Enacted by lawmakers after extensive debate, Massachusetts' definitions of rape and sexual assault safeguard the right to be free from sexual violence, while protecting sexual freedom and privacy rights. Dear Faculty Council member: The rape definition most suitable for student life at Harvard is found in Massachusetts law. Enacted by lawmakers after extensive debate, Massachusetts' definitions of rape and sexual assault safeguard the right to be free from sexual violence, while protecting sexual freedom and privacy rights from the infringement that would result from applying the Date Rape Task Force's vastly over-inclusive and sexually-discriminatory rape definition. Massachusetts law defines rape in relevant part as "Sexual intercourse...by a person with another person who is compelled to submit by force and against his will or by threat of bodily injury." Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, chapter 277, section 39. "Indecent assault and battery," banned in chapter 265, section 13H, is defined by Massachusetts courts to include any sexual contact the perpetrator knows is unwanted. See Commonwealth v. Mosby (1991). Massachusetts law on rape and sexual assault proscribes roughly the same conduct as the rape definitions proposed by the Civil Liberties Union at Harvard and the Undergraduate Council, although Massachusetts classifies as indecent assault and battery some conduct which is defined as rape by the UC and the CLUH. Unlike the definition of the Date Rape Task Force, Massachusetts law does not restrict partners' right to engage in consensual sex. The Date Rape Task Force Report classifies most consensual sex between a couple as rape by the male, since most sex acts between willing partners do not meet the Task Force's requirements of "expressed consent" and "reasoned consent." If adopted, the Task Force's date rape definition will be the most far-reaching restriction of consensual sex imposed by any secular university in America. The Task Force deems any sexual act engaged in by a couple as rape unless it occurs after an explicit "yes" on the part of the woman, even though most happily-married couples have often made love together without explicitly discussing beforehand whether to have sex. Rape, according to the Task Force report, includes "any act of sexual intercourse which occurs without the expressed consent" of the complainant. "Expressed consent" has been defined narrowly by Task Force members like co-chair Janet Viggiani to mean a "yes" following a verbal request. The definition also classifies as rape any lovemaking that occurs without "reasoned consent," a requirement Viggiani says may be violated if the complainant is under any influence of alcohol, even if she is not legally intoxicated. Thus, if a couple shares a glass of wine and then has sex, the male can be defined by the Task Force as a rapist. The proposed rape definition applies not only to vaginal intercourse but also to oral sex and any other act involving penetration, no matter how slight. Adopting the Task Force definition would likely violate students' rights under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, both because it enforces sex discrimination by punishing males for consensual sex engaged in jointly by the couple and because it may violate privacy rights by restricting the ways in which students may make love. Since the definition classifies as rapists men who are legally innocent of rape, its application in disciplinary proceedings may also be defamatory, in placing a rape conviction on the records of a student whose only offense was to engage in consensual sex not preceded by an explicit "yes." An explicit "yes" is unnecessary to demonstrate consent. Sex is often the climax of a long progression of steadily escalating intimacy in which each partner plays an active role, not a sudden act that calls for prior discussion. Moreover, men and women in sexual relationships learn their partners' preferences, enabling them to tell from context what their partners want. An explicit "yes" requirement threatens people in sexual relationships with disciplinary action should they experience an acrimonious break-up, permitting distraught ex-lovers to accuse their partners of "date rape" for consensual sex that occurred in the heat of passion without the formality of an explicit "yes." A Crimson editorial in May justified the explicit "yes" requirement by making the rather sexist claim that "women are psychologically incapable of saying no" to sex. But women and men say no to sex everyday, and few people are more articulate about expressing their feelings than Harvard students. An explicit "yes" is not the ideal in sex. The most mutually-desired sex happens when both partners are so obviously eager for sexual relations that each would find it redundant and absurd to ask the other for explicit permission. Instead of one party propositioning the other, both partners demonstrate their enthusiastic consent more powerfully through active participation in lovemaking. By contrast, grudgingly consensual sex acts, like those between a prostitute and her clients, are preceded by explicit discussion and agreement, because one party wants sex, while the other consents only to obtain money or other benefits. A verbal request followed by a "yes" may reflect an imbalance in sexual desire between the partners rather than deep mutual desire. The proposed definition probably violates the privacy rights guaranteed students by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. The MCRA is an unusually broad civil rights law which applies civil liberties guarantees like freedom of speech and privacy not only to the government but also to private institutions. In Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 12, sections 11H and 11I, the MCRA says that an institution such as a university may not interfere, or attempt to interfere, with the exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights through "threats, intimidation, or coercion." Among these secured rights are freedom of speech and the right to privacy. Under the MCRA, a court in 1986 ordered Boston University administrators to stop removing divestment banners hung by BU students, saying that BU could not restrict the free speech rights of its students. Abramowitz v. Trustees of Boston University. Privacy rights are similarly applicable against universities. See Bally v. Northeastern University (1989). Privacy rights have protected private, consensual sexual relationships against any restrictions in Massachusetts since 1974, when the sodomy laws were invalidated on the basis of privacy rights found in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Prior to 1974, vindictive ex-lovers and police had periodically prosecuted partners for engaging in oral or anal sex. Massachusetts courts recognize as consensual many sexual unions which occur without any explicit "yes." Nowhere in the U.S. does consent require an explicit "yes"; most states recognize all sex that occurs without violence or expressions of unwillingness as presumptively consensual. Consent has traditionally included not only verbal and non-verbal expressions of willingness but also passive assent. Therefore, the Task Force definition infringes on students' freedom to engage in sexual acts which are understood as consensual by Massachusetts law. The definition may also be illegal because of its sex discrimination. Task Force member Naomi Hamburg told me that if a man and woman make love together silently, the man is guilty of "rape" under the Task Force definition, because he is the one whose body achieves the physical "penetration" referred to later in the rape definition. Presumably, the man would be deemed guilty of "rape" even if the act resulting in penetration were initiated by his partner, for example, if she performed oral sex on him. In defining the male, rather than the initiator of the act, as the offender, and in punishing the male for perfectly legal acts to which there was mutual consent, the Task Force definition may violate Massachusetts laws banning sex discrimination in the programs and procedures of colleges and universities. In recent years, Massachusetts courts have overturned laws which place different responsibilities on the sexes. If the Administrative Board applies it to men who engage in consensual sex, the proposed rape definition will prompt lawsuits against Harvard for defamation. Harvard may not have the right to define violators of its policies as committers of "rape" if they engage in behavior which does not constitute rape either in law or in common usage. Statements on an innocent student's scholastic records that he is guilty of "rape" could constitute libel. To promote sexual equality and preserve privacy rights, I urge the Faculty Council to adopt definitions modelled on Massachusetts law and to reject the definition proposed by the Date Rape Task Force. Hans Bader, 2L