increases considerably when an elected village chairperson comes from the two largest family clans in a village and the association is stronger when clans appear to be more cohesive. We interpret these results as evidence that informal institutions of large clans facilitate local public goods provision. In addition, we show that the collective action mechanism is more plausible than the accountability mechanism in the context of rural China. Our finding is robust to alternative explanations, such as more capable leaders, changes of formal electoral rules, and strategic co-optation of the Chinese Communist Party.
Abstract: This study provides novel and rigorous empirical evidence that informal institutions are important for determining the performance of formal ones in the context rural China. We collect a large survey to document village temples, which are inclusive voluntary organizations, and the introduction of village-level elections. We find that temples enhance the positive effect of elections on increasing village-government provided public goods.
Abstract: Why would an authoritarian regime set up deliberative institutions to allow people to complain publicly if, as is often presumed, complaints facilitate protests and cause social instability? We argue that deliberation is a process of hierarchical communication not only between the government and the citizens, but also among the citizens. We show that deliberation serves two functions. First, it helps the government respond to fluctuating public opinion. Second, it can also help to reshape the citizens' beliefs. Specifically, deliberation disorganizes citizens if they find themselves split over government policies. However, if deliberation reveals that a protest can be successful, the government identifies the danger, and improves the policy to appease the opposition. When the citizens are perceived to be sufficiently homogeneous, deliberation is allowed. We further investigate two deliberative mechanisms that combine a private poll with either a committed responsiveness or a censorship strategy. To achieve the best possible payoff in both mechanisms, the government needs to constrain itself from over-manipulating citizens' learning, thus amplifying the disorganization effect.
Abstract: Scholars have established that authoritarian regimes exhibit responsiveness to citizens, but our knowledge of why autocrats respond remains limited. We theorize that responsiveness may stem from rules of the institutionalized party regime, citizen engagement, and a strategy of preferential treatment of a narrow group of supporters. We test the implications of our theory using an online experiment among 2,103 Chinese counties. At baseline, we find that approximately one third of county level governments are responsive to citizen demands expressed online. Threats of collective action and threats of tattling to upper levels of government cause county governments to be considerably more responsive. However, while threats of collective action cause local officials to be more publicly responsive, threats of tattling do not have this effect. We also find that identifying as loyal, long-standing members of the Communist Party does not increase responsiveness.
Abstract: Are political insiders or outsiders more likely to complain about local government performance in nondemocratic and one-party systems? In this paper, we identify political connections as an important resource for expressing complaints about government performance in a context where governmental transparency is limited and risks of reprisal are high. Using data from both urban and rural China, we find that, although political insiders are not more dissatisfied with public services than ordinary citizens, they are more likely to contact authorities with complaints about government performance. This is likely because they have better access to authorities, more information about how the system works, and some degree of political protection. We also show that under certain conditions it is formal party membership that provides these resources, while at other times it is informal personal relationships that play a key role. A comparison of urban and rural China suggests that the importance of formal vs. informal political connections depends on the degree of institutional isomorphism between formal political institutions and local administration.
Work in Progress
"The Grand Canal, Communism, and Modern Economic Performance: A Study on the Persistence of Economic Activity in China, 1000-2012 A.D." (with Nancy Qian)
"The Emergence of Chinese Urban System: Courier Routes and Population Divergence, 1500-2010" (with Ming Lu).
"Does Intra-Party Democracy Ever Exist in China?" (with Yasheng Huang)