AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEologiCA

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ABSTRACT

This essay examines Aquinas’s discussions of hatred in Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 29 and II-II, Q. 34, in order to retrieve an account of what contemporary theorists of the emotions call its cognitive contents. In Aquinas’s view, hatred is constituted as a passion by a narrative pattern that includes its intentional object, beliefs, perceptions of changes in bodily states, and motivated desires. This essay endorses Aquinas’s broadly “cognitivist” account of passionate hatred, in line with his way of treating passions in general. I suggest that Aquinas’s account of hatred’s arising out of attachment is compelling. However, I also argue that if Aquinas’s treatment of hatred is to help us understand the phenomenon of hate, where classes of people are abominated for an identity they bear, and to avoid equating an oppressor’s hatred with that of the oppressed for the oppressor, the cognitive pathway to hatred must be broader than through envy.

KEY WORDS: Attachment, envy, hatred, bigotry, passions, emotion, love, Aquinas

1. Introduction

Even with the revival of philosophical interest in emotions and virtues, there are few philosophical discussions of hatred as such. A search of the Philosophical Index turns up two articles in the last twenty-five years, and only one book in which hatred or its relation to hate is a significant theme. Although there is growing philosophical literature on different forms of “hate” in civil discourse, these discussions of such issues as racism, misogyny, and homophobia have not examined their relationship to hatred as an emotion. We might well begin to address

1 The two articles in the last two decades of otherwise prodigious philosophical literature on the emotions are Ben-Zeev 1992 and Kolnai 1998. The book is by Murphy and Hampton 1988. The nature and justification of retributive hatred and its relationship to forgiveness is an issue addressed by Murphy in other writings, and by other authors responding to his views. However, this conversation occurs in work primarily focused on forgiveness and punishment and not on the character of hatred as a passion or vice.

2 In current political speech and civil discourse, “hate” broadly refers to prejudicial beliefs and actions that defame bearers of an abominated identity. I will use the term “hatred,” by contrast, to designate an emotional response that abominates its object, and generates a desire to harm or extirpate that which cannot be assuaged in any other way. It is

this deficit by taking an inventory of resources in our philosophical traditions.

In this essay, I propose to contribute to this inventory by reexamining aspects of the discussions of hatred in Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* I-II, Q. 29 and II-II, Q. 34. His view of hatred is multilayered, and at the ontological level, it names the repulsion that every finite being has for that which harms or destroys it. In this sense, love and hatred do not refer to "mental events" or "tokens of consciousness"; they refer to the tendency, for example, of plants to grow near water or in damp soil, or of any animal to flee its predator. I will focus, however, on Aquinas's moral psychology of hatred as a passion, since one might find his "phenomenology" of passions—his moral appraisal of vicious hatred—compelling in its own right as a "folk psychology" of hatred. Aquinas's understanding of the hatred that rises to the level of (human) experience must be understood in terms of his overall account of the passions, shaped as it is by his reading of Aristotle's *De Anima* III.4, 10–13, and *Rhetoric* ii.2–12. The theological discussion of hatred of persons as a vice in ST II-II, Q. 34 also contributes critical details to his account of hatred as a passion, having its etiology in attachment and envy. From these details we may derive an intuitive, if incomplete, sketch of what contemporary theorists of the emotions would call the cognitive contents of hatred. My aim here is simply to delineate this sketch, as a beginning point for broader discussion of philosophical issues about hatred and its relation to hate. As such, my aim is not Aquinas's; I am not yet taking up moral and theological questions, which are his principal concern in ST II-II, Q. 34.

I will argue that Aquinas's grounding of hatred of persons in envy is too narrow as an account of the cognitive contents of hatred felt toward

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3 All citations of Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica* are from the complete English translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (1981).

4 Both the terms "phenomenology" and "folk psychology" demand comment, lest my use of them suggests that I think we should find Aquinas's view of hatred merely of antiquarian value. I use "phenomenology" to refer to the essentially descriptive enterprise of locating general features of the experiences which humans, as language-using agents, describe in particular linguistic terms. It answers the question, asked for a specific group of persons (as subjects) defined by sharing a language of self-description, "what is called 'hatred'?" Such an account is also "folk psychology" to the degree that it articulates a "taxonomy of emotion types based on the meaning ascribed by the subject to the stimulus situation." This definition is that of Paul E. Griffiths 2003, 11. As such, it is a critical step in any theory of emotion, psychological or philosophical, though not all theorists agree about the nature of its significance and value, and in particular, whether emotion types can only be defined in terms of subjects' meanings.
persons. However, I also show that he entertains a broader account of the cognitive features of hatred of persons. Both the theological context of his discussion and the cognitive parameters of passionate hatred as he delineates them suggest a much richer account. This account is not in itself a critique of what Aquinas does say. Aquinas does not discuss hatred of persons perceived to bear an abominated identity that seems to justify treating them in ways not regarded as morally permissible for persons in general. If passionate hatred is a common constituent of all forms of hate, or if we are to understand the primary moral risk of hate as that it predisposes agents to feel and act upon hatred indiscriminately for whole classes of persons, then a “folk psychology” of hatred must take account of much broader patterns of meaning “ascribed by the subjects” of hatred to its “stimulus situations” (Griffiths 2003, 39). However, the account that Aquinas gives of the sources of hatred in attachment shows that any meaningful psychological theory of hatred as an emotion—or any account of hatred as a vice—requires, if not entails, an evaluation of the loves in virtue of which the subjects of hatred hate. It is this feature of Aquinas’s treatment that points beyond folk psychology to a meaningful account of hatred as a moral challenge—an issue to be taken up in future work and discussions.

2. Hatred and Love: Aquinas’s Moral Psychology of Hatred as a Passion

ST I-II, Q. 29 addresses the ontology and moral psychology of hatred within the context of a section of the Summa Theologica fundamentally concerned with theological anthropology, and specifically with the passions and dispositions. Hatred is analyzed here in terms of its ontological and psychological place within natural human agency and ends. It is also in this Question that Aquinas accounts for two critical senses in which hatred is the “opposite” of love. This analysis immediately follows, and presupposes, his treatment of love as a “movement of the sense appetite” or as a “passion.” The model for Aquinas’s treatment of the passions in general, and of love and hatred in particular, is that of Aristotle’s De Anima III.9–13, and more generally of De Anima I.1, Rhetoric ii.3, and Nicomachean Ethics II.5, III.6–7 (see Jordan 1986). Aquinas defines natural love and hatred in terms of the movement of appetite as follows:

Now with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so it has a natural dissonance from that

My remarks reflect the definitions of racisms and racial prejudice in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s “Racism” (Goldberg 1990).
which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So therefore, in
the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain har-
mony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while
hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as
repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears
the aspect of the good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect
of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object
of hatred [ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 1, responsio].

It is part of the order of creation, the order of eternal law, that every finite
being “tends” to that which is conducive to its survival and flourishing,
and repels or avoids those things that harm or are inimical to its flour-
ishing. At the most basic level, the appetites are the form in animate
creatures of this basic ontological affinity that anything has toward that
which sustains it as the kind of thing it is, and a repulsion toward that
which harms it. In virtue of appetitus, which includes both “being moved
toward” and “being averted from” objects that either are conducive or
inimical to the subject’s good, subjects are acted upon by objects outside
of them in accord with eternal law. Appetites in animals, furthermore,
consist partly of a “passive, sensible” component (complacentia) that is
“naturally moved by the thing apprehended.” An animal appetite is “pas-
sive” in that it must be “moved” or be an object perceived by the subject.
However, an appetite also includes as a component an active “movement,”
which is a consequent desire that moves the creature with respect to what
it perceives (see Crowe 1959). Aquinas then employs fundamental tech-
nical notions of natural and “animal” appetite and a critical distinction,
which he discusses in ST I, Q. 80 A.2, between “sensible” and “intellect-
ual” appetite to account for the essential nature and complementarity of
love and hatred. Throughout ST I, Q. 81, Aquinas speaks of the function
of appetites as a movement, and explains why this is so in ST I, Q. 81, A.2.
In sensing and in forming beliefs and subsequent desires about what
one perceives, the subject is moved toward objects of desire and averted
from objects perceived as an evil.\footnote{See Harak 1993 for his especially
helpful treatment of appetitus and of the self as “moved mover” (96–98),
as well as his discussion of the causes of passions (81–84).}

In rational creatures with a capacity for the formation of beliefs and
for deliberation, however, the natural animal appetite also includes a
“superior inclination” that involves a further element of judgment and
intention. Though the movement of appetites that is characteristic of
all animals is also present in rational animals, the appetites of rational
animals are moved by objects that are apprehended as the intentional
objects of perception and belief. Passions in rational animals are
\footnote{For a clear and basic treatment of ST I, Q. 80–81 on the appetites, see Baker 1941, Harak 1993.}
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“cognitive” in the sense that they are “mental events”: this is what it means to say that objects of passion are “apprehended.” In contemporary philosophical language, a “passion” as Aquinas understands it is a complex mental event or “extended mental episode” that necessarily involves the formation of beliefs about a perceived object and an ensuing pattern of affect or bodily change and motivated desire. Two words of caution are in order here. First, “passion” or “a passion” cannot be reduced to any one of these elements and is not to be flatly assimilated to a modern notion of “emotion” or “an emotion.” Second, the desires that arise in passion are not to be associated with “will” as such. Noting that passion is often “felt” but not acted upon, Aquinas’s way of making sense of this feature of passion is to associate “will” with “choice” (electio). Thus, in feeling hatred, one may “feel” the motivation, or have the desire, to attack and destroy another, but may choose not to do so. If one unself-consciously acts upon the desires motivated by a passion, then (perhaps through poor habituation), one’s “reason” is simply moved by passion: this would be an instance of intemperance. Yet one may “self-consciously” either choose or choose not to act upon the desires that may quite involuntarily arise insofar as one is the subject of passion. If one

8 Jordan (1986, 88) helpfully comments on the distinction between intellectual and sensitive appetite (with specific reference to ST I, Q. 81, A. 1, sed contra and responsio) that “one is like rest, the other like motion” and, “As the physical analogies make clear, this distinction ought not to be reified as a distinction between two faculties, much less two entities.”

9 In ST I-II, Q. 24, A. 2, responsio, Aquinas refuses the Stoic view that passions are “interruptions” of reason’s control in conscious experience, and thereby to be regarded as “diseases” of the soul. He sides with the Aristotelian-Peripatetic that passion is an interruption of reason’s control only if it is badly habituated. Also note his endorsement of Augustine’s refusal of Cicero’s calling “what the Greeks call pathē” “disturbances” in ST I-II, Q. 22, A. 2, sed contra. His treatment of specific passions, furthermore, identifies them with the formation of specific sorts of beliefs about certain kinds or categories of objects: hence the belief that someone has “slighted one’s excellence” is not only a “constantly conjoined” precondition of anger, but part of it, as is the desire that it motivates to inflict pain or harm upon its object in proportion to the standards of retributive justice. On the distinction between “passion” and “emotion,” and the evolution of modern notions of “emotion” from earlier notions of passion, see Amélie O. Rorty 1982 and 1993, and specifically her claim that sentiments are the descendents of stoic epithumeis and emotions, especially as they are defined in the tradition of theorizing emotions associated with Hume and the James-Lange school, the descendents of the kataleptic impression. On the Stoic notion of passions as katalepsis, see Nussbaum 1990, 263–67, esp. 265, n. 7. See also Aquinas’s claim that passions are “properly to be found” in the sensitive as opposed to the intellectual appetite because they involve “corporate transmutation” in ST I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, responsio. Nonetheless, the passion is not merely this felt bodily change.

10 A more fruitful way to understand “will” in Aquinas’s thought would be to equate it, in modern moral psychology, with the capacity to form what Harry Frankfurt calls “second-order volitions.” See Frankfurt’s “Freedom of the will and the concept of a person” and “Identification and externality” (1988), especially his comments on the verb, “to want”
chooses to act on passion-motivated desires beyond the counsels of prudence, then this would be an instance of incontinence or malice.\(^{11}\)

In Aquinas’s refinement of a basic Aristotelian psychology of the sensible appetite, he identifies two “powers” (ST I-I, Q. 80, A. 3, *sed contra* and *responsio*): a “concupiscible” power wherein “corruptible things” need and have an inclination to acquire what is required for survival and flourishing, “according to the senses, and as its nature predisposes it”; and an “irascible” one where they resist that which inflicts harm and hinders acquisition of what is needed (“suitable”). In ST I-II, Q. 23, A. 1, 2, Aquinas discusses how it is that in the rational psyche of humans, passions like all forms of love and hatred, desire, sexual desire, hunger, and thirst are forms of the first power—being moved to attachment. Anger, courage, shame, grief, and other psychologically natural and fundamental emotions are, however, forms of the second power—being moved to resist impediments to attachment. Specific passions, furthermore, are (according to ST I-II, Q. 23, A.4, *responsio*) differentiated “in accordance with their active causes, which in the cases of the passions of the soul, are their objects,” and not by “how they feel” to the subject.\(^{12}\)

According to Aquinas, any token experience of any specific passion is what contemporary philosophers of mind would call a “complex mental episode.” Any such experience involves a three-stage movement: (i) an “aptitude to tend” toward or away from the mover or intentional object (love and hatred); (ii) depending upon whether the loved or hated object is not yet possessed or extirpated, a movement toward or away from the object (desire or aversion); and (iii) the stage when the subject believes either that the object is possessed (or the subject “rests” in it) or that she will never possess it (joy or sorrow).\(^{13}\) Hatred at this level moves

\(^{11}\) Bowlin’s discussion of the different forms of incontinence, the virtues, and “steadfastness” is extremely helpful here (1999, 28, 45). See also Yearley’s remarks about reason’s control of the virtues as “political” (1990, 82–83). On malice, see Yearley 1990, 86–87, but also Bowlin 1999, 49 n. 33.

\(^{12}\) ST I-II, Q. 23, A. 4, *responsio*: Different passions “differ in accordance with their active causes, which in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects.” This passage and one other (ST I-II, Q. 60, A. 5, *responsio*) identify what individuates specific passions of the soul—active causes and objects.

\(^{13}\) The movement of the irascible passions presupposes their objects already being “found” good or evil (being loved or hated). The “aptitude” to “seek good” or “shun evil,”
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beyond being merely a natural repulsion from that which harms to being a passion that presupposes beliefs about the relation of certain objects of consciousness to a good already loved.\(^\text{14}\)

In rationally willful animals, the concupiscible and irascible powers “obey” reason both in its “estimative” and calculating (means to ends) function (Yearley 1990, 75). The sensible appetite does not apprehend “the universal”; it does not in itself encounter objects as particular examples of kinds or classes of objects that may have a relatively consistent relation to fulfilling or impeding desire and need, or to causing pleasure and pain. Though the sensible appetite apprehends objects as desirable or undesirable, and as painful or pleasurable, having beliefs about the goodness or evil of anything represents a further abstract function of reason beyond the sensitive appetite. Aquinas says that it is through the intellectual appetite, “through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form” (ST I-I, Q. 80, A. 1, 2, \textit{sed contra} and responsio of both). “Having a feeling” about something presupposes implicitly seeing it as an instance of a particular kind of thing; and this “seeing as” is reason functioning in what Aquinas calls reason’s “estimative” role.

\(\text{14}\) It remains an open question whether Aquinas regards all forms of love and hatred as passions. One anonymous reader argues that Aquinas admits in ST I-II, Q. 26, A. 3 that not all forms or instances of love (and, therefore, of hatred) are forms of passion. I do not find this reading convincing. This reading may refer to Aquinas’s claim (Q. 26, A. 2, end of responsio) that “love is a passion, properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense as it is in the will.” This “wider and extended sense” is evidently that captured in the notion of “dilection” (\textit{diligere}), which (in Q. 26, A. 3, responsio) Aquinas says “implies, in addition to love, a choice (electionem) made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and therefore is not in the concupiscible power but in the will, and only in the rational nature.” Yet in the replies to objections 1, 2, and 3 (Q. 26, A. 3), he states that love is in the concupiscible passion and that it “denotes a passion.” In replies to objections 1, 2, and 3, it is because dilection (regard) involves choice and is in the intellectual appetite, that love and dilection are “the same” in the intellectual appetite. Aquinas’s own language here suggests, however, that love can refer to a state of the will because the will chooses passion’s object, or vice versa. In either case, the concupiscible faculty is “moved,” and may be “endorsed” by the will without its “overpowering” the will. See ST I-II, Q. 10, responsio. To insist that because “\textit{diligere}” is a form of love and is not in the sensitive appetite, it is a species of love that is not passionate, however, refutes the distinction between sensitive and intellectual appetite into two faculties in a way that conflicts with the kinds of metaphors (rest and motion) that suggest Aquinas regards these as two “moments” of a single “power.” See Jordan 1986, 88.
Hatred, like love as desire, is subsequently shaped by the functioning of reason in its apprehension of the "universal," as it grasps abstract properties that give classes of objects a more or less consistent relationship over time to human desires and interests. So, beyond and out of the spontaneous aversive responses of "natural hatred" arise a variety of generalized hatreds. These forms of hatred presuppose a rational "estimate" of whole classes and categories of objects, relative to the ways in which they tend to effect pain, pleasure, the fulfillment of desire, and, more generally, to effect realization of human interests. Hatred in this sense is the contrary of love as amor, or as desire for what is apprehended as pleasurable and ultimately believed in some sense to be "good." Furthermore, the hating and loving response becomes predispositional as agents form more or less settled conceptions of what is good or evil, and affective response becomes attuned through habituation to objects encountered under reason's apprehension. Over time, agents come to respond with more or less spontaneous hatred (or love, or anger, or shame, or fear, or grief, and the like) to objects as instances of classes and kinds about which they have already formed beliefs. Habituation also shapes the ability of agents to exercise voluntary endorsement or restraint (will) with respect to desire motivated by passion. Habituated and intersubjective ways of perceiving (seeing as) are reflected in the formation of more or less settled evaluative beliefs about what is good and evil; and the strength or weakness of will and habituated capacity to choose with respect to desires motivated by passion determine the degree to which, and ways in which, passion is reflected in action.\(^{15}\)

Aquinas's remarks about hatred in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 2 foreground five critical implications of his overarching, Aristotelian psychology of the appetites and passions. (1) "Natural hatred" is a prreflective, and even preconscious "natural dissonance." It simply names the fundamental aversion or repelling movement of anything away from that which is inimical to its good. At this ontological level, hatred and love are symmetrical opposites; though we will see that this does not imply any "higher" symmetry of value or etiology between them. (2) For all animals, including rational animals, natural hatred takes the form of a primitive, prerational feature of the psyche, and is an ingredient in all specific, sensible appetites that avert from that which is inimical to its good. (3) In rational animals, "passional hatred" is intentional and cognitive. It is about an intentional object present in the consciousness of the subject who feels hatred. To feel it is necessarily to be in a cognitive state involving both perception and belief formation. (4) In animals, rational or otherwise, hatred is a form of concupiscence. In some fundamental sense, 

\(^{15}\) I am indebted here, and commend the reader to, the discussion of habituation in Nelson 1992, 72–73.
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It is the same kind of thing that love is, and is logically and phenomenologically a necessary concomitant of love at the level of amor or desire. At this level, it follows natural hatred in that it is a directionally opposite concupiscent “movement” from love as such. (5) Its presence precedes, and is a necessary condition for, the formation of conceptions of good and evil, as well as all habits that predispose affect, and the degree to which it is acted upon. For humans, immediate and nonreflective aversions are shaped through experience and reflection into phenomenologically diverse forms of passionable hatred.

In a more contemporary philosophical idiom, Aquinas broadly understands hatred, like other passions such as anger, fear, shame, grief, and the like to presuppose intentionality and cognition as necessary conditions for “feeling” passion. The identity of any passion to which one is subject is an instance of a type identified by a prototypical linking of specific beliefs about a specific object having certain properties in virtue of which certain motivated desires occur. Aquinas’s account of hatred, and of passion in general, however, is not a purely cognitive theory. Passions are not merely cognitions; that is to say, they are not fundamentally to be equated with the evaluative judgments they presuppose as necessary conditions and definitive components. They are cognitively defined and directed forms of deeper ontological and psychic “drives.” We may extrapolate from Aquinas’s remarks about emotions such as anger, fear, and love among others, that “feeling” may characterize the subjective experience of some emotions, and that it can only be discharged and assuaged through specific courses of action, achieving specific intentional ends. Hatred is identified in the experience of subjects phenomenologically, and defined logically, by what Ronald de Sousa calls a formal object and by an immanent teleology. Feeling a specific passion implicitly attributes some property to its objective target, and motivates a consistently identifiable array of desires. Though these desires do not have to be acted upon, as will typically be the case with nonrational

16 Cognitive theories of the emotions consider emotions to be a certain kind of judgment with propositional content, and not merely to be differentiated in experience by that content. Solomon 1976 and Nussbaum 2001 are notable examples of such views. See specifically Nussbaum’s argument that emotions essentially are “judgments of value.”

17 For indirect evidence that Aquinas regards a kind of subjective, experienced internal sensation as at least a defining characteristic of some passions in experience, note his remark about hatred being “more keenly felt” than love in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 3, sed contra and his remark in ST I-II, Q. 46, A. 6 (“On Anger,” and specifically, “Whether Anger is More Grievous than Hatred”) that, “As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile.”

animals (and are, therefore, no “part of” the passion), acting successfully upon them typically “discharges” and assuages the feeling as a bodily condition.

Hatred's target also has to be perceived as having some property in order for the feeling of hatred to arise as a response, and for the feeling response to be identified as hatred. That response will have to be one that can only be assuaged by the destruction or annihilation of the target toward which one feels it. Aquinas's theory of hatred requires, therefore, a further account of its defining formal objects. What kinds of things are hated? What beliefs about those things lead one to feel hatred for them? How is feeling hatred different in experience from feeling anger or jealousy, which also motivates one to cause harm to another? When, if ever, is one justified in feeling hatred, or in being predisposed to feel it spontaneously? Answers to each of these questions are presupposed in Aquinas's subsequent account of what hatred is vicious, and how vicious it is (or is not).

3. Passional Hatred

Four entailments of Aquinas's placing of natural hatred in ontology and moral psychology will have particular force in his account of hatred of persons and its moral status. A first critical aspect of Aquinas's view is that hatred as such is “natural” and cannot be intrinsically evil. Indeed, it is a necessary condition for survival and flourishing in the lives and experience of finite creatures who are vulnerable to potential harm from whole classes of things. However, whether hatred performs this natural function will depend upon how prereflective aversions are attuned and proportioned to appropriate circumstances by habituation and learning.

A second critical aspect of Aquinas's moral psychology of hatred is the location of hatred within the concupiscible rather than the irascible side of sensible appetite. Since anger is a form of the latter, hatred, even as a more complexly developed part of character, is not a form of anger. Here, Aquinas sides with Aristotle and his peripatetic heirs against the impression of the Stoics and their modern heirs that hatred is merely a developed final stage and form of anger.

In ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 6, Aquinas endorses Aristotle's view (Rhetoric II.4) that anger is always directed to “something singular” whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general. The context of this endorsement suggests that Aquinas thinks that anger is felt toward specific actions of specific agents—actions encountered as slightings of one's excellence. However, precisely because whole classes of objects and persons can have a consistent relationship to specific wants and interests, hatred, by contrast, may have whole classes or general kinds as its object. Aquinas's example is the enmity felt by sheep for wolves. In ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 6,
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ad 3, however, he accepts the notion that hatred can arise from anger and from envy. Lest this claim sound like a modification of the view that hatred is grounded in envy as its source, Aquinas notes that hatred arises “more directly” from envy because it already “looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful.” (Aquinas’s claim that hatred presupposes envy is examined below.) Anger, as Aquinas understands it, desires to cause pain to the one for whom it is felt, but “according to a certain measure,” determined by the way in which one’s excellence has been slighted, and the measure of the justice principle of proportionality.

Anger is assuaged toward its object once a deliberate injury is regarded as having been justly “paid back” by a proportional measure of intentionally caused pain by the slighted one (see ST I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, 7). Both one who hates and one who feels anger desires to cause pain to the one(s) toward whom one feels them. However, anger seeks to cause pain to the other “according to the measure of justice,” is not interminable (in the most literal sense), and does not necessarily desire to bring about the annihilation of the one(s) toward whom it is felt. Therefore, it is a “lesser evil.” If anger is felt toward a genuinely unjust action, and is acted upon according to the measure of justice, it is not sinful. Indeed, it would be the response of a virtuous person. Hatred, by contrast, is said in ST I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, sed contra and ad 1, to wish evil per se toward the one for whom it is felt, and not according to the measure of justice, as vengeance. Hence, hatred is “interminable” because it is not assuaged by an action that inflicts pain or harm as a just means to vengeance (and by its very nature is “far worse and graver than anger”).

Aquinas describes hatred in this passage as: “satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure.” Here Aquinas draws an analogy between the evil that the one who hates desires to bring about with the miser’s attachment to wealth. Both the miser and the hater value something that only has instrumental value as an end as such.19 This is the first sense in which hatred may be irrational in a way anger cannot be. Aquinas believes not only that this example explicates the view of Aristotle (in Rhetoric ii.4) that anger is appeased if other evils befall the one toward whom anger is felt. Though Aquinas endorses Aristotle’s view that one feels anger more impulsively and intensely in the moment, referring as he does to the heating of bile, hatred is never appeased, and

19 Any discussion of the viciousness of hatred, or the moral status of willful acts motivated by hatred, would have to take into account Aquinas’s view that the death of another person can never rightfully be intended as an end in itself. Bowlin’s discussion of Aquinas’s evaluation of murder, and of when the death of another person as the result of a necessary act of self-preservation is justified, make this clear (Bowlin 1999, 112–13).
it desires the pain and/or annihilation of the other as an end beyond any
measure of justice.
Aquinas acknowledges, then, that hatred can arise out of anger “by
way of increase.” His sense is that an end that is initially desired, even
with justification, as a means to justice, may come to be desired as an
end in itself. This progression from anger to hatred, then, is an account
of how one passion may arise out of another as the nature of its “active
cause” and “object” undergoes change. It may be that the desire to cause
pain to the other, or to destroy the other, “outlasts” the causing of pain re-
quired by justice as vengeance and/or punishment. Here, one “goes so far
as to desire his neighbor’s evil” as such, which is hatred by its very def-
inition. We will briefly take up, in the conclusion, the question whether
Aquinas’s account of the difference between anger and hatred, and his
acknowledgement that hatred can arise out of anger, can accommodate
the intuition that bigoted hatred arises out of anger.
A third critical entailment of Aquinas’s overall view in ST I-II, Q. 29,
A. 2 is that love must “precede” and cause hatred because something is
hated to the extent that it “hinders” or “destroys” something that must
already be found agreeable—and to that extent, already loved. Love and
hatred are said to be “naturally simultaneous logically, but not in ex-
perience.” Aquinas’s exposition of this claim bears closer scrutiny than
we can give it here—but one gloss is repeated, and reiterated in ST II-II,
Q. 34, which focuses on the boundaries and character of vicious hate; and
that gloss is that love is “logically” prior to hatred because it “amounts
to the same thing that one love a certain thing, and hate its contrary.”
Now since “natural” love and hatred cut across (as one constituent) all
sensitive and intellectual appetite in humans, they extend across desire,
emotion, and even considered beliefs about the good. As corruptible and
finite creatures, vulnerable as we are, it is literally impossible to have the
capacity to love without also having the capacity to hate. Aquinas seems
to be making a logical claim: For any rational creature: If one loves A,
then one is thereby predisposed (by nature) to hate whatever impedes
obtaining or harms A. Or, to the degree that one is rational, one cannot be
truly said to love A without, at the “same time,” hating whatever would
impede one’s obtaining A or would harm it. However, we might or might
not actually experience any love and its implied hatred at the same time,
as a matter of actual feeling in experience.
Aquinas is both extending the phenomenology of hatred implied in his
Aristotelian theory of the emotions and making a normative claim about
the circumstances under which hatred is rational. This is what I think
Aquinas means when he says, in ST II-II, Q. 34 that love and hatred
are “naturally simultaneous logically.” Finally, in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 3,
responsio, Aquinas flatly claims, “Every hatred arises from some love as
its cause.” “Cause” here bears the sense of “active cause,” which means
that it is both a “necessary condition” and an efficient cause. Hatreds will be implied both at the phenomenological and logical levels by every attachment or love, and every form and instance of attachment creates the phenomenological conditions under which corresponding hatreds are possible. To the degree that there is no attachment, nothing is hated. One is “a-pathetic.”

A fourth entailment is embedded in the claim that Aquinas makes about the “strength” of hatred in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 3, *responsio*, in light of the claim that love is always the cause of hatred: “It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause.” The character and depth, or the “investment” in the attachments that give rise to instances and kinds of hatred must explain the motivational salience of the hatreds. This is a critical point for any subsequent discussion of hatred as a vice at the level either of passion or “in” the will. Though we are not specifically addressing these issues in this essay, it bears on the issue of what passionate hatred is in the following ways. The forms and instances of passion that should be identified as hatred in virtue of their actual “active causes” and “objects” will not always arise in experience (or corrupt choice and action) as irruptions into consciousness that are experienced by the subject as “overpowering” reason. It also refers to “cooler” (but perhaps for that reason more insidious) mental phenomena that may ultimately shape agents’ considered judgments about “the good,” and thereby come to corrupt the will’s deliberation and choice itself.20 Hatred may be caused and disordered by love in any of the ways in which love itself, of whatever form, may be disordered. What will mark the real and objective presence of hatred across all potential cases is a pattern of “active cause” and “object,” which may be schematically sketched as follows: the intentional object (the thing one desires and possibly also wills to destroy) has some property that leads to the subject forming a belief that the intentional object in some way impedes her having or enjoying some good, loved as an end. However, in ST II-II, Q. 34, we get a clearer sense of how, at least with respect to the hatred of persons, this narrative pattern involves sorrow, and at least in some cases, envy.

4. Hatred, Sorrow, and Envy

Aquinas’s discussion of vicious hatred in ST II-II, Q. 34, though it focuses on moral and theological questions about vicious hatred, fills 20 For a richer consideration of ways in which passion may corrupt the will other than by overpowering it, see Bowlin’s discussion of “species of inconstancy” in 1999, 42–46 and Nelson’s discussion, with reference to Aquinas’s remarks in ST I-II, Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1, 2, of the way in which it falls within the purview of prudence to deliberate about the proper ordering of ends, where some ends are appropriately subordinated to others. The ends of hatred—avoiding evil—should always be “a means directed toward obtaining some good,” citing ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 3 (Nelson 1992, 49–50).
gaps in the overall account of emotional hatred’s implicit evaluative and propositional content. It is with this goal in mind that we examine this discussion. In ST II-II, Q. 34, Aquinas resumes discussion of hatred in a section of the Summa Theologica concerned with the virtues realized through the operation of divine grace upon aspects of human nature “fitted” to respond “obedientially” to grace. Hatred is treated here as a vice contrary to charity. The wrongly felt hatred of neighbor and God that Aquinas addresses in ST II-II, Q. 34 represents more than simply a perversion of the “natural” and necessary human capacity whose nature he examined in ST I-II, Q. 29. For humans, flourishing in its fullest sense of realizing God’s creative intentions for humans requires charitas, or love of God and neighbor. Charity presupposes grace as a condition that “extends” the natural appetite by being “superadded to the natural power” (see ST II-II, Q. 23, A. 2, sed contra and ad 1.) Hatred of persons, then, is a refusal of divine grace, even beyond a natural capacity failing to be oriented toward its proper objects. Even so, humans, whose natural capacity for love is extended and focused through grace onto God and the neighbor, do not fully realize God’s creative intention for humans in this life. It is continued and consummated in the coming life of the resurrected body. Hatred remains a logical and phenomenological possibility, and indeed a tragic necessity, as long as goods loved are insecure or contingent.

Charity cannot be conditioned on other persons’ goodwill, cooperation, or trust. In Aquinas’s claim that others must not be hated for “their nature” it is implied that they can never be hated as such. (See ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 3, the end of the responsio.) What is called “hatred” can only justly target sinful traits in others, although in ST I-II, Q. 23, A. 1, ad 2, Aquinas endorses Jerome’s assignment of hatred of vice to the irascible or resistive faculty. In light of the earlier discussion of his decidedly non-Stoic conception of the difference between anger and hatred, this “hatred” can be so in name only. We noted earlier, with the help of Bowlin’s discussion of Aquinas’s view of justified killing that the destruction of another person can never rightly be intended as an end in itself. Therefore, since intending the annihilation of its object as an end in itself is one of the definitive cognitive constituents of hatred, persons as such must never be hated. Sinful traits in others and in ourselves are to be grieved and resisted. In ST II-II, Q. 34, it follows that even when others stand as an actual impediment to goods we justly seek to secure, hatred is never justified or virtuous.

In the final article of ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 6, Aquinas makes it clearer how his earlier treatment of the moral psychology of hatred informs his account of hatred of the neighbor (ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 5, responsio). The sed contra is worth quoting in full:
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[Hatred of his neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (NE, vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of the good: so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so that out of envy cometh hatred [ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 5, sed contra].

In the opening, we see Aquinas deriving from his previous claim about the logical priority of love to hatred the notion that hatred may be "misdirected" by prior misdirected loves. Even in hating the neighbor, humans are also functioning according to their nature—"intending to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned." When someone is hated, that person's existence and present flourishing is found to be a source of pain; and that pain can only be assuaged by annihilating them. In Aquinas's language: "Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not first, but the last in the downfall of virtue."

Aquinas's point may be made this way: one must always love something already in order to hate that which impedes its enjoyment; so that love must already be disordered anywhere hate is vicious. Further, in ST I-II, Q. 29, A. 3, responsio, Aquinas claims: "according to different degrees of good, there are different degrees of love, to which correspond different degrees of hatred." Given that love must always potentiate hatred (create conditions under which it may naturally emerge), and is "stronger," anytime we hate in a way that contravenes the love of neighbor, our hatred must be caused by a greater love, by something we "idolatrously" love more, to which the hatred of neighbor "corresponds." This disordering leads to finding in the well-being of others a source of sorrow or pain, rather than naturally regarding their flourishing as a good. This remains true either at the level of goodwill, which does not presuppose the operation of grace, or of charity, which does presuppose it. By implication, hatred is felt for that which impedes access to the pleasures afforded by these goods. (See ST II-II, Q. 36, A. 6, ad 1.) We might also fail to hate (that is, fail to grieve and resist) those things that impede our realization of genuinely good and appropriate loves, such as love of God or the genuine flourishing of the neighbor. Here Aquinas describes us as loving rather than hating the "iniquities" that impede our love of God or the realization of genuine human flourishing. Indeed, this "love of iniquity"
The only form of self-hatred Aquinas can recognize as genuine (ST I-II, Q. 29, sed contra and end of responsio).

We then encounter the claim that vicious hatred of the neighbor is rooted in envy; and envy is surely defined more broadly than we could have imagined—“sorrow at the neighbor's good.” For a fuller exposition, envy has its own section in ST II-II, Q. 36 and in De Malo, among other places. Aquinas claims, “It may happen that another's good is apprehended as one's own evil, and in this way sorrow can have another's good as its object.” In his discussion of vicious hatred in ST II-II, Q. 34, Aquinas locates two sources of envy leading to hatred: (1) where the good of another is an occasion of harm to oneself, and (2) where one fears harm from an enemy because of his prosperity. Every animal, Aquinas says, “naturally avoids sorrow,” just as it naturally seeks what fulfills its desires and brings it pleasure. It will be this “natural avoiding” of the pain of sorrow that supplies the motivational direction characteristic of natural hatred in passional hatred. The passional response to the withdrawal of a good, or what is apprehended, desired, and valued as a good, is itself painful and thus naturally avoided. Sorrow is, in this sense, a compounding of the pain of an unfulfilled appetite such as hunger, thirst, or unrequited sexual desire. It is a pain that arises from, and often accompanies, the loss of satisfaction or the anticipation of such a loss. And, as we will see, Aquinas believes it can become focused on classes of objects to the degree that some abstract property they are seen as possessing induces us to recognize them as a real or potential impediment to our securing some good.

In ST II-II, Q. 36, A. 6, responsio, Aquinas begins with the claim that sorrow has one's own evil—what displeases, frustrates desire fulfillment, or diminishes natural function and flourishing—as its “object.” Following Aristotle's claim that envy is a “disturbing pain excited by the prosperity of others” (Rhetoric ii.9), Aquinas defines envy as apprehending another's good as one's own evil. We feel sorrow for another's good if we believe the other's realization of that good cannot but bring harm to us, or “when a man grieves for his enemy's prosperity,” since this enables his enemy to exercise an advantage and to inflict more harm. Aquinas then points out, again citing and following Aristotle's Rhetoric ii.9, that such “envy” is really an effect of fear, and is not necessarily wrong or sinful. The second and more critical way Aquinas thinks we can come to feel sorrow for another's good is that “another's good may be reckoned as being one's own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one's own good name or excellence.” This, he claims, is the way in which envy is “grieving for another's good,” and that the “goods in which a good name consists” are the specific objects of morally critical envy.

Another necessary condition of envy is not having what one perceives the other to have. This condition still is not sufficient as a cognitive
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ingredient to define a feeling as “envy properly speaking.” If it is “virtuous goods” that one desires and perceives oneself to lack, even this “zeal” for what one does not possess may not itself be wrong, irrational, or vicious. It is sorrow over another’s possession of material goods or another’s good fortune and social standing, in so far as it surpasses ours, which defines envy “properly speaking.” Aquinas narrowly specifies that attachment to material possessions or “a good name” beyond their real instrumental necessity as a condition for genuine human flourishing, is loving them inordinately. Wealth or riches are “temporal goods” that may include fame or reputation or any other good of fortune; and these goods may accrue to the worthy or unworthy, and may be possessed justly or unjustly. However, even where possession accrues to the unworthy, it has to be according to the ordinance of God’s will “for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation” (ST II-II, Q. 36, A. 3, responsio).

Furthermore, temporal goods lack the aspect of goods as ends in themselves, in comparison to the “goods to come,” by which Aquinas means love of God, “consummated” in the life to come of the resurrected body. This love is enabled, though only imperfectly in this life, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. One who, however, even imperfectly loves God—their treasures “laid up in heaven”—will not sorrow in others’ unworthily possessed temporal goods, but only grieve and resist the injustice in virtue of which they possess them—without hating what they have “in virtue of nature and grace.” The reason is that the one who loves genuine good will not perceive herself to lack anything of genuine value that the other possesses.

All forms of passional hatred presuppose the presence of an affect or feeling, often itself identified as the emotion by contemporary noncognitivist theorists of emotion. We recall from the previous section that this “pain” can be assuaged only by extirpating the target from the subject’s presence, often by annihilating it. This pain, identified presciently by Aquinas as a felt condition of the body, is supplied (as it were) by sorrow for another’s good, and the subject of hatred comes to value the pleasure of this pain’s relief as an end in itself—the “last step” in sin. The hatred of persons, thereby shares this essential teleological and narrative structure with all forms of natural, passional hatred.

To summarize:

Envy presupposes as conditions the following: (Tense may not matter for (1)–(4).)

1. A believes B possesses a good, which (a) A loves, or (b) A believes gives B a status which A loves.
2. A believes that A does not now possess that good.
3. A’s believing that A does not possess that good causes pain to A.
Hatred of persons, when the cognitions of envy are present, is the natural “internal movement,” like anger and desire, which then averts from whatever is painful.

(5) Given (4), A feels aversion for B. This is the “affect” or “feeling” of hatred.

(6) A’s aversion for B cannot be satisfied or assuaged in any way other than by a means such that B’s presence (and possession of the envied good) is annihilated for A, and A takes pleasure in this annihilation. This is the motivational “telos” to which natural hatred predisposes its subject. Aquinas rests definitional weight here since this is the content that hatred does not share with another emotion. Note Aquinas’s claim that the hater takes pleasure in the destruction of the object or target of hatred in ST II-II, Q. 108, A. 1, responsio, where he contrasts hatred with a desire for vengeance.

One final observation has to be made. One way in which hatred is distinct from most other passions of the soul is that unlike fear or anger, for example, no virtuous mean of passional hatred is specified, at least with respect to persons as the objects of hatred. It is never justified as compatible with charity or as prudent. The reason is that appropriately habituated aversion and resistance to evils should never rise to the level of desiring, or taking pleasure in, the annihilation of its object as an end in itself. It remains an open question whether this “precept” also extends to hatred of nonpersons. Natural aversion as a means to avoiding and resisting insurmountable harms is taken into other passions, moderated by habituation, such that it remains subordinated as a means to the ends of appropriate loves. It never moves through steps (5) and (6) as we have sketched the narrative of hatred’s cognitive contents above, so the pleasurable relief of some sorrow becomes its own end. As such, it never reaches the “last step” in which it becomes hatred as such. It is not that the virtuous, as the Stoics insist, extirpate natural hatred, but that it, like natural love, is a “pre-passional,” appetitive “ingredient” in other passions that may be virtuously habituated. However, given the cognitive content of passional hatred, especially in its motivated desire to annihilate its object, it may be that it cannot have a “virtuous” form as hatred.
5. Hatred, Bigotry, and “Hate”

I return now to ask to what extent Aquinas’s accounts of natural hatred and hatred of persons enable us to address critical questions about the relation of hatred and hate. I do so, remembering that hate predisposes subjects to feel many emotions, and not simply hatred, as Aquinas delineates it. Rosalind Hursthouse makes this point very well:

Recall, firstly, how extreme racism expresses itself in emotion, the way it generates not only hatred and contempt, but fear, anger, reserve, suspicion, grief that one’s offspring is going to marry a member of the rejected race, joy when evil befalls them, pity for members of one’s own race who are bettered by them, pride when one succeeds in doing them down, amusement at their humiliation, surprise that one of them has shown signs of advancing humanity, horror or self-contempt at the discovery that one has felt fellow-feeling for one—it is hard to think of a single emotion that is not corrupted [Hursthouse 1999, 114].

It is important to keep in mind that although Hursthouse’s remark is about racism, much the same can be said about other forms of what is called “hate” in civil and political discourse. Hate, of the forms that have the corrupting power that extreme racism has, refers to a whole network of beliefs and patterns of representation, which are typically deeply rooted in cultural ethoi. Being socialized into hate orients perceptions such that its subjects are predisposed to see the other as an embodiment of specific xenophobic images and expectations. In this way, I would argue, hate provides for hatred, and the other emotions it can corrupt, what Ronald de Sousa calls “paradigm scenarios”—“little dramas in which our natural capacities for emotional response were first enlisted.”21 This is not, in itself, a surprising or controversial claim. However, it points out that part of the way hate predisposes those socialized into hatred is by focusing emotional responses on specific targets, identified by specific motivating properties, and mobilized by the ongoing demonization—part

21 Ronald de Sousa 1987. The quoted line comes from 41, where de Sousa introduces the term. However, the idea is developed at length at 181–83. The following extended comment (182) helps to frame the relevance of the notion for us here. It will argue that it also opens the door to identifying Aquinas’s specific and critical insight: “My hypothesis is this: We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture, to which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion-type… and second, a set of characteristic or “normal” responses to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. It is in large part in virtue of the response component of the scenarios that emotions are commonly held to motivate. But this is, in a way, back-to-front: for the emotion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only afterward assumed to cause it.”
of what de Sousa calls a paradigm scenario. We saw that Aquinas defines emotive hatred specifically in terms of cognitive content, including what is hated—its object or target, and attributes the object is believed to have such that it is perceived to threaten the securing of some good—its motivating properties. This perception leads to sorrow and a typical subsequent motivational response—a desire to harm the target out of proportion to any notion of just deserving. In his account of hatred of persons, Aquinas examines the perversion of the natural capacity for hatred in the absence of a full, grace-enabled realization of faith, hope, and charity, in this life.

Whatever we think of the broader theological context within which Aquinas treats hatred of persons, I think that Aquinas’s identification of the broad cognitive structure and contents of natural emotional hatred is broadly correct and no more controversial than other theories of the emotions that define them in terms of their cognitive contents. The question, then, is whether his account of the hatred of persons originating in envy enables us to address some critical philosophical questions about hate. (1) Do those who express hatred toward a representative of a hated class always characterize the target of their hatred as possessing a good or status that the hater regards as an evil and finds painful? (2) Can we really say that it is envy of their oppressors that victims feel in hating them? And could we find compelling the implication that hatred felt by victims and oppressors is morally equivalent? I will discuss two examples that, I believe, show that Aquinas’s account of the cognitive content of hatred of persons entirely in terms of envy is too narrow.

(1) Consider the case of Ruby Bridges, the first African-American child to attend a legally racially integrated school in New Orleans. The crowds of white men and women who lined the sidewalk to abuse her as she made her way to school—she was six years old—seem, beyond controversy, to have been feeling and expressing hatred for her. If we grant that they were, then it seems equally hard to understand it as rooted in envy. We should recall, from the above, that Aquinas very carefully specifies that one who feels envy perceives the target of his envy to possess some good which he believes he himself does not have. The other’s possession of that good sorrows the envier because it constitutes the other as a material threat, or secures for her a status which the envier cannot have without possessing the goods he believes are possessed by the target of his envy. Ruby Bridges was poor. She was not hated because she was believed to be in possession of, or to be coming into possession of, material goods that made her a threat, either of violence or of genuine loss of status for the whites who hated her. In attending the “white” school, she was being accorded an enfranchisement already possessed by those who hated her; and their own possession of it is in no way diminished by extending it to her. So if it is merely acquiring the social goods that Jim Crow denied
blacks that caused hatred for Ruby Bridges, Aquinas’s characterization of envy is stretched beyond recognition if it is attributed to them. It is not clear that conditions (1)—(3) from above are fulfilled. However, (4) and (5) clearly are present.

What was the investment of Ruby’s oppressors in her disenfranchisement and enforced separation? Ruby Bridges could not rationally be blamed by those who hated her for overturning Jim Crow. She is perceived to embody a hated identity; and as such becomes a “scapegoat” for the expression of hatred. (1) It is within the context of resistance to the limited social roles accorded the denigrated identity that makes her a flashpoint for the expression of hatred. Ruby’s entry into a school reserved for whites is demeaning by, in the words of Jean Hampton, “making it appear that they are of equal rank and value and should thus be accorded equal treatment.”22 (2) Because she is weak, however, Ruby is vulnerable to attack; and the attack upon her seems to the attackers to have been a defense of what was rightfully theirs. (3) However, the attack assuages a feeling of hatred felt for a whole class of persons, characterized as they are by the vision of racism. (4) As such, it functions as a kind of expressive, cathartic spectacle by acting out the motivating desires to which hate predisposes its subjects. Cases such as that of Ruby Bridges call for an account of the cognitive pathways to hatred that acknowledges the historical and cultural context of hate in which victims become targeted by hatred. A sufficient account must give flesh to the sense in which the haters of Ruby Bridges felt demeaned, as well as the error implicit in the cognitive content of that feeling. In giving depth to the contents of these cognitions we give a richer account of the pathways to perhaps (3), but certainly (4) and (5).23

Surely Aquinas’s characterization of envy as a source is accurate for a range of cases of hatred of persons. However, its very value is in its specificity, which is lost if the identified elements of the Ruby Bridges type of cases are forced into it. One way to apply Aquinas’s account of

22 Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton 1988, 49.
23 An anonymous reader proposes that envy can, nonetheless, explain the hatred of Ruby Bridges if it is the case that her haters envied her holding the social goods afforded to her by the end of Jim Crow by acquiring them justly, denying the “moral innocence” many white southerners had “so carefully cultivated.” The trouble with this proposal, however, is that it entails that Ruby’s detractors know, at some level, that their own enjoyment of the social goods Jim Crow denied to Ruby is unjust. This would amount to attributing beliefs to them that they certainly did not “profess.” It seems more likely that they mistakenly believed that Jim Crow’s exclusively securing these social goods for them was just, perhaps as their “manifest destiny.” It is the vicious will to harm an innocent expressed by Ruby’s detractors that unmasks the fiction of moral innocence or sense of just entitlement cultivated by many defenders of Jim Crow. As the reader would surely urge, it is the will to harm her, beyond any plausible notion that detractors’ passions were overpowering their own better judgment, that calls for an account beyond merely holding mistaken moral beliefs.
the cognitive contents of hatred, on the other hand, is to point out that it suggests why the struggle of an oppressed group can be perceived as an attack. Even if material or economic status is not diminished for those who hate bearers of an abominated identity, “blurring boundaries” and resisting oppression exposes the value invested in a specific status. It is actually the theological context within which Aquinas treats hatred of persons that entails that this investment must be seen not as a genuine good but as a corrupted conception of good, to the degree that it effaces love of neighbor. We find in it an attachment to a status that demands to be marked by the spectacle of difference, so that transgressing the boundaries that keep privileged identities in “relief” appears to be an attack on something deserved or natural. An account of abomination and stereotyping, and their relation to the way that cultures often legitimate hate, extends rather than contradicts both Aquinas’s sketch of emotional hatred and the theological context in which he extends it to understand hatred of persons.

(2) Consider the following widely quoted account of a Bosnian Muslim woman who gives her son the name “Jihad” with the hope that he will avenge her abuse and rape.

The Serbs taught me to hate. For the last two months there was nothing in me. No pain, no bitterness. Only hatred. I taught these children to love. I did. I am a teacher of literature. I was born in Ilijas and I almost died there. My student, Zoran, the only son of my neighbor, urinated into my mouth. As the bearded hooligans standing around laughed, he told me “you are good for nothing else you stinking Muslim woman . . .” I do not know whether I first heard the cry or felt the blow. My former colleague, a teacher of physics, was yelling like mad, “Ustasha, ustasha . . .” And kept hitting me. 24

The woman in Vukovic’s account has survived a brutal attack, part of a broader genocidal goal to humiliate and degrade her as a way to debase her “kind.” Like Ruby Bridges, she is a scapegoat. She characterizes her own feeling as hatred, and connects it to a desire for revenge. A desire for revenge as such is not a part of hatred as Aquinas defines it, so long as it aims at inflicting a harm justly deserved, and would be assuaged by doing so (see ST II-II, Q. 108, Of Vengeance). It is also the motivational telos of justified anger, though this is not what this woman says she feels. 25 Aquinas says in his discussion of vengeance that we must attend to the “mind of the avenger.” “For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his

25 On anger and vengeance, see ST I-II, Q. 46, A. 6, responsio, and I-II, Q. 48, A. 2, reply to objection 1.
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Vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men” (ST II-II, Q. 108, A. 1, *responsio*). The woman from Sarajevo does not specify what fate for her attackers would satisfy her desire for revenge. Even if conditions (4) and (5) of hatred, schematized above, were true of her, and even if she took pleasure in avenging her attackers, I for one would not extend Aquinas’s imputed moral blame. (Issues of moral gravity must be deferred to a later essay.) It is not clear that what she expected from her attackers was more than respect and a measure of goodwill. Nothing in her words hints that she loves a good, or even a status, they possess. Envy as it is schematized above in (1)–(3) hardly describes how she regards them.

The words of the woman from Sarajevo make it clear that her perception of her attackers is not only that they are hostile, but that their hostility is an egregious betrayal. She contrasts her former regard for two of them, one a former colleague and one a former student to their expression of contempt for her as a Muslim and their brutal and humiliating treatment. Any account of cognitive content must take explicit account of these elements because her hatred, or theirs, does not seem to arise from envy.

In ST II-II, Q. 34, A. 3, *ad 3*, Aquinas regards hatred of those who show hostility toward one as justified. His answer is worth quoting in full: “Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.” Hatred for those who show hostility toward us is not justified, however, because the threat they represent is genuine, but because their hostility is sinful. Justified hatred, if indeed it is consistent for Aquinas to endorse the denomination of this passion as hatred (per remarks above noting his endorsing Jerome’s placing this “hatred” in the irascible faculty—ST I-II, Q. 23, A. 1, reply to objection 2), has the “sin in them” and not “our brother’s nature” or “what he holds from God” as its motivating property. Although, we should note that in ST II-II, Q. 35, A. 3 (replies to objections 2 and 3), Aquinas subtly equates hating the sin in detractors, and in those who are hostile, with hating them. Here, Aquinas himself looks beyond envy to acknowledge other cognitive pathways and content to some cases of hatred of persons. In doing so, he places the weight of identifying this emotion felt as hatred on the strength of (5) above: desire to annihilate the target. The woman in Sarajevo does not tell us, however, what she believes would avenge her assailants; so, it is unclear how Aquinas’s definitions of anger or hatred would apply to her. Would he claim that what she actually felt was anger? Even if her feeling could only be assuaged by her attackers’ painful death, if death was justly deserved as a punishment, this desire
would not mark the feeling it satisfies as hatred. However, if we take her at her word and grant that what she feels is hatred, and honor the specificity of Aquinas’s analysis of envy, then we need an account of her cognitive pathway to hatred in terms of her perception of her attackers as is revealed in her testimony. To the degree that the defining weight rests on (5), Aquinas’s sketch of natural hatred can accommodate, and even enable, it.

Finally, we see that Aquinas himself does not in fact treat envy as the only cognitive pathway to hatred of persons. We can clearly discern at least two others: (1) Hatred can arise out of anger, where the avenging that assuages the feeling becomes pleasurable in its own right, so that it is no longer assuaged by inflicting just the degree of harm required by justice. Harm comes to be valued itself as a pleasurable end, rather than as an instrument to justice and public good. (2) Hatred can arise as sorrow and resistance to vicious traits and willful misdeeds in others, especially when these traits render them hostile or otherwise a genuine threat. Here, however, their good is not merely wrongly believed to be an evil. Instead, their traits or actions are evil. Hatred is a natural and justified response to genuine evil. And to the degree that persons are inseparable from their evil or vicious traits, they are apparently hated, though not “in themselves.”

To the degree that it is plausible to define hatred in terms of its motivational telos Aquinas’s broader sketch of natural hatred can accommodate, and even invites, a more nuanced account of the cognitive pathways and contents of hatred of persons. Here, we may reasonably regard his account as incomplete, as “folk psychology,” but open to elaboration. It is helpful to recall that Aquinas regarded the Summa Theologica, where he discusses hatred, as an encyclopedia of theological disputation for beginning students. His own aim is evidently to prepare students to elaborate the views presented there, within the boundaries of recognized doctrinal and intellectual authority. Even if we are uninterested in Aquinas’s theological aim, or in the theological context in which he discusses hatred, the sketch he gives us of hatred as a natural emotion is a rich and suggestive one that runs counter to the modern and postmodern inclination to pathologize hatred as “phobic” and simply irrational. It also demands that we treat hatred as an essentially moral issue, and that we can understand it only in relation to conceptions of the good.26

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Aquinas on Attachment, Envy, and Hatred

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Queries

**Q1** Author: Please confirm that the change “the opposite of love” retains the intended sense.

**Q2** Author: Please confirm the correct name of the author—Jordon/Jordan.

**Q3** Author: Please confirm the correct date of citation—1992/1993.

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