Papers

The Epistemic Upshot of Adaptationist Explanation

I argue, contrary to what is commonly supposed, that knowledge of the adaptationist explanation of human cognition might either defeat, bolster, or preclude the epistemic justification of our current beliefs.

The Evolutionary Challenge and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality

I argue that we do not know whether there is moral knowledge because we lack the evidence to know whether there indeed was an evolutionary advance in which our ancestors acquired the capacity to learn moral facts.

Morality as Bullshit: An Evolutionary Perspective

Drawing from the human evolution literature and using ideas from cognitive science, I argue that, contrary to the popular conception of their descent, human moral belief systems may ultimately be the result of ancient parental deception.

Does Truth Ground Knowledge? Three Counterexamples to Transitivity

I show that the transitive closure of metaphysical grounding is in tension with the principle that the knowledge that p obtains partly in virtue of the truth that p and argue that we should abandon the principle.