Design principles for efficient and resilient CPS: The role of control theory, game theory, and the theory of incentives

Saurabh Amin, MIT and Demos Teneketzis, University of Michigan

Abstract: We discuss how ideas from control theory, game theory, and the theory of incentives can provide new design guidelines for engineering cyber-physical systems (CPS). We illustrate using problem instances in three application areas: i) vulnerability assessment and secure control for smart networks, ii) pricing of charging services for electric vehicles, and iii) electricity pooling markets with strategic producers. These problems present new opportunities to apply the above theories to improve CPS efficiency and resilience.

Saurabh Amin is an Assistant Professor of CEE at MIT. He received his Ph.D. from UC Berkeley. He works on robust diagnostics and control problems that involve using networked systems to manage critical infrastructures. He also studies the effect of security attacks and random faults on the survivability of networked systems, and designs incentive schemes to reduce network risks.

Demos Teneketzis is Professor of EECS at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He received his Ph.D. from MIT. His research interests are in stochastic control, informationally decentralized systems, communication networks, energy markets, stochastic scheduling and resource allocation, mathematical economics, and discrete event systems.