David McAdams' Home Page
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Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Professor, Associate Professor of Economics (without tenure), MIT Sloan
Contact Information
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E-mail: mcadams@mit.edu
- E52-448, MIT Sloan School of Management, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142
- Phone: (617) 253-1306, Fax: (617) 258-6855
- Administrative Assistant: Matt Hartman, mlhart@mit.edu, (617) 253-9748
News
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Robert Lloyd (Bobby) McAdams was born on May 18, 2006. Here is a picture in which he is about
three months old and eleven months old.
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Recently published: "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries" (with Michael Schwarz) in American Economic Review, March 2007.
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Recently published: "Adjustable Supply in Uniform Price Auctions: Non-Commitment as a Strategic Tool". Economics Letters, April 2007.
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Recently published: "Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under epsilon-Best Response" (with James Chapman and Harry Paarsch) in American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, May 2007.
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Recently published: "Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit" (with Michael Schwarz) in Inquiry, Summer 2007.
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Recently published: "Uniqueness in Symmetric First-Price Auctions with Affiliation" in Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007.
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Recently published: "Who Pays When Auction Rules are Bent?" (with Michael Schwarz). International Journal of Industrial Organization, October 2007.
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Recently published: "On the Failure of Monotonicity in Uniform-Price Auctions". Journal of Economic Theory, November 2007.
- Media stories: I am quoted in an October 2007 NPR story on Massachusetts' Governor Deval Patrick's plan to auction casino licenses, as well as in a January 2008 NPR story on attempts by the New England Patriots to prevent ticket resale.
- For the classroom: An interesting game-theory vignette on the game-show Jeopardy!, suitable for advanced undergraduates. On Friday March 16th, 2007, all three contestants tied (with a positive balance) for the first time ever. While the press emphasized the unlikeliness of the outcome, theory actually predicts the three-way tie given the player balances going into Final Jeopardy!. In particular, as long as each player seeks to maximize his probability of returning to play again, a three-way tie can emerge in the unique Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies of the Final Jeopardy! subgame. For background information, see the Wall Street Journal article (where I am quoted).
