24.221: Metaphysics
Prof. Sally Haslanger
April 14, 2003
Freewill II

"No Coercion" + "No-Duress" Compatibilism (Ayer)
Ayer  provides examples to suggest that my action is free only if it is under the control of how I choose, and I am being compelled by anyone (by external force or threat) to act as I do. However, external duress is not the only issue, for internal duress is a threat to freedom as well. Consider an addict: when offered the drug, their desire is so strong they are unable to choose anything but the drug. So Stace's idea that the cause must be "internal" is not enough. However, perhaps it is enough to require that the cause be a certain sort of internal event.
Basic idea: My free action is voluntary, i.e., it is caused by my own desire or choice, and the choice in turn has the rights sorts of causes (no threats, phobias, addictions, etc.).
I act freely iff
(i) the way I act is the result of my choice,
(ii) the immediate causes of my choice are "internal" to me,
(iii) my choice is not the result of coercion or duress, and
(iv) I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to.
Compatibility: my acts and choices are caused, but the causal sequence might have been different, and the actual causes are "of the right sort". So they are free even if caused.
Problems: The whole point of our attempt at analyzing freedom is to determine more clearly whether freedom is compatible with determinism. Simply saying that I am free if I am not coerced or under duress is unhelpful because we have no clear way to distinguish coercion and duress from more ordinary cases of being caused to choose and act as one does. What makes addiction a threat to freedom, whereas a passion for learning is not? What makes kleptomania a threat to freedom whereas a deep commitment to be honest in one's dealings with others is not?

Hypothetical Choice  Compatibilism
Basic idea:  It seems plausible that freedom is a matter of having been able to act differently than one in fact acts. (This is the core idea of premise (2).) But what does it mean to say that one was "able to act otherwise"? Last time we considered the "choice analysis of ability": I could have acted otherwise iff had I chosen to act otherwise, I would have. If we pursue this notion of "acting otherwise" can we avoid the conflict with Determinism?
I act freely iff
I am able to act otherwise iff
I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to.
Compatibility: my acts and my choices are caused, and yet a different causal sequence might have caused different choices and acts. So I'm free even if caused to act as I act.
However, note that the definition implies:
IF [had I chosen to act otherwise, I would have acted otherwise], THEN [I act freely].
or
IF had I chosen to perform action A* instead of A, I would have performed A*, THEN I performed A freely.
Are there counter-examples to this conditional?
Problem cases: coercion, kleptomania, i.e., cases in which my choices were in fact constrained to a degree sufficient to undermine my freedom, but in which the counterfactual is true that if I had chosen otherwise, I would have acted otherwise.
Ayer suggests we suppose that:
...another person has obtained an habitual ascendancy over me...I have acquired so strong a habit of obedience that I no longer go through any process of deciding whether or not do what the other person wants...my own deliberations have ceased to be a causal factor in my behavior (20).
This is the picture of a puppet, not a free agent. But notice that it may still be true that if the puppet had chosen to behave differently, he would have; it's just that he's not going to choose differently (or really himself choose at all) because he is being controlled.
•     Sometimes my actions are not the result of my choice at all, so aren't free; but it is still true that if I had made a genuine choice, I would have acted otherwise.
•     Sometimes my actions are the result of my choice, but my choice was compelled or made under duress, so the action wasn't free; but it is still possible that if I had chosen to act differently, I would have acted differently.

The compatibilist's goal is to find an account of freedom that is compatible with determinism, and a determinist will claim, surely, that prior circumstances do compel me to act as I do. In short, a compatibilist position cannot place the condition on freedom that our choices must be completely unconstrained. So we need a new strategy.

II.  Libertarianism
A.  Chisholm and Agent Causation
Of our readings, Chisholm is the representative libertarian.  Libertarians buy the basic incompatibilist argument:
i)    If x acts freely in performing action A, then x could have done otherwise.
ii)    If x's performing A is determined, then x could not have done otherwise.
iii)    So, if all acts are determined, then x never acts freely in performing action A.
We’ve seen that both (i) and (ii) are controversial.  So rather than focusing on the determinism side of the freewill dilemma, let's consider how denying determinism might open the possibility of freewill.

Recall that the problem with the idea that indeterminism solves the problem is that if my action is uncaused or random, then it seems no more free than if it is determined by prior events.  Random events are as much out of my control as those that are caused by prior conditions.  So denying determinism offers little help.
However, consider determinism again:
DET)    Whatever happens is determined by prior events.
Chisholm points out that we may deny determinism, i.e. maintain that:
IND)    Some things that happen are not determined by prior events,
without maintaining that the exceptions are uncaused or random.  We need only claim that some events are not caused by other events.  He suggests
[In defending freewill] we must not say that every event involved in the act is caused by some other event; and we must not say that the act is something that is not caused at all.  The possibility that remains, therefore, is this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by something else instead.  And this something else can only be the agent—the man. (28)
How is this supposed to work?  Consider Aristotle's example: "...a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a person." (Physics VII: 256a6-8).  According to Chisholm, the moving of the staff and the hand are both events, and the hand-moving event causes the staff-moving event in the ordinary way (Chisholm refers to the causation between events as transeunt causation).  Moreover, there is plausibly a brain event that causes the hand-moving event; again this is ordinary event causation.  But, Chisholm maintains, if the action of moving the hand is free, then the brain event that causes the hand-moving event is not caused by another event, but is caused by the person or agent.  (Chisholm calls such agent causation immanent causation.)  I cause the neurons in my brain to fire in the way necessary to cause my hand to move, and there is no event which determines the firing of those neurons.    So consider Chisholm’s Libertarianism:
I act freely in performing an action A iff
(i)  I, rather than some prior event, am the cause of A (or of some event that directly causes A), and
(ii)  I could have performed an action other than A.
Incompatibility: If determinism is true I couldn't have performed an action other than A, so I wouldn't satisfy (ii).
Freedom: I am the source of my actions; they are not determined by prior events.
Problems:  Many have rejected the idea of agent causation because it appears mysterious and not fully compatible with our conception of the physical universe.  For example, as Chisholm himself points out, if the firing of the hand-moving neurons is not caused by a prior event, the agent must bring it about that the firing occurs without there being anything happening in the agent.  As Chisholm explains, "...the agent himself cannot be said to have undergone any change or produced any other event (such as "an act of will" or the like) which brought [the action] about." (30).  This seems to leave agent causation somewhat mysterious, e.g., what  distinguishes a case in which there is an agent and the occurrence of a random neural firing, and an agent causing a neural firing?  Chisholm answers this question by simply pointing out that there is something mysterious even about event causation: what distinguishes an event A followed by an event B, and an event A causing event B?    [Can you find any differences between the two sorts of cases?  Are they equally mysterious?]  But others find this response unconvincing.  How, for example, does pointing to the agent as cause explain the event if there is nothing that the agent does to bring it about?