Entrepreneurial Finance and Non-diversifiable Risk

Hui Chen†  Jianjun Miao‡  Neng Wang§

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†MIT Sloan School of Management. Email: huichen@mit.edu. Tel.: 617-324-3896.
‡Department of Economics, Boston University and Xinhua School of Finance and Insurance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. Email: miaoj@bu.edu. Tel.: 617-353-6675.
§Columbia Business School and NBER. Email: neng.wang@columbia.edu. Tel.: 212-854-3869.
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Abstract

Entrepreneurs face significant non-diversifiable business risks. We build a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial firms to demonstrate the important implications of non-diversifiable risks for entrepreneurs’ interdependent consumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit (cash-out and default) decisions. The optimal capital structure is determined by a generalized tradeoff model where risky debt provides significant diversification benefits. Non-diversifiable risks have several important implications: (1) more risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but optimally choose higher leverage, even though leverage makes his equity more risky; (2) lack of diversification causes entrepreneurial firms to underinvest relative to public firms, and allowing for risky debt partially alleviates this problem; (3) entrepreneurial risk aversion can overturn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt. We also examine cash-out option and external equity as additional channels for diversification, and analytically characterize the idiosyncratic risk premium that under-diversified entrepreneurs demand for holding the firm.

Keywords: Default, diversification benefits, entrepreneurial risk aversion, incomplete markets, private equity premium, hedging, capital structure, cash-out option, precautionary saving

JEL Classification: G11, G31, E2
1 Introduction

An entrepreneur is “one who organizes, manages, and assumes the risks of a business or enterprise” (Merriam-Webster). Indeed, lack of diversification is one of the defining characteristics of entrepreneurship. Numerous empirical studies have documented that (i) active businesses account for a large fraction of entrepreneurs’ total wealth (e.g. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) find that about 75 percent of all private equity is owned by households for whom it constitutes at least half of their total net worth), and (ii) entrepreneurial firms tend to have highly concentrated ownership (e.g. Heaton and Lucas (2004) document that in the Survey of Small Business Finances the principal owner of a firm holds on average 81 percent of the firm’s equity, and the median owner wholly owns the firm). As theory of agency conflicts and informational asymmetry (between the entrepreneur and financiers) shows, such concentrated ownership is a way to provide proper incentives for the entrepreneur.

Motivated by both the empirical evidence and the micro theory, we provide a first dynamic incomplete-markets model that explicitly incorporates the effect of non-diversifiable risk on the valuation and intertemporal decision making (investment, financing, business exit) for an entrepreneurial firm. We achieve this objective by unifying a workhorse dynamic corporate finance model (Leland (1994)) with models of incomplete-markets consumption smoothing/precautionary saving (e.g. Friedman (1957), Hall (1978), Deaton (1991)) and dynamic consumption/portfolio choice (e.g. Merton (1971)). We show that non-diversifiable business risk not only generates quantitatively significant effects on dynamic capital budgeting, financing, business exits, and valuation of entrepreneurial firms, but provides a range of novel empirical predictions.

Besides high concentration of equity ownership, another important feature of private businesses is that they predominantly rely on debt for outside funding (see Heaton and Lucas (2004), Robb and Robinson (2009) for US evidence, and Brav (2009) for UK evidence). This could be due to

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1Among the other empirical studies are Gentry and Hubbard (2004), Berger and Udell (1998), Cole and Wolken (1996), and Petersen and Rajan (1994).

2Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) provide evidence that agency considerations play a key role in explaining why entrepreneurs on average hold large ownership shares.

the fact that the small size of many private businesses does not justify the fixed costs for issuing
outside equity. Strong information asymmetry and incentive alignment problems from a diluted
ownership also tend to make debt dominate equity for these firms. As a result, the main forms of
financing for the majority of these firms are inside equity and outside debt.

What determines the optimal amount of debt to issue? Due to market incompleteness, the
diversification benefit of risky debt becomes a key factor in addition to the standard tradeoff
between tax benefits and costs of financial distress. Zame (1993) argues that risky debt has the
advantage in helping complete the markets. Heaton and Lucas (2004) provide the first model of the
diversification benefits of risky debt for entrepreneurial firms in a static setting, and analyze the
interaction between capital budgeting, capital structure, and portfolio choice for the entrepreneur.

We take the insight of Heaton and Lucas to a dynamic setting, and incorporate business exit
cash-out, outside equity, investment/project choice, and tax considerations for the entrepreneurial
firm. These features not only make the model more realistic, but highlight the impact of market
incompleteness on a wide range of firm decisions. For example, like default, the option to cash out
also helps complete the markets and can have large effects on firms’ financing choices. Moreover,
we provide analytical characterization of capital budgeting/hurdle rate, capital structure tradeoff,
and endogenous exit decisions.

We consider a risk-averse entrepreneur with access to an illiquid non-tradable investment
project. The project requires a lump-sum investment to start up, and generates stochastic cash
flows that bear both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Like a consumer, the entrepreneur makes
intertemporal consumption/saving decisions and allocates his liquid wealth between a riskless asset
and a diversified market portfolio (as in Merton (1971)). Like a firm, the entrepreneur also makes
investment/capital budgeting, financing, and exit decisions.

If he chooses to take on the project, the entrepreneur sets up a firm with limited liability (e.g.
limited liability companies (LLC) or an S corporation), which makes debt non-recourse. Moreover,

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4Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that debt often dominates equity in settings with
asymmetric information because debt is less information-sensitive. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers
with low levels of ownership may exert less effort, which is arguably more important to the growth of private businesses
than well-established public firms.
the LLC or S corporation allows the entrepreneur to face single-layer taxation for his business income. In normal business times, the entrepreneur uses business income to service the firm’s debt. If the firm’s revenue falls short of servicing its debt, the entrepreneur may still find it optimal to use his personal savings to service the debt in order to continue to the firm’s operation. However, when revenue becomes sufficiently low, the entrepreneur defaults on the debt, which triggers inefficient liquidation as in classic tradeoff models of corporate finance. If the firm does sufficiently well, he might choose to incur the transaction and other costs (such as taxes), repay the debt in full, and realize the capital gains by selling the firm to cash out. After exiting from his business (cash-out or default), the entrepreneur becomes a regular household and lives only on his financial wealth.

Cash-out and default allow the entrepreneur to achieve diversification benefits. These business exit decisions are essentially (non-tradable) American style options on the illiquid project and take the form of endogenous double-threshold policies.

Importantly, the entrepreneur’s business income and wealth accumulation are endogenously affected by the firm’s capital budgeting, leverage, and business exit decisions. While he can hedge the systematic component of his business risks using the market portfolio, he cannot diversify the idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets, and the idiosyncratic risk exposure will affect his interdependent consumption, investment, financing, and business exit decisions. Such non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk makes entrepreneurial finance distinct from the standard textbook treatment of corporate finance, and can sometimes overturn the predictions of standard finance theory on firm valuation, financing choices, and agency problems.

While we use the entrepreneurial firm as the motivating example, our framework also applies to public firms with concentrated managerial ownership. Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders (e.g. founders or founders’ families/heirs) who have significant cash-flow equity rights in the firms. The lack of investor protection in some countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)) and (concentrated) ownership structure (via dual-class shares, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) for an early cross-country study, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) for East Asian countries, and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western European countries. While the U.S. is often viewed as a country with relatively dispersed ownership, Holderness (2009) provides evidence showing that the US is comparable with other countries in terms of ownership concentration.

5This one-time entrepreneurship assumption does not affect the model’s key economic mechanism (i.e. non-diversifiable risk) in any significant way. We leave extensions to allow for repeat entrepreneurship for future research.
6See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) for an early cross-country study, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) for East Asian countries, and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western European countries. While the U.S. is often viewed as a country with relatively dispersed ownership, Holderness (2009) provides evidence showing that the US is comparable with other countries in terms of ownership concentration.
pyramid-ownership structures, and cross-ownership) entrench under-diversified controlling shareholders and managers, and hence make our model of managerial (entrepreneurial) decision making empirically relevant. Albuquerque and Wang (2009) provide a general-equilibrium incomplete-markets asset pricing model with both controlling shareholders and outside investors. Their focus is on equilibrium asset pricing, rather different from the focus of this paper.

The main results of the model are the following. First, on capital structure, our framework provides a generalized dynamic tradeoff model, where in addition to the standard tradeoff between tax benefits of debt and costs of financial distress/agency (as in Leland (1994)), risky debt also provides diversification benefits. This is because risky debt helps reduce the entrepreneur’s exposure to idiosyncratic business risk by enabling risk sharing in the default states. Hence, he rationally chooses more debt and hence higher leverage for the firm. The options of default and cash-out in our model have important feedback effects on the capital structure and pricing of credit risk. Our analysis also suggests that the natural measure of leverage for entrepreneurial firms is private leverage, defined as the ratio of public (market) value of debt and the private (subjective) value of firm. This private leverage captures the diversification benefits of risky debt and highlights the tradeoff between inside equity and outside debt.

The diversification benefits of debt are large. Even without any tax benefit of debt, the entrepreneurial firm still issues a significant amount of debt. The diversification benefits also lead to a seemingly counterintuitive prediction: more risk-averse entrepreneurs prefer higher leverage. On the one hand, higher leverage increases the risk of the entrepreneur’s equity stake within the firm. On the other hand, higher leverage implies less equity exposure to the entrepreneurial project, making the entrepreneur’s overall portfolio (including both his private equity in the firm and his liquid financial wealth) less risky. This overall portfolio composition effect dominates the high leverage effect within the firm. The more risk-averse the entrepreneur, the stronger the need to reduce his firm risk exposure, therefore the higher the leverage.

Second, due to market incompleteness, the entrepreneur will demand an idiosyncratic risk premium when valuing the firm. We derive an analytical formula for this idiosyncratic risk premium, the key determinants of which are risk aversion, idiosyncratic volatility, and the sensitivity of en-
entrepreneurial value of equity with respect to cash flow. Quantitatively, we show that ignoring the idiosyncratic risk premium can lead to substantial upward bias in firm valuation. One consequence of this bias is that the conventionally used leverage, which does not account for idiosyncratic risk premium, substantially underestimates the leverage of entrepreneurial firms. Based on the survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001), smaller firms are less likely to use CAPM than larger ones. Our theory suggests that small firms are likely run by under-diversified owners/managers who may demand an idiosyncratic risk premium.

Naturally, the idiosyncratic risk premium also affects investment decisions. We extend the standard law-of-one-price-based capital budgeting approach (net present value (NPV) and adjusted present value (APV) analysis) to account for non-diversifiable risk and incomplete markets. We show that market incompleteness leads to underinvestment for entrepreneurial firms (relative to otherwise identical public firms), especially for projects with high idiosyncratic risk. Risky debt can partially alleviate the underinvestment problem by improving diversification.

Third, unlike for the public firm where equityholders have risk seeking incentives (as in Jensen and Meckling (1976)) when risky debt is in place, the entrepreneur may prefer to invest in projects with low idiosyncratic volatility due to his precautionary motive, provided that the firm is not in deep financial distress. This result holds even for very low risk aversion. Our model thus provides a potential explanation for the lack of empirical and survey evidence on asset substitution and risk-shifting incentives (Graham and Harvey (2001)).

Fourth, on option valuation, our model extends the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing methodology to account for the impact of idiosyncratic risk under incomplete markets on (non-tradable) option valuation. The standard dynamic replicating portfolio argument no longer applies, and options can only be valued using utility-based certainty equivalent methodology as we do here. Idiosyncratic volatility now has two opposing effects for option valuation. In addition to the standard positive convexity effect as in Black-Merton-Scholes, the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving motive under incomplete markets implies a negative relation between option value and idiosyncratic volatility, ceteris paribus.

The non-diversifiable risk and concentrated wealth in the business make the entrepreneur value
his equity less than do diversified investors. Thus, compared to a firm owned by well-diversified investors, the entrepreneur defaults earlier on the firm’s debt and cashes out earlier on his business. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) make the observation that equity is a call option on firm assets, and hence is convex in the firm’s cash flows (under complete markets). In our model, inside equity, while also a call option on the entrepreneurial firm’s asset, is not necessarily globally convex in the underlying cash flows. When the entrepreneur’s risk aversion and/or idiosyncratic volatility are sufficiently high, the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand can make his private value of equity concave in cash flows.

Our model generates a rich set of empirical predictions. Consider two otherwise identical firms, one public and one private. First, the private firm will have higher leverage due to diversification arguments. Second, while the standard tradeoff model (e.g. Leland (1994)) predicts leverage decreases with volatility for the public firm, leverage for the private firm might increase with idiosyncratic volatility due to the diversification benefits for entrepreneurs. Third, while the complete-market option pricing analysis suggests that higher idiosyncratic volatility defers the exercise of real options in public firms, our model predicts that more idiosyncratic risk makes the private firm have higher default thresholds and lower cash-out thresholds, hence implying a shorter duration to be private. Finally, our model predicts the private firm has more default risk and thus a higher credit spread.

In a related study, Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009) model the decision of entrepreneurs to go public as the tradeoff between diversification benefits and the costs of losing private control. While their paper studies the pricing and IPO decision for an all equity private firm, we analyze the entrepreneur’s decisions on investment, debt/equity financing, consumption-saving, and business exit (cash-out and default). Another related paper is by Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil (2009), who analyze the impact of idiosyncratic risk on consumption, capital structure, and default, among other issues. They also find that more risk averse owners default more.

In terms of methodology, our paper builds on and contributes to the real options literature. The usual heterogeneity and endogeneity argument/critique applies. Here, the ownership structure is obviously endogenous.

The usual heterogeneity and endogeneity argument/critique applies. Here, the ownership structure is obviously endogenous. See Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) for seminal contributions on real options. See Abel and Eberly (1994) for a unified analysis of investment under uncertainty. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a textbook treatment on real options approach to investment.
and the incomplete-markets consumption smoothing/precautionary saving literature (see Deaton (1992) and Attanasio (1999) for surveys). Unlike Miao and Wang (2007), who analyze a real options model under incomplete markets and all equity financing, we integrate incomplete markets real options model with dynamic corporate finance. For analytical tractability reasons, we adopt the CARA utility specification as in Merton (1971), Caballero (1991), Kimball and Mankiw (1989), and Wang (2006). Our model contributes to this literature by extending the CARA-utility-based precautionary saving problem to allow the entrepreneur to reduce his idiosyncratic risk exposure via financing and exit (i.e. cash-out and default) strategies.

2 Model setup

**Investment opportunities.** An infinitely-lived risk-averse entrepreneur has a take-it-or-leave-it project at time 0, which requires a one-time investment $I$. The project generates a stochastic revenue process $\{y_t : t \geq 0\}$ that follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM):

$$dy_t = \mu y_t dt + \omega y_t dB_t + \epsilon y_t dZ_t, \ y_0 \text{ given},$$  

where $\mu$ is the expected growth rate of revenue, $B_t$ and $Z_t$ are independent standard Brownian motions that provide the sources of market (systematic) and idiosyncratic risks of the private business, respectively. The parameters $\omega$ and $\epsilon$ are the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of revenue growth. The total volatility of revenue growth is

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\omega^2 + \epsilon^2}. \tag{2}$$  

As we will show, the three volatility parameters $\omega$, $\epsilon$, and $\sigma$ have different effects on the entrepreneur’s decision making.

In addition, the entrepreneur has access to standard financial investment opportunities as in Merton (1971).\footnote{It is straightforward to consider entering the labor market as an alternative to running entrepreneurial business, which provides an endogenous opportunity cost of taking on the entrepreneurial project. Such an extension does not} The entrepreneur allocates his liquid financial wealth between a riskfree asset which
pays a constant rate of interest $r$ and a diversified market portfolio with returns $R_t$ satisfying:

$$dR_t = \mu_p dt + \sigma_p dB_t,$$  

(3)

where $\mu_p$ and $\sigma_p$ are the expected return and volatility of the risky asset, respectively, and $B_t$ is the standard Brownian motion introduced earlier. Let

$$\eta = \frac{\mu_p - r}{\sigma_p}$$  

(4)

denote the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, and let $\{x_t: t \geq 0\}$ denote the entrepreneur’s liquid (financial) wealth process. The entrepreneur invests the amount $\phi_t$ in the market portfolio and the remaining amount $x_t - \phi_t$ in the riskfree asset.

**Entrepreneurial firm.** If the entrepreneur decides to invest in the project, he runs it by setting up a limited-liability entity, such as a limited liability company (LLC) or an S corporation. The LLC or S corporation allows the entrepreneur to face single-layer taxation for his business income and makes the debt non-recourse. We may extend the model to allow for personal guarantee of debt to varying degrees. This feature effectively makes debt recourse to varying degrees. The entrepreneur finances the initial one-time lump-sum cost $I$ via his own funds (internal financing) and external financing. In the benchmark case, we assume that the only source of external financing is debt.\footnote{See Petersen and Rajan (2002), Heaton and Lucas (2004), and Brav (2009) for evidence that debt is the primary source of financing for most entrepreneurial firms. In Section\textsuperscript{7} we introduce external equity as an additional source of financing.} One interpretation of the external debt is bank loans. The entrepreneur uses the firm’s assets as collateral to borrow, so that the debt is secured.

We assume that debt is issued at par and is interest-only (consol) for tractability reasons. Let $b$ denote the coupon payment of debt and $F_0$ denote the par value of debt. Debt is priced competitively in that the lenders break even on the risk-adjusted basis. We further assume that debt is only issued at time 0 and remains unchanged until the entrepreneur exits. Allowing for dynamic capital structure before exit will not change the key economic tradeoff that we focus on:
the impact of idiosyncratic risk on entrepreneurial financing decisions.

After debt is in place, at any time $t > 0$, the entrepreneur has three choices: (1) continuing his business; (2) defaulting on the outstanding debt, which leads to the liquidation of his firm; (3) cashing out by selling the firm to a diversified buyer.

While running the business, the entrepreneur receives income from the firm in the form of cash payments (operating profit net of coupon payments). Negative cash payments are interpreted as cash injections by the entrepreneur into the firm. Notice that trading riskless bonds and the diversified market portfolio alone can not help the entrepreneur diversify the idiosyncratic business risk. He can sell the firm and cash out, which incurs a fixed transaction cost $K$. The default timing $T_d$ and cash-out timing $T_u$ are not contractible at time 0. Instead, the entrepreneur chooses the default/cash-out policy to maximize his own utility after he chooses the time-0 debt level. Thus, there is an inevitable conflict of interest between financiers and the entrepreneur. The choices of default and cash-out resemble American-style put and call options on the underlying non-tradeable entrepreneurial firm. Since markets are incomplete for the entrepreneur, we cannot price the entrepreneur’s options using the standard dynamic replication argument (Black-Scholes-Merton).

At bankruptcy, the outside lenders take control and liquidates/sells the firm. Bankruptcy ex post is costly as in standard tradeoff models of capital structure. We assume that the liquidation/sale value of the firm is equal to a fraction $\alpha$ of the value of an all equity (unlevered) public firm, $A(y)$. The remaining fraction $(1 - \alpha)$ is lost due to bankruptcy costs. We also assume that absolute priority is enforced, and abstract away from any ex post renegotiation between the lenders and the entrepreneur.

Before the entrepreneur can sell the firm, he needs to retire the firm’s debt obligation at par $F_0$. We make the standard assumption that the buyer is well diversified. He will optimally relever the firm as in the complete-markets model of Leland (1994). The value of the firm after sale is the value of an optimally levered public firm, $V^*(y)$.

After the entrepreneur exits from his business (through default or cash-out), he “retires” and lives on his financial income. He then faces a standard complete-markets consumption and portfolio
choice problem.

**Taxes** We consider a simple tax environment. The entrepreneurial firm pays taxes on his business profits at rate $\tau_e$. When $\tau_e > 0$, issuing debt has the benefit of shielding part of the entrepreneur’s business profits from taxes. For a public firm, the effective marginal tax rate is $\tau_m$. Unlike the entrepreneurial firm, the public firm is subject to double taxation (at the corporate and individual levels), and $\tau_m$ captures the net tax rate (following Miller (1977)). Finally, $\tau_g$ denotes the tax rate on the capital gains upon sale. Naturally, higher capital gain taxes will delay the timing of cash-out.

**Entrepreneur’s objective** The entrepreneur derives utility from consumption $\{c_t : t \geq 0\}$ according to the following time-additive utility function:

$$E \left[ \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} u(c_t) \, dt \right], \quad (5)$$

where $\delta > 0$ is the entrepreneur’s subjective discount rate and $u(\cdot)$ is an increasing and concave function. The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize his lifetime utility by optimally choosing consumption ($c_t$), financial portfolio ($\phi_t$), and whether to start his business. If he starts his business, he also chooses the financing structure of the firm (coupon $b$), and the subsequent timing decisions of default and cash-out ($T_d, T_u$).

### 3 Model solution

First, in Section 3.1 we report the complete-markets solution for firm value and financing decisions when the firm is owned by diversified investors. Then, we analyze the entrepreneur’s consumption/saving, portfolio choice, default, and initial investment and financing decisions. The complete-markets solution of Section 3.1 serves as a natural benchmark for us to analyze the impact of non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk on entrepreneurial investment, financing and valuation.

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11Extending our model to allow for sequential rounds of entrepreneurial activities will complicate our analysis. We leave this extension for future research.
3.1 Complete-markets firm valuation and financing policy

Consider a public firm owned by diversified investors. Because equityholders internalize the benefits and costs of debt issuance, they will choose the firm’s debt policy to maximize *ex ante* firm value by trading off the tax benefits of debt against bankruptcy and agency costs. The results in this case are well-known.\(^\text{12}\) In Appendix A, we provide the after-tax value of an unlevered public firm \(A(y)\) in equation (A.19), and the after-tax value of a public levered firm \(V^*(y)\) in equation (A.21).

Next, we turn to analyzing the entrepreneur’s decision problem under incomplete markets.

3.2 Entrepreneur’s problem

The significant lack of diversification invalidates the standard finance textbook valuation analysis for firms owned by diversified investors. As a result, the standard two-step complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) analysis\(^\text{13}\) (i.e., first value maximization and then optimal consumption allocation) no longer applies. This non-separability between value maximization and consumption smoothing has important implications for real economic activities (e.g. investment and financing) and the valuation of entrepreneurial firm-related financial claims.

We solve the entrepreneur’s problem by backward induction. First, we summarize the entrepreneur’s consumption/saving and portfolio choice problem after he retires from his business via either cashing out or defaulting on debt. This “retirement-stage” optimization problem is the same as in Merton (1971), a dynamic complete-markets consumption/portfolio choice problem. Second, we solve the entrepreneur’s joint consumption/saving, portfolio choice, and default decisions when the entrepreneur runs his private business. Third, we determine the entrepreneur’s exit decisions (cash-out and default boundaries) by comparing his value functions just before and after retirement. Finally, we solve the entrepreneur’s initial (time-0) investment and financing decisions taking his future decisions into account.

Conceptually, our model setup applies to any utility function \(u(c)\) under technical regularity

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\(^{12}\) For example, see Leland (1994), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Miao (2005).

\(^{13}\) Cox and Huang (1989) apply this insight to separate intertemporal portfolio choices from consumption in continuous-time diffusion settings.
conditions. For analytical tractability, we adopt the CARA utility throughout the remainder of the paper. That is, let \( u(c) = -e^{-\gamma c}/\gamma \), where \( \gamma > 0 \) is coefficient of absolute risk aversion, which also measures precautionary motive. We emphasize that the main results and insights of our paper (the effect of non-diversifiable idiosyncratic shocks on investment timing) do not rely on the choice of this utility function. As we show below, the driving force of our results is the precautionary savings effect, which is captured by utility functions with convex marginal utility such as CARA (see Leland (1968) and Kimball (1990)). While CARA utility does not capture wealth effects, it helps reduce the dimension of our double-barrier free-boundary problem, which makes the problem much more tractable compared to constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility.

**Consumption/saving and portfolio choice after exit.** After exiting from his business (via either default or cash-out), the entrepreneur no longer has any business income, and lives on his financial wealth. The entrepreneur’s optimization problem becomes the standard complete-market consumption and portfolio choice problem (e.g. Merton (1971)). The entrepreneur’s wealth follows

\[
    dx_t = (r(x_t - \phi_t) - c_t) \, dt + \phi_t (\mu_{\rho} dt + \sigma_{\rho} dB_t).
\]

(6)

The consumption and portfolio rules are given by

\[
    c(x) = r \left( x + \frac{\eta^2}{2\gamma r^2} + \frac{\delta - r}{\gamma r^2} \right),
\]

(7)

\[
    \phi(x) = \frac{\eta}{\gamma r \sigma_{\rho}}.
\]

(8)

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15 An undesirable feature of CARA-utility models is that consumption and wealth could potentially turn negative. Cox and Huang (1989) provide analytical formulae for consumption under complete markets for CARA utility with non-negativity constraints. In our incomplete-markets setting, imposing non-negativity constraints substantially complicates the analysis. Intuitively, requiring consumption to be positive increases the entrepreneur’s demand for precautionary saving because he will increase his saving today to avoid hitting the constraints in the future. The induced stronger precautionary saving demand will likely strengthen our results (such as diversification benefits of outside risky debt).
Entrepreneur’s decision making while running the firm. Before exit, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth evolves as follows:

\[ dx_t = (r (x_t - \phi_t) + (1 - \tau_e) (y - b) - \xi_t) dt + \phi_t (\mu_p dt + \sigma_p dB_t), \quad 0 < t < \min (T_d, T_u). \] (9)

The principle of optimality implies that the entrepreneur’s value function \( J^*(x, y) \) satisfies the following HJB equation:

\[
\delta J^*(x, y) = \max_{c, \phi} \left[ u(c) + (rx + \phi (\mu_p - r) + (1 - \tau_e) (y - b) - c) J^*_x(x, y) + \mu y J^*_y(x, y) + \phi \sigma_p \omega y J^*_{xy}(x, y) \right].
\] (10)

The first-order conditions (FOCs) for consumption \( c \) and portfolio allocation \( \phi \) are as follows:

\[
u^* = J^*_x(x, y),
\] (11)

\[
\phi = \frac{-J^*_y(x, y)}{J^*_x(x, y)} \frac{\mu_p - r}{\sigma_p^2} + \frac{-J^*_{xy}(x, y) \omega y}{J^*_x(x, y) \sigma_p}.
\] (12)

We summarize the solution for consumption/saving, portfolio choice, default trigger \( y_d \), and cash-out trigger \( y_u \) in the following theorem.

**Theorem 1** The entrepreneur exits from his business when the revenue process \( \{y_t: t \geq 0\} \) reaches either the default threshold \( y_d \) or the cash-out threshold \( y_u \), whichever comes first. Prior to exit, for given liquid wealth \( x \) and revenue \( y \), he chooses his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi(x, y) &= r \left( x + G'(y) + \frac{\eta^2}{2 \gamma r^2} + \frac{\delta - r}{\gamma r^2} \right), \\
\phi(x, y) &= \frac{\eta}{\gamma r \sigma_p} - \frac{\omega}{\sigma_p} y G'(y),
\end{align*}
\] (13) (14)

where \( G(\cdot) \) and \( y_d \) solve the free boundary problem given by the differential equation:

\[
r G(y) = (1 - \tau_e) (y - b) + (\mu - \omega \eta) y G'(y) + \frac{\sigma_p^2 y^2}{2} G''(y) - \frac{\gamma r e y^2}{2} G'(y)^2,
\] (15)
subject to the following (free) boundary conditions:

\begin{align}
G(y_d) &= 0, \tag{16a} \\
G'(y_d) &= 0, \tag{16b} \\
G(y_u) &= V^*(y_u) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (V^*(y_u) - K - I), \tag{16c} \\
G'(y_u) &= (1 - \tau_g)V^{*'}(y_u), \tag{16d}
\end{align}

where complete-markets firm value $V^*(y)$ is defined in (A.21), and the value of external debt $F_0 = F(y_0)$ is given in (C.4).

Equation (13) states that consumption is equal to the annuity value of the sum of financial wealth $x$, certainty equivalent wealth $G(y)$, which is the risk-adjusted subjective value of the private business, and two constant terms capturing the effects of the expected excess returns and the wedge $\delta - r$ on consumption. Equation (14) gives the entrepreneur’s portfolio holding, where the first term is the standard mean-variance term as in Merton (1971), and the second term gives the entrepreneur’s hedging demand as he uses the market portfolio to dynamically hedge the entrepreneurial business risk.

The differential equation (15) provides a valuation equation for the certainty equivalent wealth $G(y)$ from the entrepreneur’s perspective. In the standard CAPM model, only systematic risk demands a risk premium. Since the systematic volatility of revenue growth is $\omega$, the risk-adjusted expected growth rate of revenue in the CAPM model is

$$\nu = \mu - \omega \eta. \tag{17}$$

If we drop the last nonlinear term in (15), the differential equation becomes the standard pricing equation: equating the instantaneous expected return of an asset under the risk-neutral measure (RHS) to the risk-free rate (LHS). The last term in (15) captures the additional discount due to non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. Intuitively, the higher the risk aversion parameter $\gamma$ or the idiosyncratic volatility of revenue $\epsilon_y$, the larger the discount on $G(y)$ due to idiosyncratic risk. The
next section provides more detailed analysis on the impact of idiosyncratic risk on $G(y)$.

Equation (16a) comes from the value-matching condition for the entrepreneur’s default decision. It states that the private value of equity $G(y)$ upon default is equal to zero. Equation (16b), often referred to as the smooth-pasting condition, is the optimality condition for the entrepreneur in choosing default.

Now we turn to the cash-out boundary. Because the entrepreneur pays the fixed cost $K$ and triggers capital gains when cashing out, he naturally has incentive to wait before cashing out. However, waiting also reduces his diversification benefits ceteris paribus. The entrepreneur optimally trades off tax implications, diversification benefits, and transaction costs when choosing the timing of cashing out. The value-matching condition (16c) states that the private value of equity upon cashing out is equal to the after-tax value of the public firm value after the entrepreneur pays the fixed costs $K$, retires outstanding debt at par $F_0$, and pays capital gains taxes. The smooth-pasting condition (16d) ensures that the entrepreneur optimally chooses his cash-out decision.

**Initial financing and investment decisions.** Next, we complete the model solution by endogenizing the entrepreneur’s initial investment and financing decision. The entrepreneurial firm has two financial claimants: inside equity (entrepreneur) and outside creditors. The entrepreneur values his ownership at a certainty equivalent value $G(y)$. Diversified lenders price debt in competitive capital markets at $F(y)$, which does not contain the idiosyncratic risk premium because outside investors are fully diversified. Thus, the total *private value* of the entrepreneurial firm is

$$S(y) = G(y) + F(y). \quad (18)$$

We may interpret $S(y)$ as the total value that an investor needs to pay in order to acquire the entrepreneurial firm by buying out the entrepreneur and the debtholders.

We show that, at time 0, the optimal coupon $b$ maximizes the private value of the firm:

$$b^* = \arg\max_b S(y_0; b). \quad (19)$$
This result arises from the entrepreneur’s utility maximization problem stated in (B.11). Note the conflicts of interest between the entrepreneur and external financiers. After debt is in place, the entrepreneur will no longer maximize the total value of the firm $S(y)$, but his private value of equity $G(y)$. Theorem 1 captures this conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and outside creditors.

The last step is to characterize whether the entrepreneur wants to undertake the project. He makes the investment and starts up the firm at time 0 if his lifetime utility with the project is higher than that without the project. This is equivalent to the condition that $S(y_0) > I$.

We may interpret our model’s implication on capital structure as a generalized tradeoff model of capital structure for the entrepreneurial firm, where the entrepreneur trades off the benefits of outside debt financing (diversification and potential tax implications) against the costs of debt financing (bankruptcy and agency conflicts between the entrepreneur and outside lenders). The natural measure of leverage from the entrepreneur’s point of view is the ratio between the public value of debt $F(y)$ and the private value of firm $S(y)$,

$$L(y) = \frac{F(y)}{S(y)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

We label $L(y)$ as private leverage to reflect the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the leverage choice. The entrepreneur’s preferences (e.g. risk aversion) influence the firm’s capital structure. The standard argument that shareholders can diversify for themselves and hence diversification plays no role in the capital structure decisions of public firms is no longer valid for entrepreneurial firms.

Our discussions have focused on the parameter regions where the entrepreneur first establishes his firm as a private business and finances its operation via an optimal mix of outside debt and inside equity. For completeness, we now point out two special cases. First, when the cost of cashing out is sufficiently small, it can be optimal for the entrepreneur to sell the firm immediately ($y_u = y_0$). The other special case is when asset recovery rate is sufficiently high, or the entrepreneur is sufficiently risk averse, so that he raises as much debt as possible and defaults immediately ($y_d = y_0$). Both cases lead to immediate exit. In our analysis below, we focus on parameter regions that rule out these cases.
4 Risky debt, endogenous default, and diversification

We now investigate a special case of the model in Theorem 1 which highlights the diversification benefits of risky debt. For this purpose, we shut down the cash-out option (by setting the cash-out cost $K$ to infinity, making the cash-out option worthless).

We use the following (annualized) baseline parameter values: riskfree interest rate $r = 3\%$, expected growth rate of revenue $\mu = 4\%$, systematic volatility of growth rate $\omega = 10\%$, idiosyncratic volatility $\varepsilon = 20\%$, market price of risk $\eta = 0.4$, and asset recovery rate $\alpha = 0.6$. We set the effective marginal Miller tax rate $\tau_m$ to 11.29% as in Graham (2000) and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007). In our baseline parametrization, we set $\tau_e = 0$, which reflects the fact that the entrepreneur can avoid taxes on his business income completely by deducting various expenses. Shutting down the tax benefits also allows us to highlight the diversification benefits of debt. Later, we consider the case where $\tau_e = \tau_m$, which can be directly compared with the complete-markets model. We set the entrepreneur’s rate of time preference $\delta = 3\%$, and consider three values of the risk aversion parameter $\gamma \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. Finally, we set the initial level of revenue $y_0 = 1$.

**Private value of equity $G(y)$ and default threshold.** Figure 1 plots private value of equity $G(y)$ and its derivative $G'(y)$ as functions of $y$. The top and the bottom panels plot the results for $\tau_e = 0$ and $\tau_e = \tau_m$, respectively. When $\tau_e = 0$, the entrepreneur with very low risk aversion ($\gamma \to 0$, effectively complete-markets) issues no debt, because there are neither tax benefits ($\tau_e = 0$) nor diversification benefits ($\gamma \to 0$). Equity value is equal to the present discounted value of future cash flows (the straight dash line shown in the top-left panel). A risk-averse entrepreneur has incentive to issue debt in order to diversify idiosyncratic risk. The entrepreneur defaults when $y$ falls to $y_d$, the point where $G(y_d) = G'(y_d) = 0$. When $\tau_e = \tau_m$, the entrepreneurial firm issues debt to take advantage of tax benefits in addition to diversification benefits. The bottom two panels of Figure 1 plot this case.

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\[16\] We may interpret $\tau_m$ as the effective Miller tax rate which integrates the corporate income tax, individual’s equity and interest income tax. Using the Miller’s formula for the effective tax rate, and setting the interest income tax at 0.30, corporate income tax at 0.31, and the individual’s long-term equity (distribution) tax at 0.10, we obtain an effective tax rate of 11.29%. 

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Figure 1: **Private value of equity** $G(y)$: debt financing only. The top and bottom panels plot $G(y)$ and its first derivative $G'(y)$ for $\tau_e = 0$ and $\tau_e = \tau_m$, respectively. We plot the results for two levels of risk aversion ($\gamma = 1, 2$) and the benchmark complete-market solution ($\gamma \to 0$).

The derivative $G'(y)$ measures the sensitivity of private value of equity $G(y)$ with respect to revenue $y$. As expected, private value of equity $G(y)$ increases with revenue $y$, i.e., $G'(y) > 0$. Analogous to Black-Scholes-Merton’s observation that firm equity is a call option on firm assets, the entrepreneur’s private equity $G(y)$ also has a call option feature. For example, in the bottom panels of Figure 1 ($\tau_e = \tau_m$), when $\gamma$ approaches 0 (complete markets case), equity value is convex in revenue $y$, reflecting its call option feature.

Unlike the standard Black-Scholes-Merton paradigm, neither the entrepreneurial equity nor the firm is tradable. When the risk-averse entrepreneur cannot fully diversify his project’s idiosyncratic risk, the global convexity of $G(y)$ no longer holds, as shown in Figure 1 for cases where $\gamma > 0$. The entrepreneur now has precautionary saving demand to partially buffer against the project’s
non-diversifiable idiosyncratic shocks. This precautionary saving effect induces concavity in $G(y)$. When revenue $y$ is large, the precautionary saving effect is large due to high idiosyncratic volatility $\epsilon y$, and the option (convexity) effect is small because the default option is further out of the money. Therefore, the precautionary saving effect dominates the option effect for sufficiently high $y$, making $G(y)$ concave in $y$ for high $y$. The opposite is true for low $y$, where the convexity effect dominates.

The precautionary saving effect also causes a more risk-averse entrepreneur to discount cash flows at a higher rate. For a given level of coupon $b$, the entrepreneur values his inside equity lower (smaller $G(y)$), thus is more willing to default and walk away. Moreover, a more risk-averse entrepreneur also has a stronger incentive to diversify idiosyncratic risk by selling a bigger share of his firm, which implies a larger coupon $b$, a higher default threshold, and a higher debt value, ceteris paribus. The two effects reinforce each other. Figure 1 confirms that both $G(y)$ and the default threshold $y_d$ increase with risk aversion $\gamma$.

**Capital structure for entrepreneurial firms.** First, we consider the special case where risky debt only offers diversification benefits for the entrepreneur and has no tax benefits ($\tau_e = 0$). Then, we incorporate the tax benefits of debt into our analysis.

The top panel in Table 1 provides results for the entrepreneurial firm’s capital structure when $\tau_e = 0$. If the entrepreneur is very close to being risk neutral ($\gamma \rightarrow 0$), the model’s prediction is essentially the same as the complete-market benchmark. In this case, the standard tradeoff theory of capital structure implies that the entrepreneurial firm will be entirely financed by equity (since debt provides no benefits). The risk-neutral entrepreneur values the firm at its market value 33.33.

For $\gamma = 1$, the entrepreneur borrows $F_0 = 8.28$ in market value with coupon $b = 0.31$, and values his non-tradable equity $G_0$ at 14.39, giving the private value of the firm $S_0 = 22.68$. The drop in $S_0$ is substantial (from 33.33 to 22.68, or about 32%) when increasing $\gamma$ from zero to one. This drop in $S_0$ is mainly due to the risk-averse entrepreneur’s discount of his non-tradable equity position for bearing non-diversifiable idiosyncratic business risks. The default risk of debt contributes little to the reduction of $S_0$ (the 10-year cumulative default probability rises from 0 to 0.4% only).

In Section 3 we introduced the natural measure of leverage for entrepreneurial firms: private
Table 1: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: Debt financing only.

This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur only has access to debt financing and no option to cash out. The parameters are reported in Section 4. The initial revenue is $y_0 = 1$. We report results for two business income tax rates ($\tau_e = 0\%, 11.29\% (\tau_m)$) and three levels of risk aversion. The case “$\gamma \to 0$” corresponds to the complete-markets (Leland) model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma \to 0$</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$F_0$</th>
<th>$G_0$</th>
<th>$S_0$</th>
<th>$L_0$</th>
<th>$CS$</th>
<th>$p_d(10)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_e = 0$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>22.68</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma \to 0$</th>
<th>$b$</th>
<th>$F_0$</th>
<th>$G_0$</th>
<th>$S_0$</th>
<th>$L_0$</th>
<th>$CS$</th>
<th>$p_d(10)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_e = \tau_m$</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>30.12</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>14.85</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>21.86</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

leverage $L_0$, given by the ratio of public debt value $F_0$ to private value of the firm $S_0$. Private leverage $L_0$ naturally arises from the entrepreneur’s maximization problem and captures the entrepreneur’s tradeoff between private value of equity and public value of debt in choosing debt coupon policy. For $\gamma = 1$, the private leverage ratio is about 36.5%.

With a higher risk aversion level $\gamma = 2$, the entrepreneur borrows more ($F_0 = 14.66$) with a higher coupon ($b = 0.68$). He values his remaining non-tradable equity at $G_0 = 5.89$, and the implied private leverage ratio $L_0 = 71.3\%$ is much higher than 36.5\%, the value for $\gamma = 1$. The more risk-averse entrepreneur takes on more leverage, because he has stronger incentive to sell more of the firm to achieve greater diversification benefits. With greater risk aversion, default is more likely (the 10-year cumulative default probability is 12.1\%), and the credit spread is higher (166 basis points over the riskfree rate).

Next, we incorporate the effect of tax benefits for the entrepreneur into our generalized tradeoff model of capital structure for entrepreneurial firms. To compare with the complete-markets benchmark, we set $\tau_e = \tau_m = 11.29\%$. Therefore, the only difference between an entrepreneurial firm
and a public firm is that the entrepreneur faces non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk.

The first row of the lower panel of Table 1 gives the results for the complete-markets benchmark. Facing positive corporate tax rates, the public firm wants to issue debt, but is also concerned with bankruptcy costs. The optimal tradeoff for the public firm is to issue debt at the competitive market value $F_0 = 9.29$ with coupon $b = 0.35$. The implied initial leverage is 30.9% and the 10-year cumulative default probability is tiny (0.3%).

Similar to the case with $\tau_e = 0$, an entrepreneur facing non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk wants to issue more risky debt to diversify these risks. The second panel of Table 1 shows that the entrepreneur with $\gamma = 1$ borrows 14.85 (with the coupon rate $b = 0.68$), higher than the level for the public firm. The private leverage more than doubles to 67.9%. Not surprisingly, the entrepreneur faces a higher default probability and the credit spread of his debt is also higher. With $\gamma = 2$, debt issuance increases to 16.50, and private leverage increases to 81.4%.

**Determinants of capital structure decisions.** To further demonstrate the important role of idiosyncratic risk in determining the capital structure of entrepreneurial firms, we now turn to two comparisons.

First, consider an econometrician who has correctly identified the entrepreneurial firm’s debt coupon $b = 0.85$ and default threshold $y_d = 0.47$, but does not realize that the entrepreneur’s subjective valuation $G(y; b, y_d)$ is lower than the corresponding public equity value $E(y; b, y_d)$ due to non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. Indeed, he assigns the entrepreneur’s equity with a value at $E_0 = 11.10$ instead of the subjective valuation $G_0 = 3.77$, thus obtaining a leverage ratio of 59.8%, substantially lower than the entrepreneur’s private leverage $L_0 = 81.4%$. The large difference between the private and market leverage ratios highlights the economic significance of taking idiosyncratic risk into account. Simply put, standard corporate finance methodology potentially underestimates the leverage of entrepreneurial firms.

Second, we highlight the impact of the entrepreneur’s endogenous default decision. The public and the entrepreneurial firms have significantly different leverage decisions because both debt issuance and default decisions on debt (given the same level of debt coupon outstanding) are dif-
Table 2: Decomposition of Private Leverage for Entrepreneurial Firms

This table compares a private firm owned by a risk-averse entrepreneur with a public firm. There is no option to cash out. We assume $\tau_e = \tau_m$, while the rest of the parameters are reported in Section 4. All the results are for initial revenue $y_0 = 1$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10-yr default probability (%)</th>
<th>public debt</th>
<th>equity value</th>
<th>firm value</th>
<th>financial leverage (%)</th>
<th>credit spread (bp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2 \ (b = 0.85, y_d = 0.47)$</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>20.27</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public ($b = 0.85, y_d = 0.47$)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>27.60</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public ($b = 0.85, y_d = 0.35$)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>29.26</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public ($b = 0.35, y_d = 0.14$)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.29</td>
<td>20.82</td>
<td>30.11</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Different. To see the quantitative effects of endogenous default decisions on leverage, we hold the coupon rate on outstanding debt fixed. That is, consider a public firm that has the same technology/environment parameters as the entrepreneurial firm. Moreover, the two firms have the same debt coupons ($b = 0.85$).

Facing the same coupon $b = 0.85$, the public firm defaults when revenue reaches the default threshold $y_d = 0.35$, which is lower than the threshold $y_d = 0.47$ for the entrepreneurial firm. Intuitively, facing the same coupon $b$, the entrepreneurial firm defaults earlier than the public firm because of the entrepreneur’s aversion to non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The implied shorter distance-to-default for the entrepreneurial firm translates into a higher 10-year default probability (22% for the entrepreneurial firm versus 10% for the public firm) and a higher credit spread (213 basis points for the entrepreneurial firm versus 178 basis points for the public firm). Defaulting optimally for the public firm raises its value from $S_0 = 27.60$ to $S_0 = 29.26$.

The preceding two comparisons help explain the differences in leverage ratios between the entrepreneurial firm and the public firm. First, fixing both the coupon and the default threshold, the entrepreneur’s subjective valuation (due to non-diversifiable risks) has significant impact on the implied leverage ratio. Ignoring subjective valuation substantially underestimates the entrepreneurial firm’s leverage. Second, facing the same coupon, the entrepreneurial firm defaults earlier than the public firm, which reduces the value of debt and lowers the leverage ratio, but the quantitative effect
seems small. Third, diversification motives make the entrepreneur issue more debt than the public firm, which further raises the leverage ratio of the entrepreneurial firm. While the numerical results are parameter specific, the analysis provides support for our intuition that the entrepreneur’s need for diversification and subjective valuation discount for bearing non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk are key determinants of the private leverage for an entrepreneurial firm.

5 Cash-out option as an alternative channel of diversification

We now turn to a richer and more realistic setting where the entrepreneur can diversify idiosyncratic risk through both the default and cash-out options. The entrepreneur avoids the downside risk by defaulting if the firm’s stochastic revenue falls to a sufficiently low level. In addition, when the firm does well enough, the entrepreneur may want to capitalize on the upside by selling the firm to diversified investors.

In addition to the baseline parameter values from Section 4, we set the effective capital gains tax rate from selling the business $\tau_g = 10\%$, reflecting the tax deferral advantage of the tax timing option. We set the initial investment cost for the project $I = 10$, which is $1/3$ of the market value of project cash-flows. We choose the cash-out cost $K = 27$ to generate a 10-year cash-out probability of about 20% (with $\gamma = 2$), consistent with the success rates of venture capital firms (Hall and Woodward (2008)).

Cash-out option: Crowding out debt. Figure 2 plots the private value of equity $G(y)$ and its first derivative $G'(y)$ for an entrepreneur with risk aversion $\gamma = 1$ when he has the option to cash out. The function $G(y)$ smoothly touches the horizontal axis on the left and the dash line denoting the value of cashing out on the right. The two tangent points give the default and cash-out thresholds, respectively. For sufficiently low values of revenue $y$, the private value of equity $G(y)$ is increasing and convex because the default option is deep in the money. For sufficiently high values of $y$, $G(y)$ is also increasing and convex because the cash-out option is deep in the money. For revenue $y$ in the intermediate range, neither default nor cash-out option is deep in the money. In

\footnote{In Appendix D.1, we investigate the effects of different capital gain taxes.}
Figure 2: **Private value of equity** $G(y)$: debt financing and cash-out option. The left panel plots the private value of equity $G(y)$ as a function of revenue $y$, and the right panel plots its first derivative.

In this range, the precautionary saving motive may be large enough to induce concavity. As shown in the right panel of Figure 1, $G'(y)$ first increases for low values of $y$, then decreases for intermediate values of $y$, and finally increases for high values of $y$.

**Table 3** provides the capital structure information of an entrepreneurial firm with both cash-out and default options. Again we consider the two cases $\tau_e = 0$ and $\tau_e = \tau_m$.

When markets are complete, with $\tau_e = 0$, there is no reason for the firm to issue debt or going public. Thus, the optimal leverage and the cash-out probability will both be zero. When $\tau_e$ is positive, the firm’s cash-out option is essentially an option to adjust the firm’s capital structure (recall that there is no diversification benefit for public firms). In this case, given our calibrated fixed cost $K$, the 10-year cash-out probability is essentially zero and hence this option value is close to zero for the public firm. Therefore, we expect that the bulk of the cash-out option value for entrepreneurial firms will come from the diversification benefits, not from the option value of readjusting leverage.

For a risk-averse entrepreneur, the prospect of cashing out lowers the firm’s incentive to issue debt. When $\tau_e = 0$ and $\gamma = 1$, debt coupon falls from $b = 0.31$ for the firm with only the default option to $0.12$ when the cash-out option is added, and the private leverage ratio at issuance falls
Table 3: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: debt financing and cash-out option

This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to both public debt financing and cash-out option to exit from his project. We report results for two business income tax rates ($\tau_e = 0$, $\tau_e = \tau_m (11.29\%)$), and we choose $I = 10$, $K = 27$, $\tau_g = 10\%$, $y_0 = 1$. The rest of the parameters are from the benchmark case in Section 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\tau_e = 0$</th>
<th>$\tau_e = \tau_m$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma \rightarrow 0$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from $L_0 = 36.5\%$ to $15.7\%$. The 10-year default probability is close to zero, but the 10-year cash-out probability is $9.2\%$, which is economically significant. For more risk averse entrepreneurs (e.g. $\gamma = 2$), the private leverage ratio is $50.9\%$, smaller than $71.3\%$ for the setting without the cash-out option. While a higher tax rate $\tau_e$ does increase the amount of debt the firm issues, the impact of the cash-out option is qualitatively similar to the no-tax case. Thus, given the opportunity to sell his business to public investors, the entrepreneur substitutes away from risky debt and relies more on the future potential of cashing out to diversify his idiosyncratic risk.

Idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and risk premium. We now turn to the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on leverage and the risk premium for equity. Figure 3 shows its effect on leverage. In complete-markets models, an increase in (idiosyncratic) volatility $\epsilon$ raises default risk, hence the market leverage ratio and the coupon rate for the public firm decrease with idiosyncratic volatility. By contrast, risk-averse entrepreneurs take on more debt to diversify their idiosyncratic risk when $\epsilon$ is higher. For $\gamma = 1$, both coupon and leverage become monotonically increasing in $\epsilon$. This
Figure 3: **Comparative statics – optimal coupon and private leverage with respect to idiosyncratic volatilities $\varepsilon$: the case of debt and cash-out option.** The two panels plot the optimal coupon $b$ and the corresponding optimal private leverage $L_0$ at $y_0 = 1$. In each case, we plot the results for two levels of risk aversion ($\gamma = 1, 2$) alongside the benchmark complete-market solution ($\gamma \to 0$).

Result implies that the private leverage ratio for entrepreneurial firms increases with idiosyncratic volatility even for mild risk aversion.

For public firms, the risk premium for equity is determined by the firm’s non-diversifiable systematic risk. For entrepreneurial firms, both systematic and idiosyncratic risks matter for the risk premium. Without loss of generality, we decompose the entrepreneur’s risk premium into two components: the systematic risk premium $\pi^s(y)$ and the idiosyncratic risk premium $\pi^i(y)$. Rearranging the valuation equation (15) gives:

$$\pi^s(y) = \eta \omega \frac{G'(y)}{G(y)} y = \eta \omega \frac{d\ln G(y)}{d\ln y},$$

$$\pi^i(y) = \gamma r \frac{\varepsilon y G'(y))^2}{2 G(y)}.$$  

The systematic risk premium $\pi^s(y)$ defined in (21) takes the same form as in standard asset pricing models. It is the product of the (market) Sharpe ratio $\eta$, systematic volatility $\omega$, and the elasticity of $G(y)$ with respect to $y$, where the elasticity captures the impact of optionality on the risk premium.\(^{18}\)

\(^{18}\)Despite this standard interpretation for the systematic risk premium, it is worth pointing out that $\pi^s(y)$ also
Figure 4: **Systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium.** This figure plots the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium for entrepreneurial firms. The top panels plot the results for two levels of risk aversion ($\gamma = 2, 4$). The bottom panels plot the results for two levels of idiosyncratic volatility ($\epsilon = 0.20, 0.25$). We assume $\gamma = 2$ when changing $\epsilon$, and $\epsilon = 0.2$ when changing $\gamma$.

Unlike $\pi_s(y)$, the idiosyncratic risk premium $\pi_i(y)$ defined in (22) directly depends on risk aversion $\gamma$ and $(\epsilon y G'(y))^2$, the conditional (idiosyncratic) variance of the entrepreneur’s equity $G(y)$. The conditional (idiosyncratic) variance term reflects the fact that the idiosyncratic risk premium $\pi_i(y)$ is determined by the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand, which depends on the conditional variance of idiosyncratic risk (Caballero (1991) and Wang (2006)).

We examine the behavior of these risk premia in Figure 4. The entrepreneur’s equity is a levered position in the firm. When the firm approaches default, the systematic component of the risk premium $\pi_s(y)$ behaves similarly to the standard valuation model. That is, the significant leverage effect around the default boundary implies that the systematic risk premium diverges to infinity when $y$ approaches $y_d$. When the firm approaches the cash-out threshold, the cash-out indirectly reflects the non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk that the entrepreneur bears, and risk aversion $\gamma$ indirectly affects $\pi_s(y)$ through its impact on $G(y)$.  

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option makes the firm value more sensitive to cash flow shocks, which also tends to raise the systematic risk premium.

The idiosyncratic risk premium $\pi^i (y)$ behaves quite differently. Figure 4 indicates that the idiosyncratic risk premium is small when the firm is close to default, and it increases with $y$ for most values of $y$. The intuition is as follows. The numerator in (22) reflects the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand, which depends on the conditional idiosyncratic variance of the changes in the certainty equivalent value of equity $G(y)$ and risk aversion $\gamma$. Both the conditional idiosyncratic variance and $G(y)$ increase with $y$. When $y$ is large, the conditional idiosyncratic variance rises fast relative to $G(y)$, generating a large idiosyncratic risk premium.

6 Idiosyncratic risk and investment

So far, we have focused on the effects of idiosyncratic risk on financing decisions. In this section, we explore how idiosyncratic risk influences an entrepreneurial firm’s investment decisions. We analyze two aspects of investment decisions. First, we examine the cutoff rule for taking on the investment at time $t = 0$, i.e., the breakeven investment cost $I$ which makes the entrepreneur indifferent between undertaking the project or not. The standard NPV analysis no longer applies due to non-diversifiable risk and incomplete markets. Second, we study the entrepreneur’s incentives for risk shifting when choosing among projects with different degrees of idiosyncratic risk (after debt is chosen).

6.1 Project choice: breakeven investment cost

As shown in Section 3, the entrepreneur will only invest in a project at $t = 0$ if the total value of the entrepreneurial firm $S(y_0)$ is greater than the one-time lump-sum cost $I$. In the full model where the entrepreneur has access to debt financing and cash-out option, the entrepreneur triggers capital gains taxes (with the tax base being the firm’s investment cost $I$) when he exercises his cash-out option. Therefore, private firm value $S(y_0)$ depends on the investment cost $I$ via the potential

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19 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting deepening our analysis on the impact of financing on investment decisions.
Table 4: Idiosyncratic Risk, Risk Aversion, and Investment Decisions

This table reports the breakeven investment cost $I$ for different levels of entrepreneurial risk aversion $\gamma$ and idiosyncratic volatility $\epsilon$ in the case with debt financing and cash-out option ($\tau_e = 0$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\epsilon$</th>
<th>$\gamma \rightarrow 0$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 1.0$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 2.0$</th>
<th>$\gamma \rightarrow 0$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 1.0$</th>
<th>$\gamma = 2.0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>optimal leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.15$</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.20$</td>
<td>25.64</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>20.88</td>
<td>25.13</td>
<td>22.19</td>
<td>19.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\epsilon = 0.25$</td>
<td>23.09</td>
<td>20.38</td>
<td>18.36</td>
<td>22.38</td>
<td>19.26</td>
<td>16.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

capital gains tax. Technically, this makes finding the breakeven investment cost $I^* = S(y_0|I^*)$ a fixed-point problem.

We compute the breakeven cost $I^*$ for the case of debt financing and cash-out option for various values of risk aversion $\gamma$ and idiosyncratic volatility $\epsilon$. Two sets of results are reported in Table 4, one with optimal debt financing, the other under the assumption of no risky debt. We focus on the case $\tau_e = 0$, which better highlights the diversification benefit of debt. With complete markets ($\gamma \rightarrow 0$), the entrepreneur will neither issue debt nor cash out. The breakeven investment cost is thus simply equal to the present value of the perpetual revenue flow $y_t$, and will be independent of idiosyncratic volatility.

When markets are incomplete, either under optimal leverage or no leverage, the breakeven investment cost falls as the entrepreneur becomes more risk averse and/or when the idiosyncratic volatility of the project becomes higher. For example, under optimal leverage with $\epsilon = 0.15$, those projects with investment costs between 25.64 and 33.33 will be rejected by an entrepreneur with risk aversion $\gamma = 1$, but accepted by an otherwise identical yet fully diversified manager. When $\epsilon = 0.25$, the difference in the breakeven costs between the entrepreneur and a diversified manager gets even bigger, leading to more projects being turned down by the entrepreneur. Intuitively, higher risk aversion and higher idiosyncratic volatility raise the idiosyncratic risk premium that the entrepreneur demands for holding the firm and hence lower the cutoff level for the investment cost $I$. Moreover, comparing the case under optimal leverage and under no leverage, we see that the
ability to issue risky debt raises the breakeven investment costs, hence making the entrepreneur more willing to invest. This effect is again stronger for higher risk aversion and higher idiosyncratic volatility.

To summarize, our results show that idiosyncratic risk and incomplete markets generate under-investment for risk-averse entrepreneurs (relative to public firms). The underinvestment problem is more severe for more risk averse entrepreneurs or projects with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Importantly, risky debt helps alleviate this underinvestment problem by improving diversification.

6.2 Project choice: asset substitution versus risk sharing

Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that there is an incentive problem associated with risky debt: After debt is in place, managers have incentives to take on riskier projects to take advantage of the option-type of payoff structure of equity. However, there is little empirical evidence in support of such risk shifting behaviors. One possible explanation is that managerial risk aversion can potentially dominate the risk shifting incentives. Our model provides a natural setting to investigate these two competing effects quantitatively.

We consider the following project choice problem. Suppose the risk-averse entrepreneur can choose among a continuum of mutually exclusive projects with different idiosyncratic volatilities ε in the interval \([ε_{\text{min}}, ε_{\text{max}}]\) after debt is in place. Let \(F_0\) be the market value of existing debt with the coupon payment \(b\). The entrepreneur then chooses idiosyncratic volatility \(ε^+ \in [ε_{\text{min}}, ε_{\text{max}}]\) to maximize his own utility. As shown in Section 3, the entrepreneur effectively chooses \(ε^+\) to maximize his private value of equity \(G(y_0)\), taking the debt contract \((b, F_0)\) as given. Let this maximized value be \(G^+(y_0)\).

In a rational expectations equilibrium, the lenders anticipate the entrepreneur’s \textit{ex post} incentive of choosing the level of idiosyncratic volatility \(ε^+\) to maximize \(G(y_0)\), and price the initial debt contract accordingly in competitive capital markets. Therefore, the entrepreneur \textit{ex ante} maximizes the private value of the firm, \(S(y_0) = G^+(y_0) + F_0\), taking the competitive market debt pricing into account. We solve this joint investment and financing (fixed-point) problem.

\(^{20}\text{See Andrade and Kaplan (1998), Graham and Harvey (2001), among others.}\)
Figure 5: **Private equity value as function of idiosyncratic volatility after optimal debt is in place.** This figure plots the private value of equity for different choices of idiosyncratic volatility $\epsilon$ after debt issuance. The coupon is fixed at the optimal value corresponding to given risk aversion. We assume $\epsilon_{\text{min}} = 0.05$, $\epsilon_{\text{max}} = 0.35$. The remaining parameters are the same as in Table 3.

Figure 5 illustrates the solution of this optimization problem. We set $\epsilon_{\text{min}} = 0.05$ and $\epsilon_{\text{max}} = 0.35$. When $\gamma \rightarrow 0$, the entrepreneur chooses the highest idiosyncratic volatility project with $\epsilon_{\text{max}} = 0.35$. The optimal coupon payment is 0.297. In this case, the entrepreneur effectively faces complete markets. The Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument applies because the market value of equity is convex and the *ex post risk shifting* problem arises. When the entrepreneur is risk averse, he demands a premium for bearing the non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk, which tends to lower his private value of equity $G(y_0)$. When this effect dominates, the entrepreneur prefers projects with lower idiosyncratic volatility. For example, for $\gamma = 1$, the entrepreneur chooses the project with $\epsilon_{\text{min}} = 0.05$, with the corresponding optimal coupon payment 0.491. Even when the degree of risk aversion is low (e.g. $\gamma = 0.1$, which implies an idiosyncratic risk premium of 2 basis points for $\epsilon = 0.05$, or 20 basis points for $\epsilon = 0.20$), we still find that the risk aversion effect dominates the risk shifting incentive.

From this numerical example, we find that in our model, even with low risk aversion, the precautionary saving incentive tends to dominate the asset substitution incentive in normal times.
Note that our argument applies to public firms as well, provided that: (i) managerial compensation is tied to firm performance; (ii) managers are not fully diversified, behave in their own interests, and are entrenched. Thus, the lack of empirical evidence supporting asset substitution may be simply due to the non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk faced by risk-averse decision makers.

7 External equity

While debt is the primary source of financing for most entrepreneurial (small-business) firms, high-tech startups are often financed by venture capital, which often use external equity in various forms as the primary source of financing. This financing choice particularly makes sense when the liquidation value of firm’s assets is low (e.g. computer software firms), and incentive alignments are more important. Hall and Woodward (2008) provide a quantitative analysis for the lack of diversification of venture-capital-backed entrepreneurial firms. In this section, we extend the baseline model of Section 2 by allowing the entrepreneur to issue external equity at $t = 0$, and study the effect of external equity on the diversification benefits of risky debt.

If it is costless to issue external equity, a risk-averse entrepreneur will want to sell the entire firm to the VC right away. We motivate the costs of external equity through the agency problems of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Intuitively, the more concentrated the entrepreneur’s ownership is, the better incentive alignment (Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Let $\psi$ denote the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur retains and hence $1 - \psi$ denote the fraction of external equity. Consider the expected growth rate of revenue $\mu$ in equation (1). We capture the incentive problem of ownership in reduced form by making $\mu$ an increasing and concave function of the entrepreneur’s ownership $\psi$ (i.e., $\mu'(\psi) > 0$ and $\mu''(\psi) < 0$). Intuitively, the concavity relation suggests that the incremental value from incentive alignment becomes lower as ownership concentration rises, ceteris paribus.

More specifically, we model the growth rate $\mu$ as a quadratic function of the entrepreneur’s ownership $\psi$, $\mu(\psi) = -0.02\psi^2 + 0.04\psi + 0.03$, with $\psi \in [0,1]$. This functional form implies that the maximum expected growth rate is 5%, when the entrepreneur owns the entire firm ($\psi = 1$),
while the lowest growth rate is 3%, when the entire firm is sold ($\psi = 0$). For simplicity, we rule out dynamic adjustments of $\psi$. Once $\psi$ is chosen, the expected growth rate $\mu$ will remain constant thereafter.

After external debt (with coupon $b$) and equity (with share $1 - \psi$ of the firm ownership) are issued at $t = 0$, the entrepreneur’s optimal policies, including consumption/portfolio rule and default/cash-out policies, are summarized in the following theorem.

**Theorem 2** The entrepreneur exits from his business when the revenue process $\{y_t : t \geq 0\}$ reaches either the default threshold $y_d$ or the cash-out threshold $y_u$, whichever occurs first. When the entrepreneur runs his firm, he chooses his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:

$$c(x,y) = r (x + \psi G(y) + \frac{\eta^2}{2\gamma r^2} + \frac{\delta - r}{\gamma r^2}),$$

$$\phi(x,y) = -\frac{\eta}{\gamma r \sigma_p} - \frac{\psi \omega}{\sigma_p} y G''(y),$$

where $(G(\cdot), y_d, y_u)$ solves the free boundary problem given by the differential equation:

$$r G(y) = (1 - \tau_e) (y - b - z) + \nu y G'(y) + \frac{\sigma^2 y^2}{2} G''(y) - \frac{\psi \gamma r e^2 y^2}{2} G'(y)^2,$$

subject to the following (free) boundary conditions:

$$G(y_d) = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (26a)

$$G'(y_d) = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (26b)

$$\psi G(y_u) = \psi V^*(y_u) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (\psi V^*(y_u) - K - (I - (1 - \psi) E_0)),$$  \hspace{1cm} (26c)

$$\psi G'(y_u) = (1 - \tau_g) \psi V^*(y_u),$$  \hspace{1cm} (26d)

where complete-markets firm value $V^*(y)$ is defined in (A.34), the value of external debt $F_0 = F(y_0)$ is given in (C.7), and the value of external equity $E_0 = E(y_0)$ is given by (C.10).

---

21 Initial equity issuance together with cashing out can be viewed as a two-step procedure to unload the entrepreneur’s private holdings. Gradual sales of ownership, e.g. as DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) consider for large shareholders, is less applicable for private business owners due to the lack of liquidity, which we capture with the fixed cost $K$.  

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33
Equation (25) shows how the partial ownership $\psi$ affects the entrepreneur’s private value of equity. A more concentrated inside equity position (higher $\psi$) raises the last nonlinear term, which raises the idiosyncratic risk premium that the entrepreneur demands. The ownership $\psi$ also affects the boundary conditions at cash-out. The value-matching condition (26c) at the cash-out boundary states that, upon cashing out, the entrepreneur’s ownership is worth a fraction $\psi$ of the after-tax value of the public firm value net of (1) the amount required to retire outstanding debt at par $F_0$, (2) fixed costs $K$, and (3) capital gains taxes. The smooth-pasting condition (26d) also reflects the effects of partial ownership.

Finally, at time $t = 0$, the entrepreneur chooses debt coupon $b$ and initial ownership $\psi$ to maximize the private value of the firm $S(y)$, which now has three parts: inside equity (entrepreneur’s ownership), diversified outside equity, and outside debt:

$$S(y) = \psi G(y) + (1 - \psi)E_0(y) + F(y).$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

The results are reported in Table 5. If the entrepreneur is risk-neutral, he will clearly prefer to keep 100% ownership. In this case, all the equity in the firm is privately held, the private leverage is 0 if there are no taxes, or 33.6% when $\tau_e = \tau_m$. When $\tau_e = 0$, an entrepreneur with $\gamma = 1$ lowers his ownership to 67%, which reduces the growth rate to 4.78% (about a 0.2% drop). However, the coupon rises from 0.55 to 0.43, and private leverage rises from 0 to 34.6%. The 10-year default and cash-out probabilities rise from 0 to 0.6% and 8.9% respectively. When $\gamma = 2$, the ownership drops further to 62%, while coupon rises to 0.52, and private leverage rises to 41.7%. The 10-year cash-out probability also rises to 12.0%. In other words, a more risk-averse entrepreneur actively uses all three channels (outside equity, outside debt, and cash-out option) to diversify her idiosyncratic risk exposure.

The results are similar when $\tau_e = \tau_m$. When $\gamma = 1$, the coupon rises from 0.55 to 0.66, and private leverage rises from 33.6% to 48.8%. Such an increase in demand for debt due to diversification is economically sizeable, especially considering that the increase is partially offset by the reduced tax benefit of debt due to lower expected growth rates. When $\gamma = 2$, the ownership
Table 5: Capital Structure of Entrepreneurial Firms: external debt/equity and cash-out option

This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to both public debt and equity financing, and cash-out option to exit from his project. We assume $\mu(\psi) = -0.02\psi^2 + 0.04\psi + 0.03$, while the rest of the parameters are reported in Table 3. All the results are for initial revenue $y_0 = 1$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Coupon</th>
<th>Public Debt</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Private Equity</th>
<th>Private Firm</th>
<th>Private Leverage (%)</th>
<th>Default Prob (%)</th>
<th>Cash-out Prob (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>$F_0$</td>
<td>$(1-\psi)E_0$</td>
<td>$\psi G_0$</td>
<td>$S_0$</td>
<td>$L_0$</td>
<td>$p_d(10)$</td>
<td>$p_u(10)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma \to 0$</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>33.22</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Coupon</th>
<th>Public Debt</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Private Equity</th>
<th>Private Firm</th>
<th>Private Leverage (%)</th>
<th>Default Prob (%)</th>
<th>Cash-out Prob (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_e = 0$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma \to 0$</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>30.07</td>
<td>45.30</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>32.76</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>15.93</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>31.10</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\tau_e = \tau_m$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Coupon</th>
<th>Public Debt</th>
<th>Public Equity</th>
<th>Private Equity</th>
<th>Private Firm</th>
<th>Private Leverage (%)</th>
<th>Default Prob (%)</th>
<th>Cash-out Prob (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma \to 0$</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>11.49</td>
<td>10.22</td>
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<td>34.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 2$</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>13.06</td>
<td>10.87</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The optimal ownership predicted by the model (between 60-70%) is low compared to the data (81% on average according to Heaton and Lucas (2004)). One possible explanation is that the agency costs of external equity we consider are small, and raising the agency costs will increase the degree of ownership concentration as well as the amount of debt the entrepreneur issues. The results in Table 5 thus confirm the robustness of our finding: entrepreneurial firms still have sizeable demand for risky debt and cash-out options for diversification purpose even when external equity is available.

Our model is also applicable to publicly traded firms where managers have significant wealth exposures due to their concentrated equity positions in firms. The capital structure studies for
public firms have exclusively used public leverage to measure the firm’s incentive to take on debt relative to equity. Our analysis implies that private leverage rather than public leverage is relevant for us to understand the determinants of capital structure for public firms where managers are under-diversified and have significant discretion. Using publicly available data to construct public leverage may potentially misrepresent the managerial tradeoff between equity and debt. As a result, credit rating agencies tend to underestimate leverage considerably and overestimate the value of default option \textit{ex post}, and hence may issue credit rating that are too high for such firms. Our model suggests that the interaction between ownership structure and capital structure is potentially quantitatively important.

8 Concluding remarks

Entrepreneurial investment opportunities are often illiquid and non-tradable. Entrepreneurs cannot completely diversify away project-specific risks for reasons such as incentives and informational asymmetry. Therefore, the standard law-of-one-price-based valuation/capital structure paradigm in corporate finance cannot be directly applied to entrepreneurial finance. An entrepreneur acts both as a producer making dynamic investment, financing, and exit decisions for his business project, and as a household making consumption/saving and portfolio decisions. The dual roles of the entrepreneur motivate us to develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial finance that centers around the non-diversification feature of the entrepreneurial business.

Besides studying the financing and investment decisions for entrepreneurs and under-diversified managers, our modelling framework can also be used to value the stock options of under-diversified executives or to analyze how these executives make capital structure and investment decisions. See Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2008) for a recent study on the optimal exercise policy for an executive stock option and implications for firm costs.

We have taken a standard optimization framework where the entrepreneur’s utility only depends on his consumption. While our model is also applicable to public firms where managers are not diversified and sufficiently entrenched, we ignore managerial incentives (e.g. being an empire builder),
which could be significant in determining capital structure decisions in public firms (Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004)). A significant fraction of entrepreneurs view the non-pecuniary benefits of being their own bosses as a large component of rewards. It has also been documented that less risk-averse (see Gentry and Hubbard (2004), De Nardi, Doctor, and Krane (2007)) and more confident/optimistic individuals are more likely to self-select into entrepreneurship.

Market incompleteness is taken exogenously in our model. Real-world capital structure decisions of entrepreneurial firms likely reflect agency frictions and informational asymmetries leading markets to be endogenously incomplete and ownership to be concentrated. For example, DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2009) derive optimal recursive contracts in settings where entrepreneurs face dynamic moral hazard issues. The optimal contracts derived in these papers can be implemented via concentrated insider ownership and credit lines. Our model also does not feature endogenous financial constraints. Moral-hazard based contracting models (such as those mentioned above) naturally generate endogenous financial constraints. We view endogenously incomplete markets as a complementary perspective and an important direction to extend our paper, which can have fundamental implications such as promotion of entrepreneurship and contract design.
Appendix

A Market valuation and capital structure of a public firm

Well-diversified owners of a public firm face complete markets. Given the Sharpe ratio $\eta$ of the market portfolio and the riskfree rate $r$, there exists a unique stochastic discount factor (SDF) $(\xi_t : t \geq 0)$ satisfying (see Duffie (2001)):

$$d\xi_t = -r\xi_t dt - \eta \xi_t dB_t, \quad \xi_0 = 1.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.1)

Using this SDF, we can derive the market value of the unlevered firm, $A(y)$, the market value of equity, $E(y)$, and the market value of debt $D(y)$. The market value of the firm is equal to the sum of equity value and debt value:

$$V(y) = E(y) + D(y).$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.2)

Under the risk-neutral probability measure $Q$, we can rewrite the dynamics of the revenue as follows:

$$dy_t = \nu y_t dt + \omega y_t dB_t^Q + \epsilon y_t dZ_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.3)

where $\nu$ is the risk-adjusted drift defined by $\nu \equiv \mu - \omega \eta$, and $B_t^Q$ is a standard Brownian motion under $Q$ satisfying $dB_t^Q = dB_t + \eta dt$.

A.1 Valuation of an unlevered public firm

Throughout the appendix, we derive our results assuming that there is a flow operating cost $z$ for running the project. The operating cost $z$ generates operating leverage and hence the option to abandon the firm has positive value. The results reported in this paper are for the case $z = 0$. Appendix D.2 provides results for the case $z > 0$.

We start with the after-tax unlevered firm value $A(y)$, which satisfies the following differential
equation:
\[ rA(y) = (1 - \tau_m)(y - z) + \nu y A'(y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 y^2 A''(y). \]  
(A.4)

This is a second-order ordinary differential equation (ODE). We need two boundary conditions to obtain a solution. One boundary condition describes the behavior of \( A(y) \) when \( y \to \infty \). This condition rules out speculative bubbles. To ensure that \( A(y) \) is finite, we assume \( r > \nu \) throughout the paper. The other boundary condition is related to abandonment. As in the standard option exercise models, the firm is abandoned whenever the cash flow process hits a threshold value \( y_a \) for the first time. At the threshold \( y_a \), the following value-matching condition is satisfied
\[ A(y_a) = 0, \]  
(A.5)

because we normalize the outside value to zero. For the abandonment threshold \( y_a \) to be optimal, the following smooth-pasting condition must also be satisfied:
\[ A'(y_a) = 0. \]  
(A.6)

Solving equation (A.4) and using the no-bubble condition and boundary conditions (A.5)-(A.6), we obtain
\[ A(y) = (1 - \tau_m) \left[ \left( \frac{y}{r - \nu} - \frac{z}{r} \right) - \left( \frac{y_a}{r - \nu} - \frac{z}{r} \right) \left( \frac{y}{y_a} \right)^{\theta_1} \right], \]  
(A.7)

where the abandonment threshold \( y_a \) is given in
\[ y_a = \frac{r - \nu}{r} \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_1 - 1} z, \]  
(A.8)

where
\[ \theta_1 = -\sigma^{-2} (\nu - \sigma^2/2) - \sqrt{\sigma^{-4} (\nu - \sigma^2/2)^2 + 2r \sigma^{-2}} < 0. \]  
(A.9)
A.2 Valuation of a levered public firm

First, consider the market value of equity. Let \( y_d \) be the corresponding default threshold. After default, equity is worthless, in that \( E(y) = 0 \) for \( y \leq y_d \). This gives us the value matching condition \( E(y_d) = 0 \). Before default, equity value \( E(y) \) satisfies the following differential equation:

\[
    rE(y) = (1 - \tau_m)(y - z - b) + \nu y E'(y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 y^2 E''(y), \quad y \geq y_d.
\]  

(A.10)

When \( y \to \infty \), \( E(y) \) also satisfies a no-bubble condition. Solving this ODE and using the boundary conditions, we obtain

\[
    E(y; y_d) = (1 - \tau_m) \left[ \left( \frac{y}{r - \nu} - \frac{z + b}{r} \right) - \left( \frac{y_d}{r - \nu} - \frac{z + b}{r} \right) \right]^{\theta_1}.
\]  

(A.11)

Equation (A.11) shows that equity value is equal to the after-tax present value of profit flows minus the present value of the perpetual coupon payments plus an option value to default. The term \( (y/y_d)^{\theta_1} \) may be interpreted as the price of an Arrow-Debreu security contingent on the event of default. The optimal default threshold satisfies the smooth-pasting condition,

\[
    \frac{\partial E(y)}{\partial y} \bigg|_{y=y_d} = 0,
\]  

(A.12)

which gives

\[
    y_d^* = \frac{r - \nu}{r} \frac{\theta_1}{\theta_1 - 1} (z + b).
\]  

(A.13)

After debt is in place, there is a conflict between equityholders and debtholders. Equityholders choose the default threshold \( y_d \) to maximize equity value \( E(y; y_d) \).

The market value of debt before default satisfies the following differential equation:

\[
    rD(y) = b + \nu y D'(y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 y^2 D''(y), \quad y \geq y_d.
\]  

(A.14)
The value-matching condition is given by:

$$D(y_d) = \alpha A(y_d).$$  \hfill (A.15)

We also impose a no bubble condition when $y \to \infty$. Solving the valuation equation, we have

$$D(y) = \frac{b}{r} - \left[ \frac{b}{r} - \alpha A(y_d) \right] \left( \frac{y}{y_d} \right)^{\theta_1},$$  \hfill (A.16)

For a given coupon rate $b$ and default threshold $y_d$, using equation (A.2), we may write the market value of the levered firm value $V(y; y_d)$ as follows:

$$V(y; y_d) = A(y) + \tau_m b \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{y}{y_d} \right)^{\theta_1} \right] - (1 - \alpha) A(y_d) \left( \frac{y}{y_d} \right)^{\theta_1},$$  \hfill (A.17)

Equation (A.17) shows that the levered market value of the firm is equal to the after-tax unlevered firm value plus the present value of tax shields minus bankruptcy costs.

While $y_d^*$ is chosen to maximize $E(y)$, coupon $b$ is chosen to maximize ex ante firm value $V(y)$. Substituting (A.13) into (A.17) and using the following first-order condition:

$$\frac{\partial V(y_0)}{\partial b} = 0,$$  \hfill (A.18)

we obtain the optimal coupon rate $b^*$ as a function of $y_0$. We also verify that the second order condition is satisfied.

Now consider the special case without operating cost ($z = 0$). First, from (A.7), the value of an unlevered public firm becomes

$$A(y) = (1 - \tau_m) \left[ \frac{y}{r - \nu} - \frac{y_a}{r - \nu} \left( \frac{y}{y_a} \right)^{\theta_1} \right],$$  \hfill (A.19)

For a levered public firm, we have an explicit expression for the optimal coupon:

$$b^* = y_0 \frac{r}{r - \nu} \frac{\theta_1 - 1}{\theta_1} \left( 1 - \theta_1 - \frac{1 - \alpha}{\tau_m} \frac{(1 - \tau_m) \theta_1}{\tau_m} \right)^{1/\theta_1}.$$  \hfill (A.20)
Substituting (A.13) and (A.20) into (A.17), we obtain the following expression for $V^*(y)$, the firm value when debt coupon is optimally chosen:

$$V^*(y) = \left[1 - \tau_m + \tau_m \left(1 - \theta_1 - \frac{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_m)\theta_1}{\tau_m}\right)^{1/\theta_1}\right] \frac{y}{r - \nu}. \quad (A.21)$$

Note that this firm value formula only applies at the moment of debt issuance and will equal to firm value when the entrepreneur cashes out.

### B Proof of Theorem 1 and 2

Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 2. Thus, we only prove the results in the general case where the entrepreneur has partial ownership $\psi$ of the firm.

After exit (via default or cashing out), the entrepreneur solves the standard complete-markets consumption/portfolio choice problem (Merton (1971)). The entrepreneur’s value function $J^e(x)$ is given by the following explicit form:

$$J^e(x) = -\frac{1}{\gamma r} \exp \left[-\gamma r \left(x + \frac{\eta^2}{2\gamma r^2} + \frac{\delta - r}{\gamma r^2}\right)\right]. \quad (B.1)$$

Before exit, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets. Using the principle of optimality, we claim that the entrepreneur’s value function $J^s(x, y)$ satisfies the following HJB equation in (10). The first-order conditions for consumption $c$ and portfolio allocation $\phi$ are given by (11-12).

We conjecture that $J^s(x, y)$ takes the following exponential form:

$$J^s(x, y) = -\frac{1}{\gamma r} \exp \left[-\gamma r \left(x + \psi G(y) + \frac{\eta^2}{2\gamma r^2} + \frac{\delta - r}{\gamma r^2}\right)\right]. \quad (B.2)$$

As shown in Miao and Wang (2007), $G(y)$ is the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent wealth per unit of the entrepreneur’s inside equity of the firm. Under this conjectured value function, it is easy to show that the optimal consumption rule and the portfolio rule are given by (23) and (24), respectively. Substituting these expressions back into the HJB equation (10) gives the differential
equation (25) for $G(y)$.

We now turn to the boundary conditions. First, consider the lower default boundary. Since equity is worthless at default, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth $x$ does not change immediately after default. In addition, the entrepreneur’s value function should remain unchanged at the moment of default. That is, the following value-matching condition holds at the default boundary $y_d(x)$:

$$J^s(x, y_d(x)) = J^e(x). \quad (B.3)$$

In general, the default boundary depends on the entrepreneur’s wealth level. Because the default boundary is optimally chosen, the following smooth-pasting conditions at $y = y_d(x)$ must be satisfied:\footnote{See Krylov (1980), Dumas (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for details on the smooth-pasting conditions.}

$$\frac{\partial J^s(x, y)}{\partial x} \bigg|_{y=y_d(x)} = \frac{\partial J^e(x)}{\partial x} \bigg|_{y=y_d(x)} \quad (B.4)$$
$$\frac{\partial J^s(x, y)}{\partial y} \bigg|_{y=y_d(x)} = \frac{\partial J^e(x)}{\partial y} \bigg|_{y=y_d(x)} \quad (B.5)$$

These two conditions equate the marginal value of wealth and the marginal value of revenue before and after default.

At the instant of cashing out, the entrepreneur retires debt at par, pays fixed cost $K$, and sells his firm for $V^*(y)$ given in (A.17). We assume that the shares owned by existing equity-holders are converted 1 : 1 into the shares of the new firm. Then the entrepreneur pays capital gains taxes on the sale. His wealth $x_{T_u}$ immediately after cashing out satisfies

$$x_{T_u} = x_{T_{u-}} + \psi V^*(y_{T_u}) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (\psi V^*(y_{T_u}) - K - (I - (1 - \psi) E_0)). \quad (B.6)$$

The entrepreneur’s value function at the payout boundary $y_u(x)$ satisfies the following value-matching condition:

$$J^s(x, y_u(x)) = J^e(x + \psi V^*(y_u(x)) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (\psi V^*(y_u(x)) - K - (I - (1 - \psi) E_0))). \quad (B.7)$$
The entrepreneur’s optimality implies the following smooth-pasting conditions at \( y = y_u(x) \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial J^*(x, y)}{\partial x} \bigg|_{y=y_u(x)} &= \frac{\partial J^c(x + \psi V^*(y) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (\psi V^*(y) - K - (I - (1 - \psi)E_0)))}{\partial x} \bigg|_{y=y_u(x)} \\
\frac{\partial J^*(x, y)}{\partial y} \bigg|_{y=y_u(x)} &= \frac{\partial J^c(x + \psi V^*(y) - F_0 - K - \tau_g (\psi V^*(y) - K - (I - (1 - \psi)E_0)))}{\partial y} \bigg|_{y=y_u(x)}
\end{align*}
\] (B.8) (B.9)

Using the conjectured value function (B.2), we show that the default and cash-out boundaries \( y_d(x) \) and \( y_u(x) \) are independent of wealth. We thus simply use \( y_d \) and \( y_u \) to denote the default and cash-out thresholds, respectively. Using the value matching and smooth-pasting conditions (B.3)-(B.5) at \( y_d \), we obtain (26a) and (26b). Similarly, using the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions (B.7)-(B.9) at \( y_u \), we have (26c) and (26d).

Finally, we characterize the entrepreneur’s investment and financing decision at \( t = 0 \). Let \( x \) denote the entrepreneur’s endowment of financial wealth. If the entrepreneur chooses to start his business, his time-0 financial wealth \( x_0 \) immediately after financing is

\[
x_0 = x - (I - F_0 - (1 - \psi)E_0).
\] (B.10)

At time zero, the entrepreneur chooses a coupon rate \( b \) and equity share \( \psi \) to solve the following problem:

\[
\max_{b, \psi} J^*(x + F_0 + (1 - \psi)E_0 - I, y_0),
\] (B.11)

subject to the requirement that outside debt and equity are competitively priced, i.e., \( F_0 = F(y_0) \), and \( E_0 = E_0(y_0) \). In Appendix C, we provide an explicit formulae for \( F(y) \) and \( E_0(y) \).

The entrepreneur will decide to launch the project if his value function from the project (under the optimal capital structure) is higher than the value function without the project,

\[
\max_b J^*(x + F_0 + (1 - \psi)E_0 - I, y_0) > J^c(x).
\] (B.12)
C Market values of the entrepreneurial firm’s outside debt and equity

When the entrepreneur neither defaults nor cashes out, the market value of his debt \( F(y) \) satisfies the following ODE:

\[
rf(y) = b + \nu y F'(y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 y^2 F''(y), \quad y_d \leq y \leq y_u.
\]  
(C.1)

At the default trigger \( y_d \), debt recovers the fraction \( \alpha \) of after-tax unlevered firm value, in that \( F(y_d) = \alpha A(y_d) \). At the cash-out trigger \( y_u \), debt is retired and recovers its face value, in that \( F(y_u) = F_0 \). Solving (C.1) subject to these boundary conditions gives

\[
F(y) = \frac{b}{r} + \left( F_0 - \frac{b}{r} \right) \bar{q}(y) + \left[ \alpha A(y_d) - \frac{b}{r} \right] q(y),
\]  
(C.2)

where

\[
\bar{q}(y) = \frac{y_1 y_2 - y_2 y_1}{y_u y_d - y_u y_d},
\]

(C.3)

\[
q(y) = \frac{y_2 y_1 y_4 - y_1 y_2 y_4}{y_u y_d y_u y_d - y_u y_d y_u y_d}.
\]

(C.4)

Here, \( \theta_1 \) is given by (A.9) and

\[
\theta_2 = -\sigma^{-2} (\nu - \sigma^2/2) + \sqrt{\sigma^{-4} (\nu - \sigma^2/2)^2 + 2r\sigma^{-2} > 1}. 
\]  
(C.5)

Equation (C.2) admits an intuitive interpretation. It states that debt value is equal to the present value of coupon payments plus the changes in value when default occurs and when cash-out occurs. Note that \( \bar{q}(y_0) \) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if cash-out occurs before default, and \( q(y_0) \) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if the entrepreneur goes bankrupt.
before cash-out. Using $F_0 = F(y_0)$, we have that the initial debt issuance is given by

$$F_0 = \frac{b}{r} - \left( \frac{b}{r} - \alpha A(y_d) \right) \frac{g(y_0)}{1 - q(y_0)}.$$  \hfill (C.6)

Similarly, for the outside equity claim, we have the following valuation equation:

$$rE_0(y) = (1 - \tau_e) (y - z - b) + \nu y F'(y) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 y^2 F''(y), \; y_d \leq y \leq y_u,$$  \hfill (C.7)

subject to the following boundary conditions:

$$E_0(y_u) = V^*(y_u), \quad (C.8)$$
$$E_0(y_d) = 0. \quad (C.9)$$

Solving the above valuation equation, we have that the value of outside equity $E_0(y)$ is given by

$$E_0(y) = (1 - \tau_e) \left( \frac{y}{r - \nu} - \frac{z + b}{r} \right) + \left[ V^*(y_u) - (1 - \tau_e) \left( \frac{y_u}{r - \nu} - \frac{z + b}{r} \right) \right] \frac{q(y)}{q(y_0)}$$
$$- (1 - \tau_e) \left( \frac{y_d}{r - \nu} - \frac{z + b}{r} \right) \frac{q(y)}{q(y_0)}.$$  \hfill (C.10)

The initial outside equity issuance $E_0$ is then given by $E_0 = E_0(y_0)$.

D Capital gain taxes and operating leverage

First, we analyze the case where the capital gains tax is zero. Then, we extend the baseline model of Section II to allow for operating leverage.

D.1 Effects of capital gain taxes

In the presence of capital gains taxes with $\tau_g = 0.10$, the benefit from cash-out falls. Table 6 shows that the 10-year cash-out probability decreases, and the entrepreneur takes on more debt in order to diversify idiosyncratic risk. However, the quantitative effects are small in our numerical...
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has both default and cash-out options to exit from his project. The parameters are: \( r = \delta = 0.03, \eta = 0.4, \mu = 0.04, \omega = 0.1, \varepsilon = 0.2, \alpha = 0.6, I = 10, \) and \( K = 27. \) The initial revenue is \( y_0 = 1. \) We report results for two business income tax rates (\( \tau_e = 0, \tau_m (11.29\%) \)), two capital gain tax rates (\( \tau_g = 0, 10\% \)), and two levels of risk aversion (\( \gamma = 1, 2 \)). The case “\( \gamma \to 0 \)” corresponds to the complete-market model, where the “cash-out” option effectively allows the firm to adjust leverage once.

| \( \gamma = 1 \) | \( \tau_e = 0, \tau_g = 0 \) |
| \( \gamma = 2 \) | \( \tau_e = \tau_m, \tau_g = 0 \) |

example. We may understand the intuition from the value-matching condition (16c). At the cash-out threshold \( y_u \), when \( \psi = 1 \), the entrepreneur obtains less value \((1 - \tau_g)V^*(y_u)\), but enjoys tax rebate \( \tau_g(K + I) \). Thus, these two effects partially offset each other, making the effect of capital gains taxes small. Clearly, if the cash-out value is sufficiently large relative to the cash-out and investment costs, then the effect of the capital gains tax should be large.

**D.2 Effects of operating leverage**

How does operating leverage affect an entrepreneurial firm’s financial leverage? Intuitively, operating leverage increases financial distress risk, and thus should limit debt financing. Panel 3 of Table 7 confirms this intuition for the complete-markets case (the limiting case with \( \gamma \to 0 \)). As the operating cost \( z \) increases from 0.2 to 0.4, the 10-year default probability rises from 2.2\% to 6.2\%, and the firm issues less debt. On the other hand, equity value also decreases because operating costs lower the operating profits. As a result, the effect on financial leverage ratio is ambiguous. In our numerical examples, this ratio increases with operating costs.
Table 7: The Effects of Operating Leverage: The case of debt financing and cash-out option

This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has both default and cash-out options to exit from his project. The parameters are: \( r = \delta = 0.03, \eta = 0.4, \mu = 0.04, \omega = 0.1, \varepsilon = 0.2, \alpha = 0.6, \tau_e = \tau_m, \tau_g = 10\%, I = 10, \) and \( K = 27. \) The initial revenue is \( y_0 = 1. \) We report results for two levels of risk aversion (\( \gamma = 1, 2 \)) alongside the complete-market solution (\( \gamma \to 0 \)).

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>( \gamma \to 0 )</th>
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<td>coupon</td>
<td>public debt</td>
<td>private equity</td>
<td>private firm</td>
<td>private leverage (%)</td>
<td>credit spread (bp)</td>
<td>10-yr default probability (%)</td>
<td>10-yr cash-out probability (%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>( z = 0.2 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( z = 0.2 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( z = 0.4 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( z = 0.2 )</td>
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<td>3.57</td>
<td>15.53</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12.05</td>
<td>86.9</td>
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<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our analysis above shows that risky debt has important diversification benefits for entrepreneurial firms. This effect may dominate the preceding “crowding-out” effect of operating leverage. Table 7 confirms this intuition. As \( z \) increases from 0.2 to 0.4, an entrepreneur with \( \gamma = 1 \) raises debt with increased coupon payments from 0.59 to 0.62. However, the market value of debt decreases because both the 10-year default probability and the cash-out probability increase with \( z \). The private equity value also decreases with \( z \) and this effect dominates the decrease in debt. Thus, the private leverage ratio rises with operating costs. This result also holds true for a more risk-averse entrepreneur with \( \gamma = 2 \). Note that the more risk-averse entrepreneur relies more on risky debt to diversify risk. As a result, the 10-year default probability increases substantially from 26.9% to 50.6% for \( \gamma = 2 \). But the 10-year cash-out probability decreases from 23.7% to 22.3%.
References


