May 30 — On the eve of the Iraq war, Robin Cook shook British
politics by quitting the government in protest of the planned invasion.
In his powerful resignation speech, the foreign secretary urged respect
for multilateral agreements and insisted that the dangers posed by the regime
of Saddam Hussein had been overstated. Cook, who served in Tony Blair’s
cabinet as leader of Parliament’s House of Commons, claimed in particular
that Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction “in the commonly
understood sense.” His supporters now say that the Coalition’s
failure to find such weapons has vindicated his stand. Cook, who is still
has his seat in Parliament, spoke this week to NEWSWEEK’s William
Underhill in London.
NEWSWEEK: COALITION FORCES only overthrew
Saddam Hussein a few weeks ago. There must be a chance that weapons of
mass destruction will still be uncovered?
Robin Cook: These are things that are not easy
to conceal. For a nuclear bomb you need a nuclear reactor. For a missile
you need a large factory. You won’t find them round in someone’s
back garden. And all these synthetic claims about Iraq being a big country
are irrelevant. If Saddam had the capacity to hit us with weapons of mass
destruction, we would have found it. I did say it was quite probable that
he had laboratory stocks of biological toxins and chemical shells that
might be used on the battlefield, but it’s an awful long time after
the end of the war [and] we haven’t found any of them, either. One
other point is frequently overlooked. Chemical and biological weapons
have a limited shelf life. All the materials that Saddam had in 1991 (at
the end of the gulf war) would have degraded to the point of being useless
long before 2003, whether or not he had destroyed them.
Isn’t it
possible that Saddam Hussein ordered their destruction, as U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested?
No. I don’t think it’s even remotely
possible. I just cannot follow the Rumsfeld logic; that watching CNN and
seeing the American build-up Saddam said to his generals, “It’s
obvious that the U.S. is going to invade; we had better destroy our biggest
weapons, so that when I am toppled there might be some very difficult
questions for Donald Rumsfeld to answer.”
So was the public deliberately misled over
the weapons’ existence?
These are charged terms. I think it’s
much wiser to keep the spotlight on the issues, and leave questions for
the government to answer rather than end up [with] personalized headlines
that I would then have to defend. The focus should be on how the government
can square what it said at the time of the build-up to [war with] Iraq
with what they have discovered—or failed to discover—in the
aftermath. It is a real issue, which they are not entitled to brush under
the carpet. We were sold the menace of the weapons of mass destruction
as the reason for the war. And the [British] attorney general based his
legal justification for war on the necessity to disarm Saddam Hussein.
If those weapons didn’t exist then the justification falls away.
Are you saying that the Blair government itself
never believed in the existence of these weapons of mass destruction?
I never saw any [cabinet] briefing or other
evidence that suggested that there was an urgent or compelling threat
from Saddam Hussein. I am not going to comment on the motivation or sincerity
of others, but I am rather puzzled that people who went to the same briefings
as me and saw the same material could come to such radically different
conclusions. To be fair to the United States administration, it never
made any bones about the reasons why it went to war. It wanted to carry
out a change of regime in Iraq. And many of the proponents of were lobbying
for it long before September 11.
And that’s also why the British government
went to war?
No, but they were madly keen to prove that
they were reliable allies of President Bush—and there were those
around President Bush who were determined to have a war.
There are those in Washington who now appear
to see the weapons issue as irrelevant.
It was their decision to put this at the heart
of their case. It cannot be a side issue after the war when they made
it a central issue before the war.
Recent weeks have produced still more evidence
to demonstrate the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s rule. Has that
altered your position in any way?
I was never in any doubt about the brutality
of the Saddam Hussein’s regime, but neither government [the United
States or Britain] ever based its case for invasion on brutality—because
that’s simply no basis in international law for going to war just
to change a regime. If we do decide that we are going to go to war to
remove brutal regimes then we have a very busy time in front of us. We
are not proposing to intervene to relieve the people of Zimbabwe of the
repressive rule of President [Robert] Mugabe. We are not proposing to
intervene in Burma where the military junta has run the country for longer
than Saddam Hussein. We have allowed more people to be killed in the Congo
civil war than were ever killed inside Iraq. If you are going to decide
that brutality is a reason for military intervention, it must be a decision
that is [made] multilaterally by an international forum. You cannot have
individual nations such as the U.K. or the U.S. deciding for themselves
which ones they are going to pick on next. One important reason is that
if you accept that principle that countries can invade countries where
you disapprove of the regime, the next time it may not be the U.S. or
the U.K. that acts on that principle.
How much damage has this affair done to Prime
Minister Tony Blair?
There is an issue of credibility not just for
the prime minister, but for the government more generally. It is going
to have to bite the bullet and admit there are no weapons of mass destruction
that could have posed a credible threat to Britain and probably were none
at the time. The longer they continue to pretend that one day they are
going to turn the corner and find a nuclear reactor the more improbable
it becomes. |