24.221: Metaphysics
Prof. Sally Haslanger
April 9, 2003

Freewill I

1.  The Problem of Freewill
STANDARD HARD DETERMINIST ARGUMENT
1.  Whatever happens (every event) is determined by prior events.  (Determinism)
2.  I act freely iff I am able to act otherwise.  (Avoidability Analysis of Freedom)
3.  If my action is determined, I am unable to act otherwise.
4.  So, I never act freely

Hard determinism is the view that determinism (1) is true and that because of this freedom is an illusion.  Soft determinism agrees with hard determinism that determinism is true, but maintains that this doesn’t rule out free will.  That is, determinism and free will are compatible. For this reason soft determinists are called compatibilists.  Hard determinists are incompatibilists.  That leaves the libertarian, who agrees with incompatibilism, but holds that determinism is false—free acts occur and are undetermined.  So, if DET is determinism, FREE is free will, and INC is incompatibilism, the positions are these:
    
                                Incompat.               Deter.             Freewill
Hard Determinist:         Y                         Y                     N
Soft Determinist:           N                         Y                     Y
Libertarian:                   Y                         N                     Y

Incompatibilism, Determinism, and Freewill are three plausible claims, but one can't maintain all three.  Each of the positions just sketched keeps two and denies one.  

Seeing this argument, you might argue that the best strategy is simply to deny determinism.  But does that solve the problem?  Is indeterminism any more compatible with freewill?
        Indeterminism:  Some events are not determined by prior events.

Consider the freewill dilemma:
1.    If determinism is true, we can never do other than what we do; so we are not free.
2.    If indeterminism is true, then some events--possibly some actions--are random; but if they are random,
                 we are not their authors.  So we are not free.
3.    Either determinism or indeterminism is true.
4.    Therefore, we never act freely.
It appears that denying determinism is no help in preserving for us some space for genuine freedom.  (We will return to this...!)

2.  Compatibilism
"Hypothetical Choice" Compatibilism  
            I act freely iff
            I am able to act otherwise iff
            I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to.
Free action in this sense is compatible with determinism.  But the reconciliation is unsatisfying;  the fact that I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to is not intuitively enough for free action.   Imagine a kleptomaniac who compulsively and without deliberation grabs any loose change she sees.  That the choice not to steal WOULD have been effective had she been capable of it does not make her action any more free.   Two things have to be added for freedom:  first, her stealing needs to be the result of a choice, and second, the choice is not forced or compelled.   Hence:

Ayer’s "Non-Constraint" Compatibilism
           I act freely iff
           I am able to act otherwise iff
           (i) I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to,
           (ii) the way I actually act is the result of my actual choice,
           (iii) no one compels me to choose as I do (no coercion or duress).
That is, my action is under the control of how I choose, and that choice is unconstrained.  Free action in this sense is meant to be compatible with determinism, but there are problems with (iii).  The hard determinist will say that even though sometimes no one compels me to choose, prior circumstances always compel me to choose as I do.   
    How would Ayer respond?
    Are there other problems with this account of freedom?