24.221: Metaphysics

Prof. Sally Haslanger

March 3, 2003

First Paper Topics

Write a 5-7 page paper (assuming roughly 300 words per page) on one of the following topics. Be sure that your paper has a clear and comprehensible thesis; that it contains arguments for that thesis; and that it anticipates and responds to likely criticisms.

Papers are due on Friday, March 21 by 3:00pm.

Deliver them to E39-245 or email them to shaslang@mit.edu.

1. Explain the "Problem of Non-Being". What is the best solution to it? (Be sure to explain some of the solutions we've discussed!)

2. According to Quine in "On What There Is," what does it take to be committed to a kind of entity? How should we decide what sorts of entities to commit ourselves to? Do you agree?

3. What is an "abstract object"? Do any abstract objects exist? If so, give examples? If not, why not? (Note you should also make clear what might be meant by 'abstract' and 'object'.)

4. According to Armstrong, the problem that best motivates universals is the problem of natural classes. But some philosophers think the problem can be solved without appeal to universals. Explain and evaluate the "primitive natural class" solution, as developed by Lewis in "New Work...".

5. What is "ostrich nominalism"? Is ostrich nominalism a tenable position? Why or why not?

6. What is the strongest form of resemblance nominalism? (Please articulate clearly what version you want to consider by stating how the account captures the phenomenon of "objective types" using resemblance and does so without violating the demands of nominalism). What are the main advantages and disadvantages of this account? Does the account avoid the need for a universal of resemblance? If so, how?

7. Consider the following from Armstrong:

The general form of the argument is this. You take the "fundamental relation" used by a particular solution to the Problem of Universals. For Predicate Nominalism this will be applying to (as general words apply to objects); for Class Nominalism it will be class membership; for Resemblance Nominalism resemblance; for Realism about universals, instantiation (a thing's being an instance of a universal). You ask then how the theory is going to deal with its own fundamental relation. As Russell argued in the particular case of resemblance, the procedure leads to a regress because the fundamental relation has to be used again: applied to tokens of itself. But having been used again, it has to be analyzed again, and so ad infinitum. (p. 54)

What is the "relation regress" or "fundamental relation regress" that Armstrong is describing here? Is there more than one kind of infinite regress threatening? Is there any way out of this regress? Please explain. (On the threat of regress, you may also want to consider: Lewis, "New Work," pp. 171-2.)

8. What is the best account of particulars? Are they "bundles of properties"? Are there "bare" particulars in which properties inhere? Is there a better account than either of these? On what basis should we decide?

Students may write on a topic of their own construction, if it is approved in advance. Submit your proposed topic to the instructor (preferably by email) by 3/17/03.