Research Articles

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Young, L., Saxe, R. (submitted). Innocent Intentions: The neural basis of individual differences in exculpation.

Young, L., Camprodon, J., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., Saxe, R. (submitted). Disrupting neural mechanisms involved in belief attribution impairs moral judgment.

Cushman, F., Young, L., Hauser, M. (submitted). Patterns of moral judgment derive from non-moral psychological representations.

Young, L., Saxe, R. (in press). An fMRI investigation of spontaneous mental state inference for moral judgment. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

Kliemann, D., Young, L., Scholz, J., Saxe, R. (in press). The influence of prior record on moral judgment. Neuropsychologia.

Young, L., Saxe, R. (2008). The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment. NeuroImage, 40, 1912-1920.

Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. PNAS, 104(20), 8235-8240.

Koenigs, M.*, Young, L.*, Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (2007). Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments. Nature, 446, 908-911. *equal contributors

Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Jin, R., Mikhail, J. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language, 22(1), 1-21.

Cushman, F., Young, L., Hauser, M. (2006). The role of conscious reasoning and intuitions in moral judgment: Testing three principles of harm. Psychological Science, 17(12), 1082-1089.

Young, L., Cushman, F., Adolphs, R., Tranel D., and Hauser, M. (2006). Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1-2), 265-278.

Commentary & Review

Young, L., Koenigs, M. (2007). Investigating emotion in moral cognition: a review of evidence from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychology. British Medical Bulletin.

Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., Damasio, A. (in press). Response to G. Kahane & N. Shackel. Nature.

Cushman, F., Young, L., (in press) The philosophy of morality and the psychology of dilemmas. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L., Cushman, F. (in press). Moral intuitions as heuristics. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, S. Stich. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Cushman, F., Young, L., Greene, J. (in press). Our multi-system moral psychology: towards a consensus view. In J. Doris, G. Harman, S. Nichols, J. Prinz, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, S. Stich. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Hauser, M., Young, L., Cushman, F. (2007). Reviving Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Oxford University Press.

Hauser, M., Young, L., Cushman, F. (2007). On Misreading the Linguistic Analogy: Response to Jesse Prinz and Ron Mallon. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity. Oxford University Press.

Cushman, F., Young, L., Hauser, M. (2006). The psychology of Justice: A commentary on Natural Justice by Ken Binmore. Analyse & Kritik, 28, 95-98.